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Abstract 
 
 
This study explores the issue area of globalization of law enforcement at the example 
of transnational public-private partnerships (PPPs) against intellectual property (IP) 
crimes. It provides a comprehensive survey of all such PPPs that involve a global 
public international organization (IOs). The study covers the PPP activities of 
Interpol, of the World Customs Organization (WCO), of the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO), of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and of the 
World Health Organization (WHO). As the term PPP is used in very different ways in 
the literature and as no existing definition appeared suitable to define all PPPs in this 
comprehensive survey, a new definition and typology of PPPs is developed and 
applied in this study. 
 
Based on the analysis of each case and their comparison, this study inductively 
develops theory that explains the studied PPP activities. This theory consists of three 
hypotheses, which concern (A) the formation, (B) the type, and (C) the continuation 
or change of transnational PPPs against IP crimes. These three hypotheses are 
based on different configurations of five influencing factors. Those are (1) 
cooperation in the pursuit of resource gains, (2) common ground, (3) the PPP 
management, (4) the representation of stakeholders, and (5) the PPP policy. 
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1. Introduction: Law Enforcement Goes Transnational 
“The sharing of information from the private sector will help law enforcement agencies in 
our 186 member countries to focus their resources more effectively in investigating 
individuals and groups linked to transnational counterfeiting and piracy. As a result of this 
cooperation, Interpol is making organized criminals aware that international borders no 
longer protect them from the long arm of the law.” 
Ronald K. Noble, Secretary General of Interpol (2008c) 
 
“Within Interpol 90% of our funding comes from the public sector and a maximum of 10% 
comes from the private sector. But within the IPR program - it varies from year to year - 
the direct or indirect benefit we get is roughly about 50/50 between the public and the 
private sector, which, I think, gives you an indication of how we work.” 
John Newton (2011), Interpol Intellectual Property Crime Program Manager 
 
A public-private partnership (PPP) is often seen as an excellent way of increasing 
public policy options by tapping into private sector resources. The two quotes above 
mention two kinds of resources that are often transferred in PPPs: information and 
money. But not every public-private partnership is a success story. In the first quote 
above, Interpol Secretary General Ronald K. Noble spoke about the launch of the 
Interpol Database on International Intellectual Property (DIIP), which is an example of 
a transnational PPP against intellectual property crime that was only partially 
successful. Based on the DIIP partnership agreement, the International Criminal 
Police Organization (ICPO Interpol) received 750,000 USD funding from the private 
sector US Chamber of Commerce and additional 250,000 USD funding from the 
public sector US Patent and Trademark Office (Huther 2010). This allowed Interpol to 
hire additional staff for its Intellectual Property Crime Program (Newton 2009a), but, 
once the database was set up, little data was provided by the private sector. 
Although many private companies run investigations into the counterfeiting and 
piracy of their products and brands, they are often reluctant to share the information 
acquired in those investigations. This is because they are afraid that their 
investigations could be jeopardized and that their reputation could be harmed if the 
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information gets into the wrong hands. Such a lack of trust is often a problem for 
cooperation. 
 Some private actors may lack trust in public actors, but there are also cases 
where public actors lack trust in private actors. Private sector support often enables 
public institutions to engage in activities they could not or would not engage in 
without private sector support. This often leads to concerns that the private actors 
have an undue influence on the public institutions. The SECURE partnership of the 
World Customs Organization (WCO) and the IMPACT partnership of the World 
Health Organization (WHO) are two examples of PPPs that were accused of undue 
private sector influence (see chapters 5 & 9). In both cases the criticism led to a halt 
of the respective PPP, but some of the criticised activities were continued in another 
organization. The WCO SECURE partnership was unsuccessful in developing an 
international intellectual property enforcement convention administered by the WCO. 
However, the controversial Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) was 
eventually negotiated outside of the WCO, was opened for signature in October 
2011, but then was rejected by the European Parliament in July 2012. 
 The WHO IMPACT partnership pursued a variety of activities against 
counterfeit medicines. It came to a halt after it was accused by the Brazilian 
ambassador at the World Health Assembly of “waging a war against generic 
medicines” (WHO 2010c: 9). However, the enforcement working group of this PPP 
continued its work under the management of Interpol. In 2011, its activities involved 
the participation of 81 countries and led to the seizure of at least 2.4 million pills, the 
shutting down of at least 13,500 illegal online pharmacy websites, and to 
investigations against at least 55 individuals (Interpol 2011c). 
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International law enforcement cooperation against transnational organized 
crime is often presented in media reports as a story of savvy criminals who exploit 
globalization and law enforcement officers who are limited by national borders, 
jurisdiction, and bureaucratic hurdles (e.g. Naím 2003). However, globalization not 
only affects the legal and illegal economy. Nation states and national law 
enforcement agencies have also adapted to it, as shown by research about 
international crime policies and international law enforcement cooperation 
(e.g. Andreas & Nadelmann 2006). This study contributes to this research area by 
showing that law enforcement agencies not only collaborate internationally, resulting 
in transgovernmental networks (Slaughter 2004: 56), but that their simultaneous 
collaboration with the private sector results in transnational1 law enforcement.   
Public international organizations2 (IOs), such as Interpol, the World Customs 
Organization, the World Intellectual Property Organization, and the World Health 
Organization, act as facilitators of transnational public-private cooperation. These IOs 
are only composed of public sector members, but for the purpose of cooperation with 
the private sector they have established special transnational PPPs, where actors 
from both the public and the private sector are members. 
 Transnational PPPs are increasingly being observed in many policy areas 
(Schäferhoff et al. 2009, Andonova 2006, Börzel & Risse 2005). However, law 
enforcement PPPs are surprising, because states are usually very reluctant to loosen 
their grip on the monopoly of the legitimate use of force (Jachtenfuchs 2005: 50). As 
this monopoly is considered to be the constituting characteristic of the modern nation 
                                            
1
 The term “transnational relations” denotes interactions across national borders that involve at least 
one non-state actor (Risse 2002: 255). 
2
 The term "public IO" denotes international organizations with public sector members only (as used by 
Amerasinghe 2005, Slaughter 2004, or Reinicke 1998). It is meant to include intergovernmental 
organizations and transgovernmental organizations (as used by Archer 2001 and Keohane & Nye 
1974). 
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state (Weber 1972: 29), transnational law enforcement PPPs can be considered a 
least-likely case for the creation and functioning of transnational PPPs in general. In 
the case of these law enforcement PPPs, the actual application of force is still done 
by national law enforcement agencies, but the entire decision making process about 
when, where, why, and how to apply force is heavily influenced by partners from 
international organizations, from other countries, and from the private sector. 
So why is this new institutional format of public-private partnership applied to 
law enforcement, a policy area where one would least expect it? This is the question 
that inspired this study. In particular, this study develops a theory that explains why 
global PPPs against IP crimes are formed, which type of PPP is chosen, and why the 
PPP is then continued or changed after its initial formation.   
The remainder of this introductory chapter briefly introduces the policy areas 
that form the background of this study. Those are international law enforcement 
cooperation, intellectual property rights, intellectual property crime, and transnational 
IPR enforcement. Finally, this chapter gives an overview of the structure of the study. 
International Law Enforcement Cooperation 
Based on the existing literature, it is useful to distinguish between three different 
aspects of international law enforcement cooperation: normative, procedural, and 
organizational. Normative aspects, also known as international prohibition regimes, 
refer to the criminalization of certain activities by international law and domestic law 
(Nadelmann 1990, Andreas & Nadelmann 2006: 17). Examples of such 
internationally criminalized activities are maritime piracy, slavery, and trade in heroin 
and cocaine. 
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Procedural aspects are concerned with the procedure of law enforcement 
cooperation. Examples of procedural agreements are extradition treaties, mutual 
legal assistance treaties, or agreements on the transfer of criminal proceedings 
(Joutsen 2005: 259). Such treaties regulate, for example, an obligation to respond to 
requests for law enforcement cooperation, the conditions under which such a request 
can be denied, and the procedures to ensure the rights of the suspect. 
Organizational aspects of law enforcements cooperation refer to the facilitation 
of law enforcement cooperation. Important examples of organizations that facilitate 
international law enforcement cooperation are the International Criminal Police 
Organizations (ICPO Interpol), the World Customs Organization (WCO), Europol of 
the European Union, and a variety of bilateral police and customs operations centers 
(Haberfeld & McDonald 2005, Barnett & Coleman 2005, Anderson 1989). The 
activities of such organizations include the establishment of personal contacts 
between law enforcement officers through a system of liaison officers and seconded 
officers, the analysis of combined information gathered by several law enforcement 
agencies, and the maintenance of databases for the exchange of information about 
fugitives, stolen motor vehicles, stolen works of art, and lost and stolen travel 
documents. Organizational aspects are especially relevant if the available 
organizations and services influence the frequency and kind of cooperation, 
compared to a situation where cooperation has to be organized ad hoc. 
The focus of this study is on an organizational aspect of law enforcement 
cooperation: the creation of transnational public-private partnerships. But normative 
and procedural aspects are also relevant for the decisions to create such PPPs. 
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Intellectual Property Rights 
Intellectual property rights (IPRs) are “legal rights which result from intellectual 
activity in the industrial, scientific, literary and artistic fields” (WIPO 2004b: 3). The 
most well-known examples of IPRs are trademarks, patents, and copyrights. 
Trademarks protect certain names or symbols used in commerce. Patents protect 
certain inventions. And copyrights protect certain literary or artistic works. There are 
also several other less well known kinds of IPRs, such as utility models, industrial 
design rights, plant breeders' rights, and geographical indications (WIPO 2004b: 3). 
The rationale behind the protection of intellectual property rights is as diverse as the 
IPRs themselves. Trademark protection increases market transparency by allowing 
the easy identification of the producer or licensor of a certain product. Patent 
protection encourages investments in research and innovation by providing a way to 
protect those investments without keeping the inventions a secret. And copyright 
protection encourages creativity by allowing the commercialization of creative works 
even if they can be easily copied. Besides such functionalist arguments for IPRs, 
they are also frequently regarded as expressing a moral right of creators in their 
creations (WIPO 2004b: 3).  
The international harmonization of intellectual property law started in the late 
19th century with the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
and the 1886 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. The 
United International Bureau for the Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPI)3 was 
created in 1893 to administer these two treaties. It evolved into the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO), which was founded in 1967 and became a 
specialized United Nations agency in 1974 (Bogsch 1992). 
                                            
3
 Bureaux Internationaux Réunis pour la Protection de la Propriété Intellectuelle 
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A very important development for the global protection of IPRs was the 1994 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which 
established a minimum standard for IPRs in the member states of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Within this minimum standard is the requirement to criminalize 
trademark and copyright infringements of a commercial scale (TRIPS Art. 61). This 
criminalization requirement makes the TRIPS agreement the first global IP treaty that 
goes beyond private law and emphasizes the public interest through the use of 
criminal law. Therefore, TRIPS is not only a trade agreement but also the foundation 
of a prohibition regime (Andreas & Nadelmann 2006: 54). 
International negotiations about IP rights continued after the TRIPS 
Agreement. Examples include the 2001 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health, several bilateral and regional agreements, and the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), which was opened for signature in October 
2011 and was rejected by the European Parliament in July 2012. General issues in 
the international IP debate include higher penalties for Intellectual property crimes 
(UNICRI 2007: 129) and the balance between private IP rights and the public 
interest, especially when it comes to patents on pharmaceuticals and life forms (Sell 
2003: 139). There are also concerns about the fair use of digital products (Mara 
2008b), the liability of the internet industry for the exchange of digital products over 
the internet, and the trade of tangible goods through internet trading platforms 
(Amazon.com et al. 2008). Transshipment issues arise in cases where the IPR 
protection differs in the country of origin, destination, and transshipment (Schneider 
2011, Vrins 2010). 
While these debates continue, the largest obstacle to IPR protection today is 
not the law but the lack of law enforcement (OECD 2008: 187). Intellectual property 
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crime is not a high priority for most law enforcement agencies around the world. As 
resources for specialized training or even specialized units are limited, most law 
enforcement agencies prioritize crimes that are considered more severe, such as 
drug trafficking, human trafficking, and terrorism. 
Intellectual Property Crimes 
Intellectual property (IP) crimes are acts that infringe IP rights and violate criminal 
law. In many cases the infringement of IP rights constitutes a criminal act in itself, as 
the TRIPS Agreement requires WTO member states to criminalize trademark 
counterfeiting and copyright piracy on a commercial scale (TRIPS Art. 61). Therefore, 
the fight against this “counterfeiting and piracy” is the focus of most activities against 
IP crime. However, some states have chosen to go beyond the TRIPS requirements 
and also criminalize infringements of other IP rights, such as patents. IP infringing 
activities may also be considered criminal if they are committed in concurrence with 
other acts that are criminal, such as fraud or smuggling.  If the use of dangerous 
counterfeit products results in deaths, it can also be addressed as negligent 
homicide. The director of the Nigerian Food and Drugs Administration even spoke of 
mass murder in the case of deadly counterfeit medicine (Akunyili 2007). 
Due to the health and safety risks of many counterfeit products, IP crimes are 
increasingly seen not only as an economic issue but also as a threat to human 
security. There are a number of recent examples: a plane flying from Norway to 
Germany in 1989 crashed due to the failure of a counterfeit spare part and killed 55 
people (UNICRI 2007:55). Thirteen babies died in China in 2004 from being given 
counterfeit baby food (ICC 2008: 141). 23 people died in Turkey in 2005 due to 
drinking a counterfeit beverage (UNICRI 2007: 51). And 50 000 people received 
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counterfeit meningitis vaccines in Niger in 1995 resulting in 2500 deaths (WHO 
2006c: 2). 
Besides the specific risks to consumers of counterfeit products, intellectual 
property crimes can also be seen as a security risk for the general public when the 
proceeds of intellectual property crimes go to organized crime groups. The common 
definitions of organized crime groups refer to their organizational duration and their 
aim to generate profits from criminal activity (von Lampe 2010). Given these 
definitions, the industrial scale of most intellectual property crimes, and the 
transnational delivery chain of the products, there is no doubt that transnational 
organized crime groups are involved in this business. A number of infamous 
organized crime groups are reported to be active in the business of counterfeiting 
and piracy, such as the Chinese Triads, the Japanese Yakuza, the Russian Mafia, 
and the Neapolitan Camorra (UNICRI 2007: 118). Intellectual property crimes are 
appealing to these organizations, because the profits are similar to those of drug 
trafficking (sometimes even higher), but the risk is very low, as penalties are less 
severe and law enforcement agencies focus less on these crimes (UNICRI 2007: 
106). The same reasons that make intellectual property crimes appealing to 
organized crime groups also make it an attractive criminal activity for the funding of 
militant political groups. For example, proceeds of intellectual property crimes in the 
tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay have been reported to go to the 
Lebanese Hizballah (Arena 2006: 459). The Irish Republican Army has also 
reportedly funded their activities with the trade in pirated movies and software 
(Treverton 2009: 82). 
It is very difficult to quantify the overall effects of IP crime. The number of 
unreported cases can only be estimated, but it is expected to be much higher than 
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the number of reported cases. It is also difficult to assess the rate in which IP 
infringing products substitute legal products in the market. And it is especially difficult 
to assess all the effects beyond the lost revenue from the sale of legal products, such 
as health and safety risks, loss of brand value, or reduced incentives for research 
and innovation (GAO 2010). For a global assessment, the most frequently cited 
figure comes from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD). According to their study, “international trade in counterfeit and pirated goods 
could account for up to USD 200 billion in 2005” (OECD 2008 :96). As this is a 
maximum figure within the OECD calculation model, the actual figure could be lower. 
However, the overall effects of IP crime could be higher, as the OECD study did not 
include domestic trade, the trade of intangible goods over the internet, nor did it 
include other factors such as loss of brand value, reduced incentives for research 
and innovation, or health and safety risks. Besides these negative effects, a 
comprehensive study on the effects of IP crime would also need to address the 
positive effects. While it is unpopular to speak about the “positive effects of crime”, 
they can be an important factor in explaining the prevalence of IP crime and the 
challenges in fighting it. For example, factories that produce counterfeit products and 
businesses that trade with them can provide jobs and income for many people. And 
consumers may be able to save money with pirated music, movies, or computer 
software. 
Transnational Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement 
Many businesses and their associations are actively involved in the transnational 
enforcement of intellectual property rights. Their private investigators can bypass the 
procedures of more traditional international law enforcement cooperation, which are 
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established by mutual legal assistance treaties. This can make transnational law 
enforcement cooperation faster and easier than international law enforcement 
cooperation, as is explained in the following quote: 
 
“There is a trial, just started in the UK, called Surf the Channel. And one of the main 
witnesses is in Los Angeles. So when I was over there four weeks ago, I had to literally go 
and get this witness, get a copy of the hard drive that he had. Then any statement in the 
UK, if it is to be fit for purpose for use in the UK court, it has to be signed on English soil. 
So I then had to drag this Californian to the British embassy to get him to sign the 
statement so it could be used as evidence in the court. But that is what we have to do 
everywhere. We prepare full evidence packages. […] And then they will take the whole 
thing, to get the actual operation or whatever done, they will just hand the package 
across. So the cops have to use just their powers to get a warrant to arrest somebody. 
Then even - and this is where we are really working hand in hand - the [private] 
investigators would then go and do the interview with the cops. So that's what else we do - 
and other industries. It’s not just the film industry. Other industries do exactly the same." 
Michael Buchan (2010), Director of Content Protection 
& Customs Liaison at the Motion Picture Association 
 
Private companies and associations invest significant resources in law 
enforcement, which would not be available by relying on public law enforcement 
agencies alone. For example, the software company Microsoft, the tobacco company 
Philip Morris International, the film industries’ Motion Picture Association (MPA), and 
the music industries’ International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) 
have all spent several millions of US dollars on the enforcement of trademarks and 
copyrights. They employ private investigators who gather evidence and prepare case 
files to hand over to a public law enforcement agency including a recommendation 
when a police raid should take place (Buchan 2010, Finn 2010, Int.03 2010, Int.21 
2010, Schild 2007). 
Private investigation work makes it a lot easier for police officers to protect 
intellectual property rights, but sometimes the private actors go even further. There 
are reports of cases where bribes were paid by private investigators for a police raid 
on counterfeiters and pirates, for example, in Russia (Phillips 2005: 96) and in 
Thailand (Green & Smith 2002: 104). However, there are also legal ways to use 
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private financial resources in order to get public law enforcement agencies to do 
more against IP crime. For example, in the USA and in China there are public-private 
arrangements where IP rights holders cover the expenses of local law enforcement 
agencies, such as equipment needed for raids, food and drink, and sometimes even 
pay for overtime (Barchiesi 2011, Phillips 2005: 36, 50). Such arrangements also 
exist at the international level. For example, Philip Morris International, Japan 
Tobacco International, British American Tobacco, and Imperial Tobacco have all 
signed agreements with the European Commission to combat contraband and 
counterfeit cigarettes. Based on these agreements, the tobacco companies provide 
annual payments of over 150 million USD to reimburse the EU and participating 
member states for their efforts against counterfeit cigarettes (EU Com 2004, EU Com 
2007, EU Com 2010a, EU Com 2010b, Alvaro 2008). The sum invested in law 
enforcement by just these four corporations is higher than the annual budgets of 
Europol or Interpol (UIA 2009) and thereby shows that non-state actors and their 
influence on law enforcement should not to be underestimated. 
Plan of the Study 
The previous sections of this chapter introduced the empirical policy areas that form 
the background of this study. Chapter 2 is dedicated to theory. It starts by presenting 
the theoretical foundations of this study: the transnationalization of law enforcement, 
international organizations and non-state actors, and a typology of public-private 
partnerships. Chapter 2 then goes on to present the theory that has been developed 
with this study and embeds these findings in existing theory. 
Chapter 3 presents the methodological foundations of this study. It starts with 
the research design that is based on the comparative method and on process 
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tracing. It then presents the methods used for data acquisition and for data 
evaluation. 
Chapters 4 through 9 each present one case study. The studies focus on 
particular public international organizations, whereas individual PPPs are then 
presented in sections within the chapters (table 1). This is done in chapter 4 on 
Interpol, in chapter 5 on the World Customs Organization (WCO), in chapter 6 on the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and in chapter 9 on the World 
Health Organization (WHO). Structuring the case studies in this way puts more 
attention on the IOs than on other PPP participants, but this is justified for three 
reasons: First, the public IOs have very important roles in the PPPs, whether by 
chairing them or by providing secretariat services for them. Therefore, most PPPs 
are closely associated with one IO even if another IO is also a member.4 Second, it 
facilitates the process tracing of PPP evolution where one PPP replaces another or 
where new PPPs complement previous ones and form a PPP network around one 
IO. Third, using IOs as cases instead of PPPs also allows a better case comparison. 
A selection bias is avoided by allowing variation of the dependent variable “PPP 
formation” and including a control case where no PPP was founded. This is done in 
chapter 8 on the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO never founded its own 
PPP against IP crime, although it administers the TRIPS Agreement, which is an 
important foundation for the global criminalization of IP infringements. The only 
exception to this IO-based case construction is the Global Congress on Combating 
Counterfeiting and Piracy. As this PPP is not more associated with one of its member 
IOs than with another, it is presented as a stand-alone case in chapter 7.  
 
                                            
4
 The only exception is the Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy. The chair of the 
board of this PPP rotates among Interpol, the WCO, and the WIPO. 
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Table 1: IOs and PPPs Covered by this Study 
Chapter IOs PPPs 
4 Interpol Interpol IP Crime Action Group, 
Operation Jupiter, 
Interpol IP Crime Training Program, 
International Law Enforcement IP Crime Conference, 
Certification Industry Against Counterfeiting,  
International IP Crime Investigator’s College,  
Database on International Intellectual Property 
5 WCO WCO IPR Strategic Group, 
SECURE Working Group,  
Rights Holders Consultative Group,  
Interface Public-Members 
6 WIPO Advisory Committee on Enforcement 
7 Interpol, 
WCO, WIPO 
Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy 
8 WTO -  
9 WHO International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting 
Taskforce (IMPACT), 
IMPACT Enforcement Working Group, 
Operation Storm, 
Operation Mamba, 
Operation Pangea 
Source: Own account  
 
After the study of the six cases in chapters 4 through 9, chapter 10 presents a 
comparison of those cases. Based on the similarities and differences, in terms of 
circumstances and results in each case, inferences about the reasons for the 
creation and the continuation or change of transnational PPPs against IP crimes are 
presented. Finally, chapter 11 presents a summary of the contributions of this study 
and an outlook to open questions that can provide the basis for further research. 
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2. Theory: Transnationalization, IOs, and PPPs 
This study explores a new research area and develops theory about the formation 
and development of transnational public-private partnerships against IP crimes. In 
spite of the exploratory character of this study, it is still embedded in wider research 
contexts that provide theoretical foundations. The primary context of this study is 
International Relations (IR) research on international law enforcement cooperation. 
The first section of this chapter explains how this study is embedded in this context 
and contributes to it with a case of transnationalization of law enforcement. Also, 
IR research about International Organizations and especially their willingness to 
cooperate with non-state actors is important background for this study. This is 
explained in the second section of this chapter. Research about public-private 
partnerships is also relevant for this study. The third section of this chapter 
introduces this research and then develops a typology of PPPs to be used in this 
study. The final section of this chapter presents the theory that was developed with 
this study and embeds the finding in existing theory.  
Transnationalization of Law Enforcement 
In International Relations research the issue of international law enforcement 
cooperation is “remarkably understudied” (Andreas & Nadelmann 2006: VIII). The 
few available studies focus on the internationalization of law enforcement: some are 
about international prohibition regimes (e.g. Nadelmann 1990, Andreas & Nadelmann 
2006), about specific international organizations such as Interpol (Barnett & Coleman 
2005) or Europol (Deflem 2006), about specific international treaties such as the 
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (Albrecht & 
Fijnaut 2002), or about police assistance in post-conflict and post-authoritarian states 
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(Bayley 2006). Other works combine several of these aspects of internationalization 
of law enforcement (Möllers & van Ooyen 2006, Haberfeld & McDonald 2005, 
Anderson 1989, Deflem 2002, Koenig & Das 2001). When it comes to privatization of 
law enforcement, there are studies about the privatization of public security (Jones & 
Newburn 2006) and about the privatization of law enforcement against economic 
crimes (Williams 2005). What all these studies have in common is that they look at 
the changing role of the nation state in law enforcement from different perspectives. 
Such change can take place via internationalization, decentralization, privatization, or 
statization as illustrated in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Changes to the Role of the Nation State for Law Enforcement 
 
Source: Own illustration inspired by Leibfried & Zürn 2005: 15 
 
 
Nation states can delegate or lose law enforcement competencies to the sub-national 
level as with community policing projects (Brogden & Nijhar 2005, Paun 2008), to the 
private sector (Jones & Newburn 2006), to the international level (Andreas & 
Nadelmann 2006), or to the European level (Jachtenfuchs 2005) – as a special form 
of internationalization. The statization of policing can be found in studies of the 
historical development of policing together with the rise of the modern nation state 
(Roberg et al. 2000: 32, Mawby 1999, Waddington 1999, Horton 1995: 7). When it 
comes to the combined effects of internationalization and privatization - the 
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transnationalization of law enforcement - there is a gap in the current state of 
research, with only very few exceptions (e.g. Abrahamsen & Williams 2009, Johnston 
2000). 
This study is meant to contribute its part to fill this gap in the current state of 
research with the example of transnational public-private partnerships against 
intellectual property crimes. It contributes a deviant case study (Bennett 2004: 22) to 
the field of international relations research on international law enforcement 
cooperation. The case is deviant insofar as studies of law enforcement cooperation 
against more prominent crimes, such as drug trafficking and terrorism, have 
concluded that there is very little transnationalization of the state monopoly of force 
(Jachtenfuchs 2006). In the case of the analyzed law enforcement PPPs, the actual 
application of force is still done by national law enforcement agencies, but the entire 
decision making process about when, where, why, and how to apply force is heavily 
influenced by partners from international organizations, from other countries, and 
from the private sector. Besides this empirical observation, there is also a theoretical 
reason to consider this case deviant: As the monopoly of the legitimate use of force 
is considered to be the constituting characteristic of the modern nation state 
(Jachtenfuchs 2005: 1, Weber 1972: 29), the transnationalization of law enforcement 
can be considered a surprising development. Even the most radical libertarians in 
political philosophy, like Robert Nozick (1974), do not propose the privatization of law 
enforcement. Nonetheless, the PPPs against IP crime in this study are a way to 
involve the private sector in law enforcement. 
 
 
28 Christopher Paun: Globalization of Law Enforcement 
 
International Organizations and Non-State Actors 
Public international organizations (IOs) are important actors in the public-private 
partnerships analysed in this study. They perform the function of a chair or a 
secretariat of the PPPs. Therefore, theories about IOs and, especially, their 
openness to non-state actors (NSAs) is relevant background for this research. In this 
context, the term public international organization denotes IOs with public sector 
members only (as used by Amerasinghe 2005, Slaughter 2004, or Reinicke 1998). It 
is meant to include intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and transgovernmental 
organizations (TGOs). TGOs are often not mentioned as a category or subsumed 
under the category of IGOs (Diehl 2005, Karns & Mingst 2004), but the distinction is 
useful for this research. As early as 1974 Keohane and Nye explicitly mentioned 
Interpol as an example of transgovernmental relations: interactions between "sub-
units of governments on those occasions when they act relatively autonomously from 
higher political authority in international politics" (Keohane & Nye 1974: 41). This 
autonomy from higher political authority is an important aspect for the direct 
cooperation between national criminal policy agencies at Interpol (see chapter 4). 
Transgovernmental cooperation with varying degrees of autonomy from higher 
political authority also exists, for example, between national customs agencies at the 
WCO (see chapter 5), and between national patent and trademark agencies at the 
WIPO (see chapter 6). Transgovernmental cooperation can happen in organizations 
(Archer 2001) and outside of organizations (Slaughter 2004). The empirical fact of 
government agencies acting relatively autonomously from higher political authority 
challenges the idea of the state as a unitary actor, which is assumed in realist and 
institutionalist International Relations theory (Simmons & Martin 2002). 
 In this study, public IOs are treated as actors, not as mere instruments or 
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forums for states. This means that IOs can act autonomously from states at least to 
some degree. In the state-centered discipline of International Relations, such 
autonomy is the result of delegation from states to IOs (Rittberger & Zangl 2006). 
Such delegation can be explained using principal-agent theory, according to which 
delegation from a principal to an agent is chosen if it is beneficial for the principal. 
This may be the case, for example, due to specialization and division of labor, due to 
the reduction of transaction costs, or because an independent body has a higher 
degree of credibility when monitoring treaty implementation or is needed for dispute 
resolution (Hawkins et al. 2006b). However, once IOs have autonomy, they can also 
seek to increase it (Hawkins & Jacoby 2006, Barnett & Finnemore 2004, Reinalda & 
Verbeek 2006). 
 Public IOs may also seek to increase their autonomy by cooperating with non-
state actors, thereby getting access to resources that are not provided by the states. 
Such interaction of an IO with NSAs may also be beneficial for and sought by the 
states themselves. For example, IO access to private sector resources reduces the 
need for public sector resources, non-state actors may be helpful in monitoring the 
IO, and they may be helpful in increasing domestic support for an IO (Hawkins & 
Jacoby 2006, Raustiala 1997). 
 There are different ways for international organizations to cooperate with non-
state actors. For example, they can be invited to special stakeholder hearings or to 
regular meetings, they can be accredited as observers, they can sell services to an 
IO, or they may engage in public-private partnerships.  
  
  
 
30 Christopher Paun: Globalization of Law Enforcement 
 
A Typology of Public-Private Partnerships 
For a study about public-private partnerships (PPPs), it is important to clarify what is 
meant by the term. Unfortunately, there is no single authoritative definition of PPPs. 
Various authors use the term with different meanings (Klijn 2010, Hodge et al. 2010, 
Schäferhoff et al. 2009, Weihe 2008, Andonova 2006, Börzel & Risse 2005, Linder 
1999). Guðrið Weihe (2008) even came to the conclusion that the different PPP 
definitions are so distinct that an overall PPP definition is not possible. Her literature 
review identified four areas of literature about PPPs with four different PPP 
approaches: The urban regeneration approach focuses on municipal PPPs, where 
participants from the public and the private sector collaborate as equal partners in 
order to improve municipal conditions for living and doing business. The 
infrastructure approach focuses on infrastructure PPPs, where a contract defines a 
principal-agent relationship between the public principal and the private agent who 
supplies the infrastructure project. The policy approach focuses on policy input from 
PPPs no matter how the public-private partnership is organized or what its focus is. 
And the development approach focuses on PPPs in the area of development aid, 
which are often, but not always, organized as a network (Weihe 2008). These 
distinctions are helpful to identify streams of literature and their origin, but it does not 
automatically lead to a clear PPP definition. 
For the purpose of this study, I developed a definition and typology of public-
private partnerships that is based on previous literature, but specifies and adjusts the 
concepts found in the literature in a way that allows an overall PPP definition and the 
identification of distinct types of PPPs. The PPP definitions used in the urban 
regeneration approach and in the infrastructure approach are fully embedded in my 
typology as the collaborative PPP type and the contractual PPP type. The policy 
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approach and the development approach do not have clear PPP definitions, but the 
more frequently found definitions have been specified to fit into this typology as the 
advisory PPP type and the PPP network type. 
 This study is based on the following definition and typology of PPPs: 
Public-private partnerships are forms of cooperation between actors from the public 
and the private sector5 that are set-up with the intention to continuously exist over a 
long period of time6 and that are organized according to the characteristics of one of 
the following types of PPPs: 
- Unitary PPP: There are four different types of unitary PPPs: 
o Collaborative PPP: Collaborative provision of public services, or significant 
contribution thereto, where the private partners voluntarily invest significant 
resources beyond information and advice without being paid by the public 
partners. 
o Contractual PPP: Private provision of public services, or significant contribution 
thereto beyond information and advice, based on a contract with public partners 
that ensures payments to the private partners in return for their investment. 
o Advisory PPP: Public partners rely on nonpaid advice or information from 
private partners for public policy decisions. 
o Consulting PPP: Public partners rely on paid advice or information from private 
partners for public policy decisions. 
- PPP Network: A network of PPPs that differ from each other through non-identical 
membership or different forms of organization, but that belong to each other by 
having the same management or by being sub-groups of a larger PPP network. 
                                            
5
 Public sector refers to governments, government agencies, and public international organizations. 
Private sector refers to for-profit and not-for-profit non-governmental organizations. 
6
 The distinction between long-term and short term cooperation may depend on the issue area. 
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Table 2: A Resource-Based Typology of Public-Private Partnerships 
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While various forms of public-private cooperation have existed for as long as there 
has been a distinction between public and private (Wettenhall 2010), the term public-
private partnership was first established in the 1970s for business-community 
partnerships for urban regeneration and development (Weihe 2008: 431). 
A prominent example is the New York City Partnership that started in the 1970s and 
organized different projects to deal with issues such as youth unemployment, 
education, transportation, housing, crime, and public safety – all with the aim “to 
make New York City a better place to live, to work and to conduct business'' (NYT 
1985). The private participants are often the driving force behind these partnerships 
and their voluntary contributions are often the main sources of funding for them 
(Weihe 2008: 431). I propose to label these partnerships as collaborative PPPs, as 
their defining characteristic is the collaborative provision of public services. An 
example of a collaborative PPP in this study is the World Customs Organization 
Intellectual Property Rights Strategic Group, which organized private funding and 
private human resources to assist the World Customs Organization in the area of IPR 
enforcement (chapter 5).  
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In contrast, the contractual PPP reflects a buyer-seller relationship. This type 
of PPP is mostly used for infrastructure projects with a special type of participation by 
the private sector that involves private financing. This is a special type of 
procurement where the public partner does not pay the price of a project to the 
private partner at once, but instead enters a long-term contract, for example, by 
leasing a prison or by allowing the private partner to charge fees for a public service, 
as in the example of toll roads. Weihe (2008) uses the term “infrastructure approach” 
and Hodge et al. (2010) use the term “long-term infrastructure contract (LTIC)” to 
describe such partnerships. However, the term contractual PPP can be used for any 
outsourcing of public services to private partners, where the contract ensures 
payments to the private partners either by the public partner or by the users of the 
public services provided. PPPs that charge a member fee as a means to pool 
resources, but not for profit, should be considered as collaborative, not contractual. 
Collaborative PPPs can also have a contract, but it does not reflect a buyer-seller 
relationship. What keeps collaborative PPPs together is not the monetary incentive 
from the partnership contract itself, but an interest in the public services provided or 
supported by the partnership. Interestingly, no global PPP against IP crime is of the 
contractual type. Therefore, it was not possible to include this type of PPP in this 
study. There are apparently enough private actors with an interest in supporting 
PPPs against IP crimes that are not paid to do so. 
Advisory PPPs are forms of public-private cooperation where public partners 
rely on nonpaid advice or information from private partners for their public policy 
decisions. Consulting PPPs resemble advisory PPPs with the only distinction that a 
contract ensures payment for the consulting. In both cases, the advice and 
information may be based on research that required the investment of monetary 
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resources by the private partners, but the resource that is transferred to the public 
partner is advice or information only. While the term public-private partnership is well 
established for collaborative and contractual PPPs, advisory and consulting PPPs 
are not always described as a PPP and it may be disputed whether it makes sense to 
describe such continuous consultation as a partnership. However, such relationships 
are described as PPPs by several authors, such as Börzel and Risse (2005: 199) in 
their co-optation PPP or Linder and Rosenau (2000: 5) in their definition of PPPs. In 
this study the Advisory Committee on Enforcement of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization is an example of an advisory PPP (chapter 6). As there is no global 
PPP against IP crime of the consulting type, it was impossible to include this type in 
this study.  
The previous four PPP types are all unitary PPPs, which means that all PPP 
members are part of one group with a relatively clear structure. In contrast, a PPP 
network has a more complex structure. It is a network of PPPs that differ from each 
other through non-identical membership or different forms of organization, but that 
belong to each other by having the same management or by being sub-groups of a 
larger PPP network. Examples of this type of partnership are the Global Alliance for 
Improved Nutrition (GAIN 2010) and the Public-Private Partnership for the Urban 
Environment of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2009, Weihe 
2008). This type of PPP often functions as a platform for further partnerships that can 
be set-up as sub-groups or projects. Often an international organization acts as a 
facilitator, while PPPs within the network provide a public service in a specific region 
or in a specific issue area. This is also consistent with the concept of IOs as 
orchestrators (Abbott et al. 2010). A PPP network may consist of collaborative, 
contractual, advisory, or consulting PPPs. An accurate description of a PPP network 
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therefore makes it necessary to describe the type of each PPP in the network. An 
example of a PPP network in this study is the International Medical Products Anti-
Counterfeiting Taskforce of the World Health Organization (chapter 9). 
This typology of PPPs provides a useful framework for the description of the 
partnership activities of Interpol, the WCO, the WIPO, and the WHO in the following 
chapters. It is helpful to show the differences and similarities of the PPPs and also 
how they change over time. Interpol started with an advisory PPP that evolved into a 
PPP network consisting of an advisory PPP and several collaborative PPPs. The 
WCO had a collaborative PPP for several years, which was then aborted and 
replaced with a network of one advisory and several collaborative PPPs. During a 
second PPP reform at the WCO, the advisory PPP within the network was replaced, 
while the collaborative PPPs continued their work.  
Reasons for Transnational PPP Creation 
As there is no single authoritative PPP definition, there is also no single established 
theory about why public-private partnerships are formed. This is also true for 
transnational PPPs. A literature review of empirical studies about transnational PPPs 
shows that they identify reasons for PPP formation that do not significantly differ from 
reasons for other kinds of cooperation, such as overlapping interests, benefits from a 
PPP, and a common understanding of a problem (Schäferhoff et al. 2009, Andonova 
2006). The applicability of general cooperation theory is not surprising, as public-
private partnerships are a special form of cooperation and therefore the requirements 
for cooperation are also necessary for PPPs. However, such studies fail to explain 
why a PPP is chosen instead of other forms of cooperation, why specific types of 
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PPPs are chosen, and why some PPPs are continued while others are terminated or 
reformed.  
This exploratory study started from the basis of rationalist cooperation theory 
(Taylor 1987), but went on to develop a theory that explains transnational PPPs as a 
distinct form of cooperation. In the course of this study, five factors have been 
identified, of which the first refers to cooperation in general (cooperation in the pursuit 
of resource gains), and the additional four apply specifically to transnational PPPs: 
 
1) Cooperation in the pursuit of resource gains 
The basis for the creation of PPPs is cooperation in the pursuit of resource gains. 
Different kinds of resources may be pursued: human resources, financial resources, 
information, advice, credibility, reputation, legitimacy, and access to further actors. 
Besides the pursuit of absolute resource gains, the pursuit of relative resource gains 
may also be important. The entire idea behind the protection of intellectual property, 
from an entrepreneurial perspective, is to gain and protect a competitive advantage, 
which is effectively a relative resource gain. Therefore many private sector members 
of a PPP participate because they pursue such relative resource gains. However, 
public sector members may also compete with other public sector actors and 
therefore seek resource gains relative to those competitors. Whether relative or 
absolute resource gains are pursued and the kind of resources pursued not only 
influence the creation of a PPP, but also which kind of PPP is founded and how it 
develops. Advisory PPPs are chosen if only information or advice is pursued. 
Collaborative PPPs are chosen if financial or other material resources are also 
pursued. PPP networks are useful if concerns about relative resource gains lead to 
cooperation problems that make it difficult to collaborate in one large unitary PPP. 
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 The finding that absolute and relative resource gains matter for PPPs, a 
special form of cooperation, is consistent with general cooperation theory. Michael 
Taylor (1987) has described several configurations of interests that could lead to 
cooperation. While the most common assumption in cooperation theory is an interest 
in absolute gains, a combination with an interest in relative gains is also possible. 
The relevance of relative gains increases with competition or rivalry between actors. 
In extreme cases, an actor will not participate in cooperation even if it is beneficial in 
terms of absolute gains when a rival actor would benefit relatively more (Taylor 1987: 
116). This line of reasoning can also be found in the concept of power in the theory of 
the state by Thomas Hobbes (1968: 185) or in the realist theory of International 
Relations (Grieco 1988). 
 
2) Common ground 
In order to move from mere cooperation to partnership, the partners need to reach an 
agreement, which requires at least some common ground. This common ground may 
involve, but does not require, common interest. The partners’ views on a given issue 
do not necessarily need to be identical, but they need to share some basic 
understanding about an issue to serve as common ground for the partnership. In 
almost all of the cases in this study, the TRIPS Agreement is the written 
manifestation of this common ground. The only exception is the case of the World 
Health Organization. The WHO developed a definition of counterfeit medicines 
together with private sector representatives, which serves as the written 
manifestation of the common ground.  
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3) PPP management 
Based on the PPP definition established above, a defining characteristic of a PPP is 
that it is set up in order to continuously exist over a long period of time. This makes it 
necessary that at least one partner in a PPP provides the day-to-day management, 
so that the PPP can continuously exist between meetings. For transnational PPPs, 
the most common provider of such management services is a public international 
organization (IO). In order to provide such services, the public IO needs approval 
from the members of the PPP, as well as from its regular constituents - the member 
states represented in the general assembly. The approval from the member states is 
even more crucial than the approval of other stakeholders. If a few stakeholders do 
not approve the PPP management, the PPP can still exist with fewer members. But if 
a few member states in a general assembly with consensus decision making reject 
the PPP management by a public IO, they can thereby put an end to the existence of 
the PPP. Therefore, the approval of the member states is crucial for the PPP 
management, which is required for the existence of the PPP. The managing IO either 
needs an explicit mandate or sufficient discretion to interpret a general mandate as 
the basis for the PPP management. 
The IO may be interested in providing the management service for the PPP in 
order to increase its discretion. The resources acquired in the PPP make it less 
dependent on the resources contributed by the member states. This is consistent 
with principal-agent theory (Hawkins & Jacoby 2006: 208). The relationship of states 
and IOs is frequently explained with a principal-agent model, where the states form a 
collective principal and the public IO is the agent (e.g. Hawkins et al. 2006a, Reinalda 
& Verbeek 2006). Non-state actors are usually described as non-principals in 
principal agent theory about IOs. However, PPPs can be seen as a special type of 
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cooperation with non-state actors that makes principals out of former non-principals. 
Within the PPP, the public and private actors are both members of a collective 
principal, delegating additional public and private authority to an IO that could  
possibly lead to a restructuring of that IO (Hawkins & Jacoby 2006: 210). Figure 2 
shows principal-agent models of delegation to an IO. Section 1 shows how non-state 
actors are usually treated in PA theory, while section 2 shows how to integrate PPPs 
into PA theory if they delegate to an IO. 
 
Figure 2: PA-Models of Delegation to an IO 
 
 
Source: 1) Own account based on Hawkins & Jacoby 2006: 208; 
2) Own account 
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4) Representation of stakeholders 
If some stakeholders are not adequately represented in the PPP, they may choose to 
oppose it from the outside. Such opposition is especially relevant if the opposing 
stakeholder has access to official decision making bodies of the public international 
organization that manages the respective PPP. Things are further complicated by the 
fact that states are not always uniform actors as assumed in realist and institutionalist 
International Relations theory. Different agencies of a state can pursue different 
policies and therefore it matters not only if a state is represented, but also by which 
government agency it is represented. In several examples in this study, a PPP was 
supported by one government agency while it was opposed by another government 
agency from the same state. The degree to which the representation of stakeholders 
is accepted can be considered the input legitimacy of the PPP. 
 This finding supplements research by Anne-Marie Slaughter, who identified 
regulators and law enforcement officers in transgovernmental networks as “new 
diplomats” (Slaughter 2004: 36, 55). This study shows that the legitimacy of such 
“new diplomats” can be challenged, especially if other stakeholders or “old diplomats” 
are not adequately represented. 
 
5) PPP policy 
Another factor that can influence the development of a PPP is its policy. The degree 
to which the PPP policy is accepted can be considered as the output legitimacy of 
the PPP. Different policies can lead to more or less political conflict, which then can 
constrain or terminate a PPP. PPPs which avoid highly controversial policies also 
avoid opposition against that PPP. This study has shown that legislative proposals 
and standard setting can lead to controversies, which jeopardize a PPP. Less 
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controversial policies are improvements to the enforcement of existing laws, the 
exchange of information, and the allocation of resources to conferences and training 
seminars. In particular, the acquisition of voluntary funding from PPP members 
avoids discussions about the distribution of resources. 
 
Based on the five factors above, three hypotheses have been developed from this 
study, which concern the formation, type, and development of transnational PPPs 
against IP crimes: 
 
A) Formation 
The factors (1) cooperation in the pursuit of resource gains, (2) common 
ground, and (3) PPP management are each necessary for the formation of a 
PPP. Together, they are sufficient for the formation of a PPP, if their 
continuous existence is anticipated. 
 
B) Type 
An advisory PPP is chosen if the public sector partners seek only information 
or advice and a collaborative PPP is chosen if they also seek financial or other 
material resources. A unitary PPP is chosen if the planned PPP activities do 
not involve cooperation problems. If, however, the planned activities involve 
cooperation problems, then the more flexible and conflict-resistant PPP 
network is the PPP type of choice. 
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C) Development 
A PPP is continued if the factors that led to its formation remain stable, its 
representation of stakeholders is unchallenged, and its policy does not include 
controversial activities such as the drafting of legislative proposals. A PPP is 
changed (reformed or terminated) if there are relevant changes to the factors 
that led to its formation, its representation of stakeholders is challenged, or its 
policy includes controversial activities such as the drafting of legislative 
proposals. 
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3. Methods: Proceeding of the Inquiry 
Starting from existing theory about cooperation, this study developed a new theory 
about a special type of cooperation: transnational public-private partnerships against 
IP crime. As the goal of this study is theory development and as this study explores a 
new research area with very recent developments, I have chosen a qualitative 
approach in order to have the ability to react to new insights and new developments 
during the study (Munck 2004). This chapter explains the methodological approach of 
this study. The first section explains the research design and the subsequent 
sections explain the methods used for data acquisition and for data evaluation.   
Research Design 
This study uses the comparative method (George & Bennett 2005: 151) based on six 
cases and the method of process tracing (Bennett 2004: 22) for each individual case 
study. The selection of the cases from all possible transnational PPPs has been done 
according to three criteria: 
First, only cases from the specific area of intellectual property crime have been 
chosen. Although this criterion is already introduced through the topic of the study 
and the research question, I would like to stress its importance for the theory 
development in this study. Non-academic policy documents often point to the 
specificities of an issue area to justify the chosen policy as appropriate. If one 
compares PPPs from different issue areas, the importance of issue-specificity may 
indeed appear overwhelming compared to other factors. However, if one keeps the 
issue area (IP crimes) constant, there is still a large degree of variation in terms of 
PPP activities, including different types of PPPs, different developments after 
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formation, as well as a case where no PPP was founded at all. These differences 
beg for an explanation, which is delivered by this study.  
 Second, I avoided choosing only existing PPPs as cases, because this would 
be a selection without variation of the dependent variable “PPP formation”. To avoid 
such a selection bias, I have chosen to structure this study into six cases along the 
lines of the involved international organizations, resulting in a comparative case study 
with variation of the dependent variable. The WTO is the case without a PPP, which 
serves as a contrast to the other cases where a PPP was created. In those other five 
cases, different types of PPPs have been created, of which some remained stable, 
while others have been changed (either reformed, replaced, or terminated). In such 
cases, several PPPs have been studied in one case according to the primary public 
IO they are associated with. This facilitated the tracing of the process that led from 
one PPP to its successor, and thereby allowed to draw more conclusions from the 
single case studies than if each PPP would have been treated as an independent 
case. The structuring of the cases along the lines of the involved public IOs is 
beneficial for the process tracing and for the case comparison, but it shifts some 
attention from the PPPs to the IOs. However, this is justified as the IOs have been 
identified as crucial actors anyway. The case study of the Global Congress on 
Combating Counterfeiting & Piracy slightly departs from the IO structured case logic, 
because this case involves several IOs as equal partners. Therefore the Global 
Congress is presented as an individual case, but is also seen in relation to the 
involved IOs. 
Third, only global IOs have been selected as cases. There is only small 
variation in terms of member states among the IOs. This small variation is also 
irrelevant, as all the active states in global IP policy are members in all IOs in this 
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study. This criterion, similar to the first, excludes certain explanatory factors that 
could have appeared overwhelming, but offer little value for theory development. The 
fact that different states pursue different IP policies is already well known (Sell 2003, 
May 2007). However, if one excludes regional and state membership variation by 
analyzing only global IOs, there is still a large degree of variation in terms of PPP 
activities. These differences beg for an explanation, which is delivered by this study. 
These three criteria have led to the identification of six cases for this study: 
Interpol, the World Customs Organization, the World Intellectual Property 
Organization, the World Trade Organization, the World Health Organization, and the 
Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting & Piracy. Given the rather small 
number of cases with considerable variation in terms of PPP creation and PPP type, I 
have chosen to study all these cases and not only a sample of them. Therefore, this 
study is a comprehensive survey of the research area narrowed down by the three 
criteria above, while it also is the study of a purposefully selected sample of the wider 
research area of all transnational law enforcement PPPs. 
Data Acquisition 
I gathered the required data for each case study with reconstructive empirical 
investigations (Gläser & Laudel 2009: 37). The investigation started in 2008 and 
lasted until 2011. Data has been gathered about ongoing processes as well as about 
processes that happened several years before the start of the investigation. Most 
analyzed processes did not happen before the year 2000, but some information has 
also been gathered about earlier events. 
In the process of the investigation, the first sources of data were the 
secretariats of the analyzed public-private partnerships against IP crime. This 
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included the relevant units within the PPP-managing public international 
organizations (Interpol, WCO, WIPO, and WHO), the IP division within the WTO, 
which did not manage a PPP but participated in PPPs of other IOs, and the business 
association SNB-REACT, which performed secretariat services for the WCO from 
2000 until 2007. The first data gathered from these sources were publicly available 
primary documents, such as websites, press releases and reports. Then I 
approached the mangers of the PPPs, as well as other employees and former 
employees who were involved in PPP-management for more information. 
I conducted semi-structured expert interviews (Gläser & Laudel 2009: 111) with them 
and received unpublished primary documents, such as internal reports, 
correspondence, and agendas, minutes and participant lists of meetings. 
Further sources were various participants of the PPPs and also opponents of 
the PPPs. I identified those further sources based on the information I received from 
the first sources, internet searches, and information from topical discussion groups 
and contact lists on internet career networks, such as LinkedIn and Xing. I also 
gathered such information with participant observations at two Global Congresses on 
Combatting Counterfeiting and Piracy (2009 and 2011), at the 2010 meeting of the 
WIPO Advisory Committee on Enforcement, at the 2010 Interpol International Law 
Enforcement IP Crime Conference, at the 2010 INTA Anti-Counterfeiting Congress, 
at the 2008 INTA Annual Meeting, and at the 2008 IACC Meeting. For the selection 
of those further sources, I used relevance and accessibility as criteria. I conducted 
interviews with people who were available in a cost-efficient way, for example, at 
conferences. I made extra efforts to speak with people I identified as either very 
important supporters or opponents of the PPPs or as very knowledgeable about 
them. For economic reasons, I had to use such a relevance- and accessibility-based 
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sampling strategy for further sources, but I did a comprehensive survey with the first 
sources. I conducted expert interviews with representatives of all the studied public 
IOs and SNB-REACT. An overview of the type of interview partners per case study is 
presented in table 3. 
 
Table 3: Expert Interviews per Case Study 
 Interpol WCO WIPO Global 
Congress 
WTO WHO 
current and 
former 
employees 
of that IO 
  2** 4 2    8*** 1   2** 
further PPP 
participants 15 13 13 23     2**** 10 
PPP 
opponents* - 5 - - - 5 
Total 
interviews 17 22 15 31 3 16 
Source: Own account based on altogether 36 expert interviews. 
*) PPP opponents have only been counted for the WCO and the WHO, as there was major opposition. 
Criticism and suggestions for improvement have not been considered opposition here. 
**) Aline Plançon, an Interpol employee on loan to the WHO, has been counted for Interpol and for the 
WHO here. 
***) Refers to employees of IOs in the Global Congress Steering Group: Interpol, WCO and WIPO. 
****) There are no PPP participants for the WTO case as there is no PPP. However, the number 
represents participants of other PPPs who mentioned failed attempts to establish a closer relationship 
between the private sector and the WTO. 
 
 
In total, I conducted 36 expert interviews. Conveniently, most interview partners were 
able to give information about more than one case as they were involved in several 
PPPs against IP crimes. Each expert interview was conducted in person and lasted 
between 30 minutes and 2 hours. Often additional information was given after the 
interview via e-mail or in phone calls. I offered anonymity to all interview partners, but 
many interview partners explicitly stated that they do not need protection through 
anonymity. I recorded almost all interviews. In only a few cases I had to rely on notes 
because the interview partner was not comfortable with a recording. 
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Although literature about interview-based research often recommends not to 
confront one interview partner with information from another interview (Gläser & 
Laudel 2009: 152), I decided to depart from that rule in the rare cases when 
information given in one interview appeared inconsistent with previously received 
information from a non-anonymous source. This strategy proved very helpful in 
increasing the accuracy of information. Once presented with the apparently 
contradictory information, the interview partners clarified misunderstandings, 
corrected errors, or supported their version of the events with evidence. In one case, 
this led to a lively e-mail exchange between interview partners with supporting 
evidence sent as attachments in copy to me. 
Data Evaluation 
I identified relevant statements about PPP developments in the interview transcripts, 
interview notes, and several primary documents and coded them using MaxQDA 
software. In further steps of the coding process I grouped the codes into code 
categories that are sufficiently abstract to be applicable across cases (Coffey & 
Atkinson 1996: 26). For example, in the first coding process I coded statements 
concerning cooperation in the pursuit of absolute gains in money, human resources, 
information for policy decisions, information for law enforcement operations, and in 
the knowledge and skills to conduct trainings. In the second step of coding, I grouped 
all these codes into the code category of cooperation in the pursuit of absolute 
resource gains. This code and the code for cooperation in the pursuit of relative 
resource gains / competitive behavior were then coded as the top-level code 
cooperation in the pursuit of resource gains. In a similar fashion, I coded all 
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references to a mandate for PPP management and all references to discretion for 
PPP management. I subsequently grouped these codes into PPP management. 
After these two phases of coding, I proceeded to the comparison of the six 
cases using Mill’s methods of agreement and difference (George & Bennett 2005: 
153) in order to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for PPP formation, type, 
and development. With this method I identified five relevant factors and developed 
three hypotheses about how these factors influence PPP formation, type, and 
continuation or change. 
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4. Interpol 
The International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO / Interpol) is a public 
international organization that facilitates international police cooperation against 
transnational crime. While Interpol has no police powers anywhere in the world, it 
offers a wide variety of support services to law enforcement agencies in its 188 
member countries. Intellectual property crimes fall into Interpol’s field of activity as 
long as they are transnational. Mere civil actions against intellectual property 
infringements do not fall into its field of activity, unless they are of interest because 
they overlap with criminal actions. Interpol increased its activities in this crime area 
after the signing of the TRIPS agreement in 1994 and especially since it created a 
dedicated IP crime unit in 2001. 
This chapter starts with relevant background Information about Interpol and 
then analyzes how Interpol became active against IP crime. The subsequent sections 
are dedicated to different Interpol-led PPPs against IP crime. They start with the 
Interpol IP Crime Action Group and analyze how this unitary advisory PPP 
increasingly developed into a PPP network, consisting of one advisory PPP and 
several collaborative PPPs. The final section of this chapter summarizes the key 
findings from the Interpol case study with a view to explaining the developments. 
Background on Interpol 
In 2009, Interpol had 188 member states, a staff of 645, and a budget of 59 million 
Euro (app. 82m USD), of which more than 90% came from member states (Interpol 
2010f). From its secretariat in Lyon, Interpol provides a wide variety of services for its 
member countries in order to improve international police cooperation. Interpol 
facilitates personal contacts between law enforcement officers through a system of 
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liaison officers and seconded officers. It maintains a global police communication 
system and several police databases, for example, to exchange information about 
fugitives, stolen motor vehicles, stolen works of art, and lost and stolen travel 
documents. Interpol also analyses the gathered information and provides information 
about transnational crime developments. Last but not least, Interpol offers assistance 
to member countries with police training, police capacity building measures, and 
operational support through the 24 hour a day operational Command and Co-
ordination Centre or through Interpol support teams who are sent on request to 
member states (Interpol 2010f). 
Interpol has a history of understanding itself as a non-political organization. 
From its beginnings, it was intended to facilitate police cooperation even between 
states that have difficult political relations. Therefore, regular diplomatic channels 
were avoided as much as possible. Interpol’s predecessor, the International Criminal 
Police Commission (ICPC), was founded in 1923 as a nongovernmental organization 
similar to an international professional association of chiefs of police, but its business 
was the facilitation of international cooperation between public law enforcement 
agencies (Anderson 1989: 39). This ambivalent character of the organization - acting 
on behalf of governments and yet remarkably independent from governments - 
continued when it was re-established after World War II. It filed a request to the 
United Nations Economic and Social Council for recognition as a nongovernmental 
organization in 1947 (Anderson 1989: 69). This request from an apparently 
intergovernmental organization created some confusion, but was eventually granted. 
However, in many respects Interpol was treated differently than other non-
governmental organizations and in 1971 the UN re-classified it as an 
intergovernmental organization (Anderson 1989: 70). Keohane and Nye explicitly 
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mentioned Interpol as an example of what they call transgovernmental: interactions 
between "sub-units of governments on those occasions when they act relatively 
autonomously from higher political authority in international politics" (Keohane & Nye 
1974: 41). 
Interpol still can be described today as a public international organization that 
is more transgovernmental than intergovernmental, and less political than many other 
public international organizations. However, the degree to which Interpol is 
transgovernmental and non-political has decreased over the years. Interpol was often 
described as a “policeman’s club” during the first 25 years after World War II 
(Anderson 1989:42, Fooner 1989: 54). In 1971, the UN re-classified it from a non-
governmental organization to an intergovernmental organization (Anderson 1989: 70) 
and it is widely regarded as such today. All public international organizations 
examined in this study recognize Interpol as a peer organization. More than 20 
international conventions mention Interpol and thereby legitimize it as an international 
institution (Interpol 2010b). Interpol’s constitution, regulations, and practices allow 
two interpretations concerning the membership of the organization. On the one hand, 
Interpol’s current constitution from 1956 frequently refers to police bodies as 
members of the organization. For example, article 4 of the constitution regulates that 
“Any country may delegate as a Member to the Organization any official police body 
whose functions come within the framework of activities of the Organization.” 
(Interpol 1956) On the other hand, the constitution regulates that each country, not 
each police body, has one vote in the General Assembly, Interpol’s supreme 
governing body. And today’s Interpol website provides a list of 188 “member 
countries” (Interpol 2010h), not member police bodies. However, the member 
countries are represented in the annual General Assemblies by chiefs of police and 
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high ranking law enforcement officers instead of the diplomats who would otherwise 
be expected in international affairs. This is regulated in the Interpol constitution: 
 
“Because of the technical nature of the Organization, Members should attempt to include the 
following in their delegations: 
(a) High officials of departments dealing with police affairs, 
(b) Officials whose normal duties are connected with the activities of the Organization, 
(c) Specialists in the subjects on the agenda.” 
Article 7, Constitution of Interpol (1956) 
  
The “technical nature” described in article 7 is understood as in contrast to the 
“political nature” of many other international organizations. Article 3 of the convention 
prohibits any “activities of a political, military, religious or racial character”. The 
purpose of this self-restraint is to allow police cooperation even between countries 
with difficult political relations, who, for example, would not want to help the other 
country in its suppression of political dissidents. However, Interpol’s interpretation of 
the distinction between political and ordinary criminals has changed over the years. 
While Interpol refused to assist in activities against war criminals after World War II, it 
changed the policy in 1985, when it issued a red notice7 requesting the arrest of Nazi 
war criminal Joseph Mengele (Anderson 1989: 46). During the 1960s and 1970s, 
Interpol reacted very reluctantly to requests for assistance against terrorists on the 
grounds that it is political, but this changed in the 1980s and 1990s (Barnett & 
Coleman 2005: 611). Since the 1999 General Assembly declared the fight against 
international terrorism as one of the main aims of Interpol (Interpol 1999b), it became 
increasingly a core crime area of Interpol and many of the Interpol red notices for 
wanted persons now concern terrorist suspects (Interpol 2011f). 
However, although the degree to which Interpol is non-political has decreased 
over the years, it is still less political than many other public international 
                                            
7
 A red notice is a standardized Interpol communication informing all Interpol members about a person 
whose arrest and extradition is requested. It is usually based on a national arrest warrant. 
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organizations and this is an important characteristic of the organization. When talking 
to Interpol employees, they mention quite frequently that they deal with technical, 
non-political matters (Reuland 2009, Newton 2009a, Plançon 2010). 
Interpol and Intellectual Property Crimes 
When Interpol first paid high level attention to the issue of intellectual property 
crimes, it was rather brief and did not have significant consequences. The Interpol 
General Assembly at its 1977 session in Stockholm passed a resolution encouraging 
member states to do more to combat piracy of movies and sound recordings. It did 
so after lobbyists from the film industry approached Interpol and asked for actions 
against such copyright infringements (Sandhu 1999: 99). However, besides 
encouraging its members to become active, Interpol did not take action itself. 
The issue resurfaced in 1994, the year when the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations was concluded and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was signed. The affected industries, which had 
lobbied for IP regulation through TRIPS (Sell 2003: 2), then also lobbied Interpol to 
get involved in the enforcement of those rights. A public-private “Working Party on 
Product Counterfeiting and Piracy” was held on two consecutive days in February 
1994 at the Interpol Headquarters in Lyon. The participants of this meeting 
represented associations, nine individual companies from Europe and the United 
States, and law enforcement agencies from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Switzerland, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Sandhu 1999: 
99). This meeting adopted recommendations to increase international cooperation 
against product counterfeiting and piracy and to raise awareness of the issue at the 
national level. In October 1994, the Interpol General Assembly in Rome passed a 
 
56 Christopher Paun: Globalization of Law Enforcement 
 
resolution that was based on the recommendations of the public-private working 
party (Sandhu 1999: 99). Interpol asked its members to increase its efforts against IP 
crime, but its own efforts were rather limited. None of the Interpol staff was 
exclusively dedicated to the issue, and the Working Party on Product Counterfeiting 
and Piracy was invited only every two years from 1994 on. 
However, Interpol made an attempt to gather more information on the issue. A 
1995 Interpol study showed that the information available about the subject was 
sketchy. The study was further complicated due to the fact that only 45 of its then 
177 member states replied to Interpol’s IP crime survey. But Interpol’s efforts to 
gather information and to raise awareness culminated in a 1999 special issue of the 
Interpol member magazine International Criminal Police Review. The entire special 
issue of more than 100 pages was dedicated to counterfeiting and piracy and 
included contributions from Microsoft, PSA Peugeot Citroen, Glaxo Wellcome, the 
Anti-Counterfeiting Group, and the International Chamber of Commerce (Interpol 
1999a). This 1999 special issue had set the scene for the 2000 Interpol General 
Assembly in Rhodes, where the Interpol General Secretariat received the mandate 
“to combat international violations of intellectual property rights.” (Interpol 2000) With 
this resolution, the General Assembly supported Interpol’s plans to address this issue 
“in co-operation with the international business community by implementing a 
comprehensive programme not only aimed at raising awareness of the problem, but 
also focusing on a comprehensive strategy to actively combat this form of crime” 
(Interpol 2000).  
This program was created in 2001 and its first manager was the Danish police 
officer Erik Madsen. Thereafter, Interpol had one staff member dedicated to 
intellectual property crimes. In order to establish a closer relationship between this 
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new program and the interested business community, Interpol hosted an 
International Conference on Intellectual Property Rights in November 2001. This 
conference proposed to establish a public-private partnership to address this issue, 
as a more formal and permanent working group (Interpol 2005b: 9). The resulting 
PPP became known as the Interpol IP Crime Action Group. 
 
The Interpol IP Crime Action Group (IIPCAG) 
At its first meetings in July and October 2002, the group was first called “Interpol 
Expert Group on Intellectual Property Rights” and then “Interpol Advisory Group on 
Intellectual Property Rights” (WIPO 2003b: 5). Only from its third meeting in January 
2003 onward did it have its final name: the Interpol IP Crime Action Group. Since 
then it has met about two to three times a year. Especially during its early years, this 
group served as the primary IP related partnership with the private sector for Interpol. 
Later, it became only one of many partnerships in a PPP network with the Interpol IP 
crime program at its center. Table 4 shows a list of the members of IIPCAG based on 
a brochure that was produced by Interpol in June 2007. This list shows 18 public 
sector members and 13 private sector members. 10 of the private sector members 
are business associations and only 3 are individual companies. 
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Table 4: Interpol IP Crime Action Group (IIPCAG) 
Founded 2002 
Secretariat: Interpol 
Co-chairs: Interpol 
Int. Federation of the Phonographic Industry (founding co-chair) 
Underwriters Laboratories (since 2006) 
Public Sector Members 
International: Interpol 
World Customs Organization (WCO) 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
Europol 
National: Belgian National Police 
Department of Public Security (PR China) 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (USA) 
Finland National Board of Customs 
French National Police 
Irish National Police (Garda Siochana) 
Italian National Police 
Mexican Institute of Industrial Property 
Mexican National Police 
Police Service of Northern Ireland (UK) 
Public Prosecutor for Serious Economic Crime (Denmark) 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
Spanish National Police (Guardia Civil and Policía Nacional) 
United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office 
Private Sector Members: 
Associations: Coalition for Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR) 
Global Anti-Counterfeiting Group (GACG) 
International Chamber of Commerce Business Action to Stop 
 Counterfeiting and Piracy (ICC BASCAP)* 
International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) 
International Trademark Association (INTA) 
Motion Picture Association (MPA) 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) 
Pharmaceutical Security Institute (PSI) 
Union des Fabricants (Unifab) 
United States Chamber of Commerce Coalition Against Counterfeiting 
 and Piracy (USCC CACP) 
Companies: Microsoft Corporation 
Procter & Gamble 
Underwriters Laboratories (UL) 
Source: Own account based on IIPCAG 2007a, Monks 2010, Grant 2011 
*) In January 2007 BASCAP merged with the Global Business Leaders Alliance Against Counterfeiting 
(GBLAAC). Until then GBLAAC was an independent member of IIPCAG (Dobson 2010). 
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While the published membership list emphasized the membership of business 
associations instead of individual companies, many participants of the meetings are 
actually employees of companies who sit at the table officially representing one of the 
business associations. For example, employees of Unilever, British American 
Tobacco, Lacoste, L’Oréal, and LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton have 
participated in IIPCAG meetings, although the names of these companies do not 
appear in the brochure or on the Interpol website (Heath 2010, Hardy 2009, Interpol 
2005b). John Newton, a British police officer who has managed the IP crime program 
since 2003, explained this emphasis on business associations instead of individual 
companies as a means to safeguard the reputation of Interpol: 
 
“It would be deadly for us to be perceived as being in the pocket of one particular company. 
That would kill the program overnight. So we work with cross-industry representative bodies.” 
John Newton (2011), Interpol Intellectual Property Crime Program Manager 
 
This concern also influences how Interpol accepts financial support from the private 
sector for its activities. The IP crime program does not accept funding from individual 
companies, only from associations. For example, the US Chamber of Commerce, the 
International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), and the Pharmaceutical 
Security Institute (PSI) supported the Interpol IP crime program financially (Newton 
2009a, Huther 2010, Kubic 2010, IIPCAG 2007b, IFPI 2005: 11). Acquiring private 
sector funding for its activities has been increasingly important for Interpol and 
especially for its IP crime program. While Interpol as a whole gets up to 10% of its 
funding from private sector entities, the IP crime program receives about as many 
contributions from the private sector as it receives from the public sector (Newton 
2011). When IIPCAG was set up in 2002, the financial aspect of the public-private 
cooperation was less prominent than it is today. It was first designed as an advisory 
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PPP, as is also indicated by the early names “Expert Group” and “Advisory Group”. 
The initial goals of the group were to raise awareness of IP crime, to exchange 
information about it and about the means to fight it, and to discuss how the fight 
against IP crime can be improved by international and public-private cooperation. 
However, the Interpol secretariat aimed to make the partnership more collaborative, 
by trying to persuade the private sector members of IIPCAG to put more resources 
into the joint fight against counterfeiting and piracy. It tried to model the Interpol PPP 
against IP crime based on another PPP at Interpol, which worked against payment 
card fraud. The payment card companies American Express, Discover, MasterCard, 
Europay, and Visa had an agreement with Interpol from 1999 to 2004 in which they 
agreed to finance Interpol activities against payment card fraud (Madsen 2002). This 
PPP was not continued, because Interpol asked the payment card companies to 
increase their funding for this PPP, but they could not reach an agreement (Int.06 
2010). 
However, Interpol’s attempt to transfer the model of the payment card PPP to 
the IP crime partnership was not successful. One important reason was that there 
are a lot more owners of intellectual property than there are payment card 
companies. While it was possible for Interpol to bring all major payment card 
companies to the table and reach an agreement that excludes the possibility of free 
riding for some stakeholders, this is practically impossible for all the IP owners and 
their many associations. Nevertheless, some private sector partners were willing to 
commit more resources to the partnership than just their advice and active 
participation in meetings, though they were not willing to provide general funding for 
the Interpol IP crime program. Such general funding by a few IP owners or 
associations would have been an incentive for free riding for others, possibly 
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competing companies, who could benefit from Interpol’s work against IP crime 
without supporting it directly. Instead, some private sector partners were willing to 
support specific Interpol projects that they considered to be more immediately in their 
interest (Dobson 2010, Newton 2009a). This strategy made it easier for them to 
justify their investment and it also increased their ability to influence Interpol 
activities. However, this project-based funding does not mean that Interpol was 
completely controlled by private sector organizations. Interpol was not dependent on 
one partner. It could choose between various partners. And whether a project was 
launched always depended on the ability to align Interpol’s interests with the interests 
of the particular partners. This is also expressed in the following two quotes. The first 
is from a private sector participant of IIPCAG, and the second is from the chair of 
IIPCAG and manager of the Interpol IP crime program: 
 
“IIPCAG is a forum for John [Newton] and the secretariat at Interpol to convince the business 
community to support initiatives that Interpol wants to do. I think to a certain extent it also 
becomes a forum where the business community can present projects that Interpol should be 
working on. But my impression is, unless Interpol, unless John sees a way that those are 
really going to help him and help Interpol, they don’t go very far.” 
Bill Dobson (2010), IIPCAG participant on behalf of the 
Global Business Leaders Alliance Against Counterfeiting (GBLAAC) and later the 
Business Action to Stop Counterfeiting and Piracy (BASCAP) 
 
"In the decision making process [I ask:] Is there a cost-benefit for Interpol? And that does not 
necessarily mean cash. Does this activity meet our core priorities? There are certain core 
priorities we have, which is operation of police databases, operation of police support, and all 
that sort of things. So I make a judgment on: does it meet the needs of our member countries 
and is it in line with the objectives of my organization.” 
John Newton (2009a), Interpol Intellectual Property Crime Program Manager 
 
As an unintended side-effect, this project-based funding also led to the fragmentation 
of the Interpol PPP from one large unitary partnership (IIPCAG) to a PPP network 
with several smaller partnerships involving only those partners willing to commit 
significant resources to it. Until 2007, IIPCAG had a central role within this PPP 
network, but this diminished over time (Newton 2009a, Monks 2010). This can also 
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be seen from Interpol publications, where all Interpol activities against IP crime were 
presented as activities of IIPCAG until 2007 (IIPCAG 2006, IIPCAG 2007b). Later, 
the IP Crime Action Group became only one of several partnerships in a PPP 
network tied together by the Interpol IP Crime Program as the central node. This is 
also reflected in later Interpol publications, which were no longer presented on behalf 
of IIPCAG (Interpol 2009f, Interpol 2010j). 
During the early years of IIPCAG, there were about 30 participants, but only 
four of them were willing to commit significant resources to the partnership beyond 
active participation and advice (Newton 2009a). These were the music industry, 
represented by the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), the 
movie industry, represented by the Motion Picture Association (MPA), the 
pharmaceutical industry, represented by the Pharmaceutical Security Institute (PSI), 
and the tobacco industry, most prominently represented by British American Tobacco 
(BAT). These four private sector partners were also the first to support Interpol’s 
training and operational activities in the operation Jupiter (Newton 2009a, Hobbs 
2009, Int.06 2010, IIPCAG 2006: 2). Among these four core supporters, IFPI was 
probably the most influential (Dobson 2010, Kubic 2010). They had lobbied Interpol 
for years to take an active role against IP crime, and when IIPCAG was founded, the 
IFPI representative Iain Grant took the lead as the private sector co-chair of this PPP 
(Grant 2011). IFPI also provided 35,000 Euro direct funding for the Interpol IP Crime 
Program (IFPI 2005: 11) and they provided training material, which served as the 
basis for an Interpol IP crime investigations manual (IIPCAG 2006: 3). 
In 2006, the US Chamber of Commerce became an important partner of 
Interpol when they decided to finance the creation of the Database on International 
Intellectual Property (DIIP) (IIPCAG 2007b). The product safety certification 
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organization Underwriters Laboratories Inc. (UL) also became an increasingly 
important Interpol partner in 2006 when UL representative Brian Monks was elected 
as co-chair of IIPCAG. Since then, UL has been a major partner in several 
partnerships in the Interpol PPP network: the International Law Enforcement IP 
Crime Conference, the Certification Industry Against Counterfeiting (CIAC), and the 
International IP Crime Investigator’s College (IIPCIC) (Monks 2010, Newton 2009a). 
The following sections of this chapter give an overview of the different partnerships in 
the Interpol PPP network. 
Operation Jupiter 
Operation Jupiter is the most prominent operational partnership in the PPP network 
of Interpol. It started in 2004 in South America and consists of several training 
seminars, investigations, and raids in different locations of the participating countries 
that are conducted annually. In the seminars, the law enforcement officers learned 
about the method of operation of IP criminals and how to distinguish counterfeits 
from original products. The trainers in these seminars were from the public and 
private sector (Newton 2009a). Also, the investigations and raids involved close 
collaboration between public law enforcement officers and private sector security 
professionals. The actual arrests and seizures have been carried out by the national 
law enforcement agencies of the participating countries because they have the 
necessary legitimacy to apply force, but the entire decision making process about 
when, where, why, and how to apply force has been influenced by the partners from 
the private sector. The resources invested by the companies and associations, in 
terms of information, intelligence, human resources, and money, were relevant for 
the outcome of Operation Jupiter. Interpol, which has neither the resources nor the 
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necessary police power for such operations, contributed in two ways: On the one 
hand, Interpol facilitated and coordinated the necessary transnational and public-
private collaboration (Newton 2009a). On the other hand, Interpol’s reputation also 
helped to legitimize the entire operation (Dobson 2010). Information was given from 
the private sector partners to Interpol, was checked there, and was then passed on to 
the national law enforcement agencies. Thereby, Interpol lent its credibility to the 
private sector information. This gain in credibility and reputation can make it more 
attractive for companies and associations to operate via Interpol rather than 
approaching the national law enforcement agencies directly. The flow of information 
from the private sector via Interpol to national law enforcement agencies in Operation 
Jupiter is also described in the following quote of a former British police officer who 
then became investigations manager at British American Tobacco: 
 
"I am one of the founder members of Operation Jupiter on behalf of my company. As a former 
Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) detective chief inspector (Organised Crime Group in the 
days when I retired), I have worked for British American Tobacco at its headquarters in 
London since I retired in 2001. [...] All the evidence gained in each phase of the [Jupiter] 
operations, and there have been four thus far, has been obtained by industry itself and then 
handed to the appropriate enforcement authority via Interpol. [...] There are great opportunities 
to be had by mutual cooperation between private industry and the enforcement authorities. 
You would be astounded at the intelligence industry generates in its operations, as was I when 
I first joined, and it is there to be shared in appropriate circumstances." 
Terry Hobbs (2009), Senior Investigations Manager, Brand Enforcement 
Group of British American Tobacco 
 
The first phase of Operation Jupiter was conducted from November 2004 until April 
2005. Its focus was the triborder region between Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. 
The participating public sector partners were the police agencies of these three 
countries together with the Brazilian Customs and Interpol. The private sector 
partners came from the music, motion picture, pharmaceutical, and tobacco industry 
(Interpol 2008e). The music and the motion picture industry each show an 
exceptional high degree of law enforcement collaboration, also between competing 
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companies. They pool their law enforcement resources to a large extent and have 
their copyrights enforced by associations. The two major global associations for 
these industries are the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) 
and the Motion Picture Association (MPA), which were also partners in Operation 
Jupiter from the beginning. The impact of their involvement might be seen from the 
fact that many of the seized products were CDs and DVDs, especially during the first 
three years of Operation Jupiter (Interpol 2008e, Interpol 2011g). Interpol published 
the first detailed statistic of the seizures with a breakdown by product category for 
Operation Jupiter III. According to this statistic, 55.5% of the seized products were 
CDs and DVDs (Interpol 2008e).  
 The pharmaceutical industry was represented in Operation Jupiter by the 
Pharmaceutical Security Institute. PSI is an association of 25 research-based 
pharmaceutical companies that focuses on anti-counterfeiting. It became the primary 
private sector partner of Interpol in the fight against counterfeit medicines and has 
also supported Interpol financially (Kubic 2010). The level of law enforcement 
collaboration between competing companies in the pharmaceutical sector is lower 
than in the music and movie industry, but it is still higher than in many other industry 
sectors. The PSI member companies have their own security staff and only rely on 
PSI for the facilitation of collaboration with other companies and for the analysis of all 
the information submitted by members, especially checking for links between cases. 
Due to the prominent role of the individual companies, some were also involved in 
Operation Jupiter individually (Interpol 2011g). 
 The tobacco industry and all other industries that subsequently joined 
Operation Jupiter have been represented by individual company representatives 
during operations, as such work is not delegated to associations. For activities in the 
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area of awareness raising and lobbying, Interpol prefers the participation of 
representatives from business associations in order not to appear too influenced by a 
few particular companies (Newton 2009a). For example, when the results of the first 
phase of Operation Jupiter were presented at a conference in Rio de Janeiro in June 
2005, the private sector was represented on the high level panel by the Global 
Business Leaders Alliance Against Counterfeiting (GBLAAC) executive director 
William Dobson (Dobson 2010, Interpol 2005c). And when the Jupiter results were 
presented on the occasion of the second Global Congress on Combating 
Counterfeiting & Piracy at the Interpol Headquarters in November 2005, the BAT 
employee Neil Withington also spoke on behalf of GBLAAC (Withington 2005). 
 
Table 5: Operation Jupiter (South America) 
No. Time Countries Results 
I Nov 2004 
- Apr 2005 
Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay 
93 arrests and seizures with an 
estimated value of 15 million USD* 
II Sep 
– Dec 2006 
Previous 3 plus Chile and 
Uruguay 
129 arrests and seizures with an 
estimated value of 35 million USD* 
III Oct  
- Dec 2007 
Previous 5 185 arrests and seizures with an 
estimated value of 116 million USD* 
IV Jul 
- Sep 2008 
Previous 5 plus Bolivia 
and Peru 
311 arrests and seizures with an 
estimated value of 131 million USD* 
V Sep 2009 
- Dec 2010 
Previous 7 plus 
Colombia, Ecuador, 
French Guyana, Panama, 
Suriname, Venezuela 
About 1000 arrests, seizures with an 
estimated value of 200 million USD* 
and more than 150 law enforcement 
officers trained 
Source: Own account based on Interpol 2008e, Interpol 2009b, Interpol 2011g, Interpol 2011d 
*) Interpol does not provide details about the method used to estimate the value of the seized goods. 
These figures need to be treated with caution due to the difficulties involved with estimating the value 
of counterfeit goods as described in chapter one.  
 
Operation Jupiter II was conducted from September until December 2006. In addition 
to the participants of the first phase, law enforcement agencies from Chile and 
Uruguay also joined. New representatives on the private sector side came from 
luxury brand companies producing textiles or other designer articles. Since then, the 
operation has been conducted annually and has included more and more industry 
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sectors and more countries. It has also led to an increasing number of arrests and 
seizures associated with the operation. Operation Jupiter V was thus far the longest 
and largest phase of Operation Jupiter. It lasted from September 2009 until 
December 2010 and involved 13 participating countries in South America and 20 
participating industry sectors. In addition to Interpol, the World Customs Organization 
was also involved. As a result of all five phases of Operation Jupiter, several hundred 
law enforcement officers have been trained in the fight against IP crime, about 1700 
people have been arrested, and several tons of counterfeit and pirated products have 
been seized, including CDs, DVDs, toys, cigarettes, watches, clothes, medicine, 
agrochemicals, and processed food (Table 5). 
The Counterfeit Medical Products Spin-Off 
Under the umbrella of Interpol operations, the majority of counterfeit product seizures 
outside of South America have been focused on medical products. An important 
reason for this is the health risk involved with pharmaceutical counterfeiting. This 
helps Interpol to legitimize the activity against IP crime (Newton 2009a). The 
specialization in counterfeit medical products has its origin in Operation Jupiter 
South-East Asia that ran from May 2005 until March 2006. It was organized by 
Interpol in collaboration with the World Health Organization and the Tropical 
Medicine Research Programme of the charitable Wellcome Trust (Newton 2009a, 
Newton et al. 2008). The focus of Operation Jupiter South-East Asia was an 
investigation into the trade of counterfeit versions of the anti-malaria medicine 
artesunate. A sample of tablets from Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and 
Vietnam was examined, showing that 49.9% of the sample was counterfeit. All 
counterfeit artesunate tablets contained less than a quarter of the required active 
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ingredient. Instead, the tablets contained a wide variety of other, potentially harmful, 
ingredients. The forensic examination of the tablets and the packages also 
suggested that at least some of them originated in China (Newton et al. 2008). In 
March 2006, the Interpol secretary general Ronald Noble presented the findings at 
the Chinese Ministry of Public Security in Beijing, emphasizing the health risk from 
the counterfeit medicine and the economic effect on the main producer of genuine 
artesunate, the Chinese pharmaceutical company Guilin. The subsequent 
investigation in China led to the arrest of two suspects and the seizure of 24,000 
blister packs of counterfeit artesunate (Newton et al. 2008). 
 In February 2006, the World Health Organization founded its own public-
private partnership against counterfeit medical products, the International Medical 
Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce (IMPACT), and Interpol was one of the 
founding members of that PPP. The collaboration between Interpol and WHO 
intensified in January 2008, when the French police officer Aline Plançon was sent 
from Interpol to WHO to manage the enforcement activities of IMPACT from the 
WHO secretariat (Plançon 2010). Since then, almost all Interpol operations targeting 
counterfeit medicine have been conducted under the umbrella of WHO IMPACT. 
These include Operation Storm in South-East Asia, Operation Mamba in Africa, and 
the global Operation Pangea, targeting counterfeit medicine sold on the internet. 
These activities will be analyzed in more detail in chapter 9 about the World Health 
Organization. However, in January 2010 the Interpol Medical Products Counterfeiting 
and Pharmaceutical Crime Unit was founded as a newly independent spin-off 
(Interpol 2010g). The remaining Interpol IP Crime Unit has been dedicated to all non-
medicine related IP crimes. 
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Other Operational and Training Activities 
The main operational partnerships are those that are conducted annually: Operation 
Jupiter in South America, Operation Storm in South-East Asia, Operation Mamba in 
East Africa, and the global Operation Pangea. However, there are also smaller 
operations which have only been conducted once, such as Operation Atlantic in West 
Africa (Interpol 2011e) and Operation Zambezi in Southern Africa (Interpol 2009a). 
The course of events is similar in each operation: a training seminar followed by 
investigations and raids with arrests and seizures. However, the partners involved 
and the support for each operation can differ. For example, low purchasing power 
makes most African states a less attractive market for many companies. Therefore, 
they are not interested in getting involved with law enforcement PPPs there, as the 
benefits would probably not offset the costs (Buchan 2010). Nevertheless, Interpol 
managed to find supporters. A major financial contributor to Interpol activities in 
Africa is the German government. Since 2008 it has financed the Interpol OASIS 
(Operational Assistance, Services and Infrastructure Support) program with an 
annual budget of 4 million EUR (Interpol 2010k, AA 2010). While OASIS supports law 
enforcement capacity building throughout Africa in general and not just in the area of 
IP crime, it has effectively been the main funding source for Interpol activities against 
counterfeiting and piracy in Africa since 2008 (Plançon 2010). 
 The operations are probably the most impressive aspect of the Interpol PPPs 
against IP crime because the results can be immediately measured by the number of 
seizures and arrests. However, there are also many partnerships organized only 
around training seminars without subsequent raids. The trainings are relevant 
because they raise awareness of IP crime, provide law enforcement officers with the 
skills and knowledge to fight it, and establish contacts between public law 
 
70 Christopher Paun: Globalization of Law Enforcement 
 
enforcement officers and private security professionals that provide the basis for 
future collaboration. One example of such a training partnership is the Interpol IP 
Crime Training Program. It started in November 2007 with a five day training course 
that was held in Rome at the police academy of the Italian financial police Guardia di 
Finanza. Four such courses have taken place in Rome, providing training for a total 
of more than 100 law enforcement officers from Italy and from many other countries. 
Private sector partners from the Interpol IP Crime Action Group provided substantial 
support to the courses including trainers, training material, and financial support. The 
private funding was also used to pay for the travel costs of several public sector 
participants (Interpol 2009f: 7, Dobson 2010). 
 Interpol organized similar courses on IP crime in Argentina, Kenya, Senegal, 
South Korea, Hong Kong, Turkey, Mexico, and Thailand, training more than 200 
people per year (Interpol 2009f, Interpol 2010j). The partners involved and the 
sources of funding differed from course to course. The course in Kenya has been 
financed by the German government through the OASIS program (Interpol 2008h), 
the course in Turkey has been financed by the European Commission (Interpol 
2010i), and the courses in Senegal and in Mexico both have been financed by the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (Interpol 2010l, Interpol 2011a). 
By receiving funding from different partners, Interpol is less dependent than if 
it would rely on only one source of income. It can get support from a wide variety of 
private and public partners. However, the Interpol IP crime program depends on 
external income, because it does not get enough funding from the regular Interpol 
budget to organize these operations and trainings (Newton 2009a). Though the 
limited regular funding increases the dependence of the program on external funding, 
it also increases its independence from the regular Interpol members and the Interpol 
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decision making bodies. It can be time consuming and could be difficult to organize a 
majority at the Interpol General Assembly to increase the budget of measures 
against IP crime, as IP crime is not considered to be a priority crime. Therefore, it is 
easier to avoid a potentially controversial discussion and seek support from individual 
member countries and from the private sector. This high level of discretion through 
less dependence on the Interpol membership is also expressed in this quote from the 
manager of the Interpol IP Crime Program: 
 
“We are not constrained by member country criteria. [...] We don't have to go and ask for 
permission, like Europol for example. They have to get authority from all the member 
countries to do specific actions. Whereas I have a conversation with a representative of 
the private sector, identify common interest, and say <okay we will do this> and then we 
just do it.” 
John Newton (2009a), Interpol Intellectual Property Crime Program Manager 
 
International Law Enforcement IP Crime Conferences 
The product safety certification organization Underwriters Laboratories Inc. (UL) 
became an increasingly important Interpol partner. In 2005, the UL vice president for 
anti-counterfeiting operations, Brian Monks, joined the Interpol IP Crime action group 
upon invitation from Interpol. In 2006, he was elected co-chair of IIPCAG (Monks 
2010). And the first separate Interpol-UL partnership within the Interpol PPP network 
started in 2007, the International Law Enforcement IP Crime Conference. This annual 
three-day conference was first hosted in June 2007 in Niagara Falls, Canada, with 
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) as the hosting partner. The RCMP was 
also the hosting partner for the 2008 conference in Halifax, Canada (Newton 2009b). 
The conference in 2009 was hosted in partnership with the Irish national police 
Garda Siochana in Dublin, Ireland (Interpol 2009e). And the 2010 conference was 
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hosted in Hong Kong, China, together with Hong Kong Customs8. While the hosting 
partner changed depending on the venue of the conference, Interpol and UL were 
continuously the leading partners in this PPP. UL managed the bulk of the 
organizational work for the conference, including financial aspects like finding 
conference sponsors, exhibitors, and charging the delegate fees. So in the end, UL 
was not the only paying partner for the conference. The sponsorship and the fees 
from private sector delegates also make it possible for many police and customs 
officers to participate for free, and additional public sector delegates only have to pay 
a reduced fee (Newton 2009a). The fact that UL managed these financial 
transactions and much of the organizational work reduced the human resources 
needed at Interpol for the conference. It also prevented potential conflicts with 
Interpol financial regulations, as the Interpol program manager explained: 
 
“It's all done in a way which complies with our financial regulations. And quite often it is 
very helpful to work with a company like UL, who insulate us. They deal with the money 
side and they approach the private sector. I'm not a fundraiser. [...] It is very useful for us 
as a way of getting financial support without Interpol having to ask for money.” 
 John Newton (2009a), Interpol Intellectual Property Crime Program Manager 
 
Interpol’s strength in this partnership is that it attracts a wide variety of conference 
participants, especially from law enforcement agencies around the world. Interpol can 
invite speakers and public sector delegates who would be less willing to come to a 
purely private sector conference. Around 400 participants came to each of the first 
three conferences and around 500 to the fourth (Newton 2009b, Interpol 2009e, 
Interpol 2010d). This format is much bigger than the Interpol IP crime training 
courses, where the specific knowledge and skills are being taught in smaller groups. 
The focus of these IP crime conferences is more to exchange information and the 
                                            
8
 Information about the 2010 Interpol International Law Enforcement IP Crime Conference has been 
obtained by a participant observation. 
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networking across national borders and between the public and the private sector. 
Smaller workshops during or after the conference may also serve a training function, 
such as the training day subsequent to the Hong Kong conference (Interpol 2010e).  
 On the other hand, the International Law Enforcement IP Crime Conference is 
smaller than the Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy analyzed 
in chapter 7. It also has a more technical and less political focus. While the Global 
Congress also lobbies a higher political level to change the legal environment, the IP 
Crime Conference is focused on practical approaches within the existing legal 
framework (Newton 2009a).  
Certification Industry Against Counterfeiting (CIAC) 
In March 2008, Interpol hosted a Certification Industry Anti-Counterfeiting Summit at 
its headquarters in Lyon. Eleven major international certification organizations 
participated in this summit and formed the Certification Industry Against 
Counterfeiting (CIAC) together with Interpol (Interpol 2008d). A list of CIAC members 
is shown in table 6. While each member has a particularly strong presence in one 
country or region, all these certification organizations operate internationally. 
Therefore their areas of operation overlap and they are to some extent competitors. 
Yet they decided to overcome the competition and collaborate on anti-counterfeiting 
work, as the CIAC industry chairperson expressed: 
 
“CIAC is again to bring all these people / industries together. We can all be competitors, but 
when it comes to counterfeiting we are not competitors. We need to provide information, who 
the bad people are and what case you solve.” 
Brian Monks (2010), Vice President Anti-Counterfeiting Operations at 
Underwriters Laboratories and Industry Chairperson of 
Certification Industry Against Counterfeiting (CIAC) 
 
  
 
74 Christopher Paun: Globalization of Law Enforcement 
 
Table 6: Certification Industry Against Counterfeiting (CIAC) 
Founded 2008 
Secretariat: Interpol and Underwriters Laboratories 
Co-chairs: Interpol and Underwriters Laboratories 
Public Sector Members 
Interpol 
Private Sector Members (with location of headquarters): 
Bureau Veritas LCIE (France) 
CSA International (Canada) 
IMQ (Italy) 
Intertek Group (United Kingdom) 
KEMA (Netherlands) 
NSF International (USA) 
SGS S.A. (Switzerland) 
TÜV Rheinland Group (Germany) 
TÜV Süd (Germany) 
Underwriters Laboratories (USA) 
VDE Testing and Certification Institute (Germany) 
Source: Own account based on CIAC 1011 and Monks 2010 
 
Interpol and Underwriters Laboratories are the leading partners in this PPP as they 
co-chair CIAC and both provide secretariat functions. However, as Interpol prefers to 
work with associations instead of individual companies, CIAC was created to 
broaden the partnership with the certification industry. Besides three summits held in 
2008 and 2010, the main CIAC activity is Operation Overshock, which focuses on the 
fight against counterfeiters of certification marks. Law enforcement agencies 
participating in Operation Overshock include the Australian Federal Police, the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Europol (Interpol 2009f: 8, Interpol 
2010j) 
Interpol is interested in intensifying the partnership with the certification 
industry within the IP crime program, because products with a counterfeit certification 
mark are especially likely to pose health and safety risks (Newton 2009a). For 
example, electrical appliances such as a flat iron, which can melt down and cause 
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fires, have been found with a counterfeit UL certification mark. Also, smoke-detectors 
with a counterfeit UL mark have been found (Monks 2009). The Interpol IP crime 
program has increasingly focused its activities on products which pose a health or 
safety risk, such as electrical appliances, toys, and medicine. For example, about 
70% of the products covered in the IP Crime training workshops in East Africa 
involved a health or safety risk. This has been done because it is easier to find public 
support for the fight against such counterfeit products than for the fight against 
pirated DVDs or counterfeit handbags (Newton 2009a). At the same time, raising 
awareness of the health and safety risks that result from counterfeiting is beneficial 
for all the partners in the Interpol PPP network, as it is used to lobby for increased 
enforcement of intellectual property rights in general. 
International IP Crime Investigator’s College (IIPCIC) 
Besides the many training courses provided at different times in a variety of 
locations, Interpol also provides IP crime training material as a permanent resource. 
This started during the early years of the Interpol IP Crime Action Group with IP 
crime investigations manuals in different languages, which were partly based on a 
training manual of the International Federation of the Phonographic Industries 
(IIPCAG 2006: 3, Interpol 2005b, Interpol 2004: 20). 
In 2009, Interpol and Underwriters Laboratories started to develop an online 
learning site: the International IP Crime Investigator’s College (IIPCIC). The first 
IIPCIC training modules were presented at the 2009 Global Congress on Combating 
Counterfeiting and Piracy in Cancun. The website (iipcic.org) went online with a set 
of seven introductory learning modules shortly before the 2011 Global Congress in 
Paris (IIPCIC 2011). The idea behind IIPCIC is not only to provide training needed for 
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IP crime investigations: it is also to provide investigators in different countries, in 
different public agencies, and in the private sector, with shared knowledge, which 
makes collaboration easier. Having an online learning site, as opposed to a printed 
manual, also allows the updating of information and the coverage of recent 
developments. Interpol also intends to use IIPCIC as a communication platform to 
connect a global IP crime investigators community. A list of contact points and 
subject matter experts is available in order to provide specific information that is not 
covered in the modules. Also, Interpol training courses are announced on the 
platform (IIPCIC 2011, Newton 2009a). 
  The leading partners in this collaborative PPP are Interpol and Underwriters 
Laboratories. The arrangement between the partners bears some similarities with 
that of the IP Crime Conference. Interpol’s strength in this partnership is its access to 
law enforcement agencies around the world. UL provided seed funding and most of 
the required human resources to develop the online learning site. Additional private 
sector partners can provide industry specific learning modules. In order to do so, they 
have to pay a fee to UL and thereby offset some of UL’s costs (Newton 2009a). For 
example, a training module about optical disc piracy has been contributed by the 
Motion Picture Association (Buchan 2010). 
Database on International Intellectual Property (DIIP) 
Providing databases for the international exchange of information between law 
enforcement agencies is one of the core businesses of Interpol. Examples are the 
databases on fugitives, stolen motor vehicles, and lost and stolen travel documents. 
However, the Interpol databases did not contain much information related to IP crime 
before the IP crime program was started (Sandhu 1999: 100). Therefore, one of the 
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first ideas Interpol presented in the IP Crime Action Group was to create a 
specialized database for IP crime in collaboration with the private sector (Dobson 
2010). The idea was that IP rights owners collect a lot of information in their 
investigations, especially for civil litigations, and that it would be beneficial to share 
that information in order to find links between cases and to get a bigger picture of the 
IP crime situation (Newton 2009a). 
However, this idea met with mixed reactions from the private sector. While the 
International Federation of the Phonographic Industries was willing to submit 
information from their investigations to an Interpol database, many other participants 
were not so keen on the idea (Dobson 2010). Some companies simply did not have 
much information to share. Others had concerns they might violate national laws for 
data protection. Still others did not expect a benefit for them that would justify the 
resources needed to process and submit the information. And yet others were 
concerned about the security of their information at Interpol. If information would leak, 
it could potentially jeopardize ongoing investigations, have a negative impact on 
brand reputation, or it could be exploited by competitors (Huther 2010, Dobson 2010, 
Newton 2009a). 
Nevertheless, Interpol pursued the aim to set up a database for the exchange 
of information related to IP crime. In 2006, Interpol managed to get financial support 
for the creation of such a database. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce (USCC) 
provided seed funding in amounts of 400,000 USD for one year and 350,000 USD for 
the second year. And the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) paid an 
additional 250,000 USD to Interpol (Huther 2010, IIPCAG 2007b). Besides financing 
the database, this grant of a million dollars was also used to hire additional staff for 
the Interpol IP crime unit (Newton 2009a). Therefore, this partnership with the USCC 
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and the USPTO was a significant boost for the development of the Interpol IP crime 
unit, although the initial expectations concerning this database have not been met as 
many companies continued to have reservations. 
The Database on International Intellectual Property (DIIP) was operational and 
was officially launched in February 2008 at a conference in India hosted by the 
USCC, the US-India Business Council, and the Confederation of Indian Industry 
(Interpol 2008c). In reaction to the concerns of the private sector, DIIP has very strict 
data handling procedures to ensure a high level of security. The database may only 
be accessed by staff of the Interpol IP crime unit and nominated technicians for 
database maintenance (Interpol 2008b). Law enforcement agencies or participating 
private sector organizations have no direct access to the database. If companies 
submit data about a case, the Interpol IP crime unit checks the data, enters it into the 
database, and checks for links to other cases in DIIP or in other Interpol databases. 
DIIP itself only contains information submitted by the private sector, and other 
Interpol databases contain information only from police agencies. While the data is 
stored separately, there is an interface that allows to find links between a case 
submitted by a public law enforcement agency and a case submitted by a private 
sector investigator (Interpol 2008b). If a link is found, Interpol staff contacts the 
organizations who submitted the data and asks if their contact information and case 
reference number may be submitted to another organization. If the organizations 
agree, only the contact is established and the information exchange then takes place 
bilaterally. Interpol does not send the case information itself. Through this system, 
collaboration between different private sector organizations and between public and 
private organizations can be facilitated (Interpol 2008b). 
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Nevertheless, the database was not as successful as hoped. Many private 
sector members of the Interpol IP Crime Action Group continued to have reservations 
about the DIIP and did not supply data. Even the Pharmaceutical Security Institute, 
one of the core Interpol partners, decided not to supply data to the DIIP. Instead, they 
offered to provide specific information to Interpol on request or establish a contact 
with a member company which has the relevant information (Kubic 2010). The US 
Chamber, which invested significant resources into the database, was dissatisfied 
with the fact that other partners of Interpol were very reluctant to invest resources, be 
it money or data for the database. The USCC representative in the Interpol IP Crime 
Action Group at the time expressed this with the following words: 
 
“I was a part of the Interpol so-called IIPCAG advisory group and I was not very pleased with 
the composition of the group, nor was I pleased with what they did. They met. They worked on 
some interesting reports. The companies contributed no money. Most of the companies were 
not contributing data to the very database that was designed to help Interpol get better data. 
To me it was not very functional.” 
Brad Huther (2010), Senior Director at the Global IP Center of the 
United States Chamber of Commerce from 2005 until 2010 
 
While the database was not as successful as hoped, it became a useful tool for 
Interpol coordinated operations. Most of the information in the database was 
gathered in operations like Jupiter, Mamba, and Storm. Thereby, it has helped to find 
links between organized crime groups involved in IP crimes in different world regions 
(Newton 2009a). 
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Key Findings about the Development of Interpol PPPs 
Interpol’s involvement with IP crime was very limited until 1994. A resolution at the 
1977 Interpol General Assembly had hardly any consequences. No staff was 
dedicated to the issue and there was very little information about IP crime in the 
Interpol files. This began to change slowly as a result of a General Assembly 
resolution in 1994, and it increased significantly after a resolution in 2000. This 
coincided with the signing of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1994 and its subsequent implementation in several 
phases, which depended on the stage of economic development of each WTO 
member country and its date of accession. The year 2000 was the year in which 
TRIPS had to be implemented in countries in transition and in developing countries 
that were parties from the beginning. 
The TRIPS agreement triggered the increased activity of Interpol in three 
ways: First, the TRIPS agreement was the first agreement to regulate an 
international minimum standard for IP rights and, thereby, provided a common 
ground for the global enforcement of those rights. Second, the TRIPS agreement 
requires member states to criminalize trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy 
on a commercial scale. This requires law enforcement agencies around the globe to 
take an active role against IP crime, and Interpol, as their global transgovernmental 
organization, is also affected by the creation of this new prohibition regime. And third, 
the affected industries that lobbied for the regulation of IP rights through the TRIPS 
agreement subsequently lobbied Interpol to become involved in their enforcement.  
 The public-private Working Party on Product Counterfeiting and Piracy that 
was first held at the Interpol headquarters in 1994 was an early form of public-private 
cooperation but not a public-private partnership. As it was hosted only every two 
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years, it rather had the character of a re-occurring conference than of a continuous 
form of cooperation, which is a defining characteristic of a PPP. The re-occurrence of 
this working party in 2001 was called the International Conference on Intellectual 
Property Rights, and it proposed to establish a public-private partnership as a more 
formal and permanent working group. Therefore, the resulting Interpol IP Crime 
Action Group (IIPCAG) is the first Interpol PPP against IP crime. It met two to three 
times a year and had a continuous work plan as an advisory PPP focused on raising 
awareness of IP crime, exchanging information about such crimes and the means to 
fight them, and discussing ways to improve the fight against IP crime. 
 However, Interpol wanted more than an advisory PPP. It wanted a 
collaborative PPP where the private sector partners invest more resources into the 
partnership. Interpol had such a collaborative partnership with the payment card 
industry against payment card fraud, but it did not succeed in establishing a similar 
partnership with the IP owning industries. Cooperation problems between the private 
IIPCAG partners, especially the risk of free riding of some partners at the cost of 
others, prevented them from pooling their resources into one unified collaborative 
PPP. Instead, some private sector partners were willing to support specific Interpol 
projects that they considered to be more immediately in their interest. This project-
based funding led to the fragmentation of the Interpol PPP from IIPCAG into a PPP 
network with several smaller partnerships that involved only those partners who were 
willing to commit significant resources to it. This transition phase went from about 
2004, when the first Operation Jupiter was started, to about 2007, when the first 
International Law Enforcement IP Crime Conference showed the special partnership 
between Interpol and UL, and when the Interpol IP crime program received a 
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significant boost through funding from the US Chamber of Commerce for the 
Database on International Intellectual Property (DIIP). 
 The new Interpol PPP network consists of IIPCAG as one advisory PPP and 
several collaborative PPPs, such as Operation Jupiter, DIIP, IIPCIC, the International 
Law Enforcement IP Crime Conference, and the Interpol IP Crime Training Program. 
The growth of the PPP network was paralleled with growth of the Interpol IP crime 
program. The number of staff grew from 1 in 2005 to 6 in 2010. About half of its 
funding comes from the public members and the other half from the private 
members. It receives requests from the members of the PPPs and reports back to 
them. So while the Interpol General Secretariat as a whole acts as an agent for the 
Interpol member states, the IP crime program within it effectively also acts as an 
agent for the private and public members of the PPP network. 
 Resources and the pursuit of gains in them are important to explain the 
formation of the Interpol PPP and its transformation. For the purpose of the exchange 
of information, it was relatively easy to set up an advisory PPP. However, when 
Interpol wanted more resources than just information, especially money, some 
cooperation problems appeared. PPP members were reluctant to invest more 
resources if the return on investment was unsure. And they were not only concerned 
with absolute gains of resources, but also with relative gains - or at least the 
avoidance of relative losses compared to their competitors. Partners did not want to 
pay for something which may be more beneficial for a free-riding competitor than for 
themselves. These concerns led to a fragmentation of the Interpol PPP into a 
network of smaller PPPs, where free-riders can be more easily excluded and where 
the benefit is more apparent. 
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The most important resources invested by the private sector partners were 
information, human resources, and money. Interpol contributed the coordinating 
functions of the secretariat of the PPP, as well as its reputation, its credibility, and its 
access to law enforcement agencies, which brought their legitimacy to apply force as 
subjects of police powers to the partnership. 
Besides the cooperation problems mentioned above, there was no major 
interference of the Interpol PPP. The Interpol member states gave the secretariat an 
explicit mandate to form an IP crime program and to work in partnership with the 
business community. Additional mandates or budget increases were not necessary, 
as Interpol acquired discretionary funding of the IP crime program from public and 
private members. Interpol also avoided getting into the contested field of IP policy. It 
did not make any legislative proposals. Interpol emphasized that it is a technical and 
non-political organization and focused on the facilitation of international and public-
private law enforcement cooperation. This avoidance of contentious issues9 is an 
important factor in explaining the durability of the Interpol PPP compared to PPPs of 
other international organizations analyzed in this study. The Interpol IP crime 
program manager explains this difference in this quote: 
 
“I think one of the reasons why we are successful is that we don't get caught up in the political 
argument about the definition of counterfeit and all that sort of thing. [...] If I get asked by the 
media about any of these political things, my response is: <Our focus is transnational 
organized criminals. These criminals are commodity brokers, they are organized criminals, 
they manipulate any product to generate profits.> And that takes us immediately straight out of 
the political dimension.” 
 John Newton (2009a), Interpol Intellectual Property Crime Program Manager 
  
                                            
9
 In 2012 the Interpol IP Crime Program was renamed to “Trafficking in Illicit Goods Program”, while 
continuing with the same management and activities against IP crimes. Apparently this name change 
reflects Interpol’s conflict avoidance strategy, as it happened amidst increased attention for 
international IP policy and public protests against ACTA. However, as this recent development 
happened after the investigation period of this study, it is not possible to present a more thorough 
analysis here.  
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5. World Customs Organization 
The World Customs Organization (WCO) is a public international organization that 
facilitates international cooperation between customs agencies with the aim of 
enhancing their effectiveness and efficiency. The enforcement of intellectual property 
rights has been a task for customs agencies around the world since the TRIPS 
Agreement has been implemented. Therefore, IP has also been a topic for the WCO 
since 1994. In the year 2000, the WCO founded the IPR Strategic Group, a 
collaborative PPP with the higher involvement of the private sector than all other 
PPPs in this study. The WCO effectively outsourced much of its IP related work to a 
private sector business association. It regained control over the outsourced activities 
when it replaced the WCO IPR Strategic Group in 2007 with another PPP, the 
SECURE Working Group, which was an advisory PPP. Collaborative partnerships 
have also been re-formed. Thereby, the WCO PPP effectively changed from a 
collaborative PPP to a PPP network. Since 2007, IP policy at the WCO has been 
highly contentious, which also affected the public-private relationship.  
 This chapter starts with relevant background information about the WCO and 
then analyzes how the WCO became active in the area of enforcement of IPRs. The 
next two sections are dedicated to an analysis of the WCO IPR Strategic Group and 
its activities in the area of legislative proposals. Subsequent sections analyze the end 
of the IPR Strategic Group and its various successors: the SECURE Working Group, 
the CAP Group, the RHC Group, and the IPM. The final section of this chapter 
summarizes the key findings from the WCO case study with a view to explaining the 
developments. 
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Background on the World Customs Organization 
In 2009, the WCO had 176 member customs administrations, which included 172 
nation states and four semi-independent administrations: Bermuda, Hong Kong, 
Macau, and the Netherlands Antilles (WCO 2010a). The WCO secretariat in Brussels 
operated with a staff of 106 and an annual budget of 14 million Euro (app. 20m USD) 
(Vorreux 2010a). The activities of the WCO range from more intergovernmental to 
more transgovernmental forms of international cooperation: for example, it developed 
and administers several customs conventions, such as the Convention on the 
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System and the Convention on the 
Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures; it maintains the Customs 
Enforcement Network (CEN) for the exchange of information about customs 
offences; it facilitates joint operations against smugglers; and the WCO provides 
training and technical assistance to help developing countries, in particular, keep up 
with international customs standards, such as the non-binding SAFE Framework of 
Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade (Mikuriya 2010). 
 As far as the conventions are concerned, the WCO is an intergovernmental 
organization. However, the WCO also acts as a transgovernmental organization, 
especially with respect to its role as a facilitator of cooperation between customs 
agencies. These two modes of cooperation, intergovernmental and 
transgovernmental, are to some extent linked to the two roles customs agencies 
have: One role is to collect revenue in the form of customs duties. In this role, which 
is embedded in fiscal policy and trade policy, the WCO tends to work more 
intergovernmentally and cooperates with the intergovernmental World Trade 
Organization (WTO). The other role is to protect societies from crimes, such as drugs 
smuggling or weapons smuggling. In this role, which is embedded in the policy area 
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of crime and policing, the WCO tends to work more transgovernmentally and 
cooperates with Interpol, which is also very transgovernmental. 
The ambiguity of the WCO between different customs roles and different forms 
of international cooperation can also be seen in its history. It was originally founded 
as the Customs Co-operation Council (CCC) in 1952, which is still its formal name, 
while the World Customs Organization is a working name adopted in 1994. The 
functions of the CCC described in article 3 of the Convention concern the revenue 
collection role, such as matters regarding the classification of goods in customs tariffs 
and their valuation, or they are rather broad and unspecific, such as “to study all 
questions relating to co-operation in Customs matters” (WCO 1967). Nothing in the 
convention explicitly refers to the protection role of customs agencies. 
With respect to the revenue role of customs agencies, the WCO was 
successful in drafting and administering intergovernmental conventions. However, it 
focused on aspects that were perceived to be more technical, such as the valuation 
of goods and their classification, and less political than tariffs themselves. The 
negotiations about tariffs were left to the trade rounds of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and, subsequently, to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). The Convention establishing a Customs Co-operation Council was signed in 
1950 together with the Convention on Nomenclature for the Classification of Goods 
in Customs Tariffs and the Convention on the Valuation of Goods for Customs 
Purposes, which were also the first conventions to be administered by the WCO 
(Asakura 2003: 288). Both conventions have been further developed and are rather 
successful today. The Nomenclature Convention has been replaced with the 
Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, which 
was signed in 1983 and entered into force in 1988. It had 138 contracting parties as 
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of 2010 and it serves as a global standard beyond its membership (WCO 2010a). It 
has also been used in GATT/WTO negotiations (WTO 2011b). The Valuation 
Convention was replaced with the WTO Valuation Agreement, which is administered 
partly by the WTO and partly by the Technical Committee on Customs Valuation 
under the auspices of the WCO. A similar division of labor between WCO and WTO 
has been established for the WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin (WCO 2011). In 
both cases the work of the WCO is perceived as more technical and less political 
than that of the WTO. This is also expressed by the following quote of the former 
head of communications at the WCO: 
 
“They have a saying at the WCO: When you arrive at the WCO, you leave your politics at the 
door. We deal with practical problems. We are looking for solutions. We work together. So that 
gives a sense of the tone of the organizations." 
 David Blakemore (2010), Former WCO Head of Communications 1996-2004 
 
 
In spite of this division of labor between WCO and WTO, they have also been in 
competition to some extent. When the WTO was founded in 1995, many people at 
the WCO secretariat were concerned that the WCO could be subsumed within the 
WTO, as much of its work was very closely related to the work of the WTO. This 
concern has led the WCO secretariat to promote the organization as indispensable 
and to emphasize work areas that are less related to the work of the WTO, such as 
the role of customs to protect societies from crimes (Blakemore 2010). 
Although the protection role of customs is not explicitly mentioned in its 
founding convention, the WCO increasingly assumed a role in these matters from its 
founding. As early as December 1953, the Customs Co-operation Council passed a 
recommendation on bilateral mutual administrative assistance in customs 
enforcement matters. And in 1954 the Council mandated the WCO secretariat to 
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perform the role of a central office pooling information about persons convicted of 
customs offences (WCO 1977). Since 1967, the WCO also pools additional 
information concerning the method of operation of smugglers, and in 1975 the WCO 
decided to extend the information from convicted smugglers to also include persons 
suspected of smuggling. This is, however, limited by laws in many countries 
prohibiting the sharing of information about suspects who are presumed innocent 
until proven guilty (WCO 1977, Blakemore 2010). Since the year 2000, the WCO has 
operated the computerized Customs Enforcement Network (CEN) for the voluntary 
exchange of information about customs offences, such as drug smuggling, weapons 
smuggling, and the infringement of intellectual property rights. Customs officers from 
more than 155 countries received access to CEN up until 2009 (WCO 2009b), but 
the willingness to upload data was less than the WCO hoped (Vorreux 2010a). 
Especially when it comes to the exchange of sensitive information, bilateral 
cooperation is often preferred over multilateral cooperation (Blakemore 2010).  
All these activities in the area of customs enforcement are rather 
transgovernmental ways of cooperation. Director Generals of customs agencies, 
Customs Attachés, and other high ranking customs officers meet in the Council, the 
governing body of the WCO, make recommendations, and mandate the WCO 
Secretariat to perform certain tasks. The secretariat then facilitates and coordinates 
direct cooperation between customs agencies. All this does not require ratifications 
as in the case of intergovernmental conventions. The WCO tried to make 
conventions concerning the protection role of customs agencies, but was less 
successful in doing so. It drafted the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance 
for the Prevention, Investigation and Repression of Customs Offences (Nairobi 
Convention), which was signed in 1977 and entered into force in 1980. But this 
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convention only has 51 contracting parties as of 2010, not including many major 
countries in world trade, such as the USA, China, Germany, Japan, South Korea, 
and the Netherlands (WCO 2010a). And the 2003 Johannesburg Convention on 
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters has not entered into force as it 
has only been ratified by three countries so far (WCO 2010a). Therefore the WCO 
also uses more transgovernmental kinds of agreements that do not need ratification. 
For example, in 2005 the WCO has set the non-binding SAFE Framework of 
Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade. And it subsequently provided 
capacity building measures, such as training and technical assistance, to implement 
these standards, especially in countries which have fewer resources to modernize 
their customs agencies accordingly (WCO 2008c). 
 Altogether, the WCO uses a combination of intergovernmental and 
transgovernmental forms of cooperation, with an emphasis on transgovernmental 
cooperation especially when it comes to the role of customs as an agency that 
protects societies from crime. This is also relevant for the approach of the WCO in 
the fight against intellectual property crime. Compared with the other public 
international organizations in this study, the WCO as a whole is less 
transgovernmental than Interpol but more transgovernmental than WTO, WIPO and 
WHO. 
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The WCO and Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement 
An important development for the relationship between customs agencies and IP 
rights owners was the 1994 TRIPS Agreement and its subsequent implementation 
until 1996 (for industrialized countries), 2000 (for countries in transition and 
developing countries), and 2013 (for the least developed countries). The articles 
51-60 of the TRIPS Agreement require the customs agencies of the WTO member 
states to cooperate with IP rights owners for the seizure of IP infringing goods. The 
basis for such border measures is an application for action from the rights owner. In 
addition, customs agencies may also seize suspected IP infringing goods on their 
own initiative (ex-officio), but, in practice, seizures without application are less 
common (e.g. EU Com 2009: 6). The application for action is a civil law measure that 
can also be used for non-criminal IP infringements. Depending on the country, 
criminal procedures involve specialized customs investigation units, specialized 
agencies, or the police (Zimmermann 2009). 
In 1994, the WCO Council explicitly mentioned the newly signed TRIPS 
Agreement in a recommendation “on the need to develop more effective customs 
controls aimed at the prevention of international trade in goods which infringe 
intellectual property rights” (WCO 1994). While the recommendation is mainly 
directed at its member customs administrations, it also served as an indirect mandate 
for the WCO to increase its own activities in this issue area, but it did so only slowly 
at first. The first representatives of IPR owners to engage with the WCO were 
associations representing copyright owners. The International Federation of the 
Phonographic Industry (IFPI) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with 
the WCO in 1988. MOUs with the organization representing mechanical copyrights 
societies (BIEM) and the Motion Picture Association (MPA) followed in 1997 
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(Robinson 1999). This approach of signing MOUs with private sector associations 
was to some extent adopted from the ACTION/DEFIS (Alliance of Customs and 
Trade for the Interdiction of Narcotics) program. The MOUs were mostly declarations 
of intent with which the WCO encouraged activities of its member customs 
administrations, but little activity of the WCO itself followed (Raven 2010). 
However, this was different in the area of intellectual property rights. The WCO 
developed an IPR program since 1997. This program collaborated with IP owners 
who fully funded the activities of the WCO in the area of IPRs (Robinson 1999, 
Brohm 2010). It produced IP training material and organized training seminars for 
customs officers. However, the WCO did not have full-time staff for its IPR program 
at that time and, therefore, it became increasingly difficult for its secretariat to keep 
up with the increasing workload for IP-related activities. To solve this problem, the 
WCO secretariat made an agreement with the anti-counterfeiting business 
association SNB-REACT, which took over most secretariat tasks for the newly 
founded WCO IPR Strategic Group in 2000 (Brohm 2010, Blakemore 2010, 
Zimmermann 2009). 
The WCO IPR Strategic Group 
The WCO IPR Strategic Group, which existed from 2000 until 2007, was a 
collaborative PPP with higher involvement from the private sector compared to any 
other PPP in this study. Many of the activities of the WCO in the area of IPRs were 
effectively outsourced from the WCO headquarters in Brussels to the private sector 
association SNB-REACT in Amsterdam. SNB-REACT was founded in 1991 in the 
Netherlands as Stichting Namaakbestrijding (SNB, Dutch for Anti-Counterfeiting 
Foundation) by the Dutch lawyer and former Chamber of Commerce Amsterdam 
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employee Ronald Brohm. This organization pooled resources from several IP rights 
owners to conduct joint activities against IP crime. Since 1995, SNB has expanded 
across borders and supplemented its name with the acronym REACT (Réseau 
Européen Anti-Contrefaçon, French for European Anti-Counterfeiting Network). SNB-
REACT has opened offices in several European countries and is also collaborating 
with independent anti-counterfeiting business associations across Europe as part of 
the REACT-Network. Its services include applications for customs seizures and 
follow up activities until the destruction of the seized goods, the organization of 
training seminars for customs and police officers, and the monitoring of internet 
auction sites and street markets (Brohm 2010). 
SNB-REACT collaborated with the WCO since 1998 for the organization of 
training seminars for customs officers. When it became clear that human resources 
at the WCO were lacking to meet the increasing demands for the organization of 
customs training, SNB-REACT offered to perform the functions of a secretariat for 
the new public-private partnership. The arrangement was that the WCO secretariat 
managed communication with the customs agencies, while SNB-REACT managed 
communication with the private sector and all remaining administrative work, 
including the hosting of a website and the handling of all the financial transactions of 
the PPP (Brohm 2010). The role of SNB-REACT in this PPP is expressed in the 
following quote by the WCO head of communications at the time: 
 
“The IPR Strategic Group was established and that was essentially an interface group of rights 
holders. The secretariat in fact was managed by SNB-REACT in the Netherlands. It was 
actually based there. And the rights holders provided the funding for the training, paid for the 
venue, they met other expenses, in terms of flying the WCO experts around the world to 
conduct the training. That was all made by the rights holders." 
 David Blakemore (2010), Former WCO Head of Communications 1996-2004 
  
 
94 Christopher Paun: Globalization of Law Enforcement 
 
 Table 7: WCO IPR Strategic Group 
Founded 2000, Terminated 2007 
Secretariat:  SNB-REACT in cooperation with WCO 
Co-chairs: WCO and Société BIC (founding co-chair), 
WCO and Procter & Gamble (2003-2007) 
Successors: WCO SECURE Working Group and IPR Business Partnership 
Public Sector Members 
World Customs Organization (WCO) theoretically representing all its member 
customs administrations (171 in 2007). In practice the customs agencies of the 
following states participated: 
Angola, Australia, Austria, 
Bangladesh, Belgium, Bhutan, 
Cambodia, Canada, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, FYR Macedonia, 
Germany, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, 
Japan, Korea (South), Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Macau, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, 
Mongolia, Montenegro, Myanmar, 
Netherlands, Nepal, New Zealand, 
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Russia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovenia, 
South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, UK, USA, Vietnam 
Private Sector Members: 
SNB-REACT theoretically representing all its members (about 150 in 2007). 
In practice the following associations and companies participated: 
Associations: International Bureau of Mechanical Rights Societies (BIEM), 
International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), 
Imaging Consumables Coalition of Europe (ICCE), 
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), 
Pharmaceutical Security Institute (PSI), 
Swiss Watch Federation (FH), 
Companies: Abercrombie & Fitch, adidas, 
BBC, BIC, British American Tobacco, 
CHANEL, Daimler Chrysler, Dolby Laboratories, 
Eli Lilly & Company, Epson, General Motors, 
Harley Davidson, Hermes, 
Imperial Tobacco, Intel, Japan Tobacco, 
La Chemise Lacoste, LVMH Fashion Group, L'Oréal, 
Microsoft, MSD Merck Shape & Dohme, 
New Era Cap Company, Nike, Nokia, 
Pfizer, Philip Morris International, Philips, Procter & Gamble, 
Reebok, Rouse & Co International, 
Samsung, Sanofi Aventis, Sara Lee, 
Sony, Sony Ericsson, Spirits International, 
Timberland, Tommy Hilfiger, 
Underwriters Laboratories, Unilever, V.F. Corporation 
Source: Own account based on WCO IPR SG 2007d and Brohm 2010 
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Table 8: Recipient Countries of WCO IPR Strategic Group Training Seminars 
 
Recipient Country Year(s) with Training Training for 
Argentina 2006* customs 
Brazil 2003, 2006* over 40 customs officers 
Bulgaria 2000*, 2001, 2005 over 40 customs and police officers 
Chile 2006* customs 
Cyprus 2003 customs 
Czech Republic 2001 40 customs and police officers 
Estonia 2001, 2002* over 60 customs and police officers 
Greece 2000 customs 
Hong Kong 2001 customs 
Hungary 2001, 2003 customs and police 
India 2006 customs 
Indonesia 2000 customs and police 
Italy 2004 customs 
Kazakhstan 2005 customs 
Kenya 2006* customs 
Latvia 2000, 2002* over 90 customs and police officers 
Lithuania 2000, 2002 over 30 customs and police officers 
Malaysia 2003, 2005 customs 
Malta 2003 customs 
Netherlands 2000 customs 
Pakistan 2005 customs 
Panama 2004 customs 
Paraguay 2006* customs 
Philippines 2007 no report available 
Poland 2001, 2002 customs and police 
Portugal 2001, 2002 over 50 customs officers 
Romania 2000, 2003 customs and police 
Rwanda 2006* customs 
Slovakia 2001 over 50 customs and police officers 
Slovenia 2000 customs and police 
Sri Lanka 2006 customs 
Tanzania 2006* customs 
Turkey 2002, 2006 over 90 customs officers 
Uganda 2006 customs 
United Arab Emirates 2001 customs 
Uruguay 2006 customs 
Vietnam 2005 customs 
Source: Own account based on WCO IPR SG 2007c 
*) These seminars were conducted in another country but included participants from the listed country 
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The management of the IPR Strategic Group has put SNB-REACT in a unique 
position of being able to offer privileged access to the WCO for its member-
companies. SNB-REACT charged a membership fee of 2000 Euro per year, which 
included membership in the WCO IPR Strategic Group (WCO IPR SG 2001b). 
However, membership was not mandatory to participate in meetings as a guest or to 
participate in specific projects, such as the many training seminars that were 
organized (Brohm 2010). But the vast majority of active private sector participants of 
the IPR Strategic Group were also members of SNB-REACT. Until 2007, SNB-
REACT had grown to about 150 members, which were thereby also members of the 
IPR Strategic Group. In practice, however, only 47 active private sector participants 
were listed in a 2007 directory of the IPR Strategic Group. On the public side, all 
WCO member customs administrations were represented in the PPP through the 
WCO, but only 59 customs administrations were listed as active participants in the 
2007 directory (table 7). 
The IPR Strategic Group had about four meetings per year. Approximately half 
of the meetings of this PPP were hosted by private sector members at various 
European company headquarters. The other half of the meetings were hosted by 
public sector members, most of which by the WCO at its headquarters in Brussels, 
and some by various national customs agencies (WCO IPR SG 2007b). The duration 
of each meeting was one, two, or three days. The longer meetings also involved 
separate sessions in subgroups. The public sector members met in a customs expert 
group and the private sector members met in a business group. The most important 
activity of this PPP was the organization of several customs training seminars in 
Europe and around the world. 
 
A Study of Transnational PPPs Against IP Crimes 97 
 
Table 8 shows a list of countries whose customs officers received training by 
the IPR Strategic Group. Several seminars also included police officers. Detailed 
reports were not available for all seminars; therefore, the list may not include all the 
participants from countries other than the country hosting the seminar. Most 
seminars took two days and consisted of elements where 10-15 IP owner 
representatives explained how to find and identify counterfeit products, and of 
elements where national or international customs experts explained techniques of 
risk analysis, procedures for seizures, and the subsequent steps until the destruction 
of the goods. In addition to the teaching and learning aspect of the seminars, they 
also served as networking events for the public and private sector participants that 
provided a basis for further cooperation (WCO IPR SG 2007c). Such follow up 
cooperation took place bilaterally between the customs agencies and the rights 
owners or their representatives, such as IFPI, MPA, or SNB-REACT itself (Brohm 
2010). The WCO did not act as a coordinator of joint transnational operations in the 
way Interpol did, but it joined Interpol-led operations like Jupiter (chapter 4) and 
Pangea (chapter 9). 
On average, the WCO IPR Strategic Group organized seven training seminars 
per year. In addition the group also participated as a partner in several seminars 
organized by other organizations, such as the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE). All seminars in table 7 were organized by SNB-REACT acting as the 
secretariat of the WCO IPR Strategic Group. But SNB-REACT also organized 
several additional seminars on its own. For example, the seminars in Hungary in 
2001 and 2003 were seminars of the IPR Strategic Group, but subsequent seminars 
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in 2004 and 2005 were organized by SNB-REACT in bilateral cooperation with the 
Hungarian Customs (WCO IPR SG 2007c). 
 Companies that participated in such training seminars often had to pay 
additional costs as the annual membership fee of 2000 Euro was not sufficient to 
fund all activities. However, the seminars were not only funded by private sector 
participants. SNB-REACT also managed to acquire funding from public sector 
sponsors, such as the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the European 
Union (WCO IPR SG 2007c). In several cases, the public funding was so generous 
that the private IP owners did not have to bear additional costs (Brohm 2010). 
However, the work of the Strategic Group was not limited to the organization 
of seminars. Subjects that were discussed at the PPP meetings included the practical 
aspects of public-private cooperation for customs seizures, desirable changes to the 
procedures for customs seizures and their legal framework, as well as the strategic 
development of the WCO IPR Strategic Group itself (WCO IPR SG 2007b). After the 
organization of the training seminars, the second most important aspect of its work 
was the drafting of legislative proposals and to lobby for their implementation. 
WCO IPR Model Legislation and Guidelines on Free Zones 
The WCO developed model legislation for the implementation of the border 
measures of the TRIPS Agreement already in 1995 (WCO 2004: 1). But in 
collaboration with its IPR Strategic Group in 2001, the WCO started drafting revised 
model legislation that went beyond the minimum standards required by the TRIPS 
Agreement. It did so based on the assumption that “the minimum level of protection 
provided by the TRIPs Agreement is no longer adequate to fight current cross-border 
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traffic in counterfeit and pirated goods” (WCO 2004: 8). The WCO Model Legislation 
is to a large extent based on provisions of the European Union customs regulation 
(3295/94 and 1383/2003). It uses the example of the EU customs regulation to 
specify several deadlines for customs agencies. It also obliges the customs agencies 
to supply rights holders with information about the parties involved in the shipping of 
the infringing goods (Art.8), while this is optional in the TRIPS Agreement (Art.57). 
The WCO Model Legislation also includes the authority of customs agencies to act 
on their own initiative (ex officio) without an application by an IP rights holder (Art.9), 
while this is only optional in the TRIPS Agreement (Art.58). And it introduces a 
simplified procedure for the destruction of seized goods if no one responsible for the 
goods opposes the destruction (Art.11). 
 While such IP rights holder friendly deadlines and procedures may by a 
burden for customs agencies, especially in developing countries, the more 
controversial aspect of the WCO Model Legislation was that it extends the scope of 
the borders measures10 beyond the TRIPS requirements, in terms of the kinds of 
intellectual property rights that are enforced with border measures and in terms of the 
cases in which border measures are applied by customs agencies. The TRIPS 
Agreement only requires the enforcement of trademarks and copyrights with border 
measures, but the WCO Model Legislation extends this to all IP rights, including 
patents for example. It also covers devices whose primary purpose is to circumvent 
copyright protection technology, such as digital rights management (Art.1). Thus, the 
WCO Model Legislation introduces principles of the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty in a 
strengthened form. 
                                            
10
 The term “border measures” denotes customs seizures of goods that crossed a border.  
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The TRIPS Agreement requires customs agencies to have the authority to 
seize11 IP infringing goods when they are imported. In contrast, the WCO model 
legislation, if applied, authorizes customs agencies to also seize IP infringing goods 
when they are exported or in transit (WCO 2004: Art.1). In order to make the seizure 
of IP infringing goods in transit or destined for export easier, the WCO model 
legislation requires that the laws that are applied are those of the country where the 
seizure takes place - as if the goods were produced or sold in that country. The laws 
of the country of origin or destination are considered to be irrelevant for trademarks, 
copyrights, and other IP rights, except in the case of IPR violations of geographical 
indications (WCO 2004: Art.1). This exception reflected the dispute at the WTO 
during that time about geographical indications between the European Union and the 
USA and Australia (WTO 2006a). The principle to seize goods in transit without 
considering the laws of the country of origin or destination was contested12 at the 
time, also beyond the issue of geographical indications. But while both sides of the 
geographical indications dispute were involved in the drafting of the WCO model 
legislation, this was not the case for the dispute about the seizure of goods in transit. 
Therefore, this did not influence the WCO model legislation at the time of its drafting 
from 2001 to 2004. Only when the same principle was presented in the 2007 WCO 
Standards Employed by Customs for Uniform Rights Enforcement (SECURE) did it 
                                            
11
 The term "seizure" is used as an umbrella term, which includes the legal concepts of "detention" and 
"suspension of release" used in the TRIPS Agreement and the WCO Model Legislation. 
12
 The definition section of the WCO Model Legislation uses a modified version of the “production 
fiction”, which is based on an interpretation of article 6 of the European Union customs regulation 
3295/94. The production fiction requires that the IPR infringement is determined based on the 
assumption that the goods were produced in the country where they were intercepted. Using such a 
fiction instead of facts was already contested at the time the WCO Model Legislation was drafted. The 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) has repeatedly made decisions in favor of owners of goods in transit 
and in contrast to the principle of the production fiction, but without explicitly addressing the production 
fiction (ECJ 2000, ECJ 2003, ECJ 2006). In the 2003 revised EU customs regulation 1383/2003 the 
production fiction is only mentioned in the recitals, casting doubt on its character. This and the ECJ 
decisions have led to a heterogeneous application of the production fiction. The customs agency in the 
Netherlands continued to use it, while the UK customs refused to do so. Finally, in December 2011 the 
ECJ made an explicit decision against the production fiction (ECJ 2011). 
(see also Schneider 2011, Reeskamp & Ouden 2010, Vrins 2010, Schneider & Vrins 2006: 92) 
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meet opposition by Brazil and others (see below in this chapter). Subsequently, 
Brazil and India complained about seizures of generic drugs produced in India and 
seized while in transit through the Netherlands to Brazil and other countries. They 
filed complaints with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body against the European Union 
and the Netherlands in 2010 (WTO 2010c). 
The WCO Model Legislation has been discussed several times in meetings of 
the WCO IPR Strategic Group. Several private sector members contributed to the 
legislation, such as the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), 
the International Trademark Association (INTA), the Business Software Alliance 
(BSA), the Swiss Watch Federation (FH), and Adidas (WCO IPR SG 2001a). In 
2002, the first version of the model legislation from the WCO IPR Strategic Group 
was presented to the WCO Enforcement Committee, an official decision making body 
of the WCO for enforcement matters. The committee stated that the customs 
agencies of many developing countries were unable to inspect goods at export or in 
transit and that the proposed time limits of the model legislation are too demanding 
(WCO IPR SG 2002d). The draft  was subsequently discussed by the entire Strategic 
Group and also by a subgroup that was primarily composed of customs 
representatives: the customs expert group (WCO IPR SG 2002d). The subgroup as 
well as the entire Strategic Group received legal advice from the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) concerning the model legislation (WCO IPR SG 
2002e). The drafting of the model legislation was also informed by a draft of the EU 
customs regulation 1383/2003 in 2002 before it was passed by the Council of the EU 
in 2003 (WCO IPR SG 2002c). After two years of consultation and editing, the model 
legislation changed more in terms of style and very little in substance (WCO IPR SG 
2004b). Nevertheless, the WCO Enforcement Committee “noted” the updated version 
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(Int.14 2010). But it neither officially endorsed it nor forwarded it to the WCO Council 
for adoption (Moraes 2009: 187). As the WCO Model Legislation was a guideline for 
countries that wanted to voluntarily implement IP protection measures beyond the 
TRIPS minimum standard, it was considered a technical and non-political document 
that did not require official adoption (Int.14 2010). Another reason for not seeking a 
higher level approval of the model legislation may have been the anticipated 
difficulties involved with a political debate about TRIPS-plus measures. Such a 
cautious approach would be understandable given the heated debate since the 2007 
WCO Council adopted the SECURE document, which is to a large extent based on 
the model legislation (see below in this chapter). 
The WCO Model Legislation was widely disseminated despite lacking 
high-level endorsement. It was presented in several customs trainings organized by 
the WCO IPR Strategic Group. For example, it was presented at seminars in 
Bulgaria, Vietnam, Panama, Uruguay, and Uganda (WCO IPR SG 2007c). According 
to a media report, the 2006 Seminar in Uganda, which included participants from 
Kenya, had some influence on the drafting of an anti-counterfeiting act that was 
passed by Kenya’s parliament in 2008 (Michael 2010). The Model Legislation was 
also used in events that were not hosted by the WCO IPR Strategic Group. For 
example, a partnership between the European Union and the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) resulted in the production and distribution of a 
Handbook on IPR Enforcement for Customs in the ASEAN countries that includes 
the WCO Model Legislation (ECAP 2007). However, the actual effects of the model 
legislation are difficult to determine as there was no monitoring of its implementation. 
The WCO secretariat attempted to change that when it started the SECURE Working 
Group in 2007 (see below in this chapter). 
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An issue that was not explicitly addressed in the WCO Model Legislation was 
that of IPR infringing goods in so-called free zones, which are also commonly 
referred to as free trade zones. An annex to the International Convention on the 
Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures (Kyoto Convention), which 
is administered by the WCO, defines free zones as locations where goods are 
generally regarded as being outside the customs territory as far as import duties and 
taxes are concerned (WCO 1999). This has led to some confusion about whether 
customs agencies should inspect goods going in and out of free zones. In 2004, the 
WCO Enforcement Committee in collaboration with the WCO IPR Strategic Group 
started to develop a Guideline on Controlling Free Zones in Relation to Intellectual 
Property Rights Infringements. This guideline was adopted by the Enforcement 
Committee in 2005 and states that customs agencies should control goods in free 
zones based on risk assessments (WCO 2005). This approach to free zones and the 
principles of the WCO Model Legislation were later parts of the 2007 WCO 
Standards Employed by Customs for Uniform Rights Enforcement (SECURE). 
From the WCO IPR Strategic Group to the SECURE Working Group 
The issue of intellectual property was a low priority for the WCO when it developed 
its IPR Program in the late 1990s and when the WCO IPR Strategic Group was 
founded in 2000. The secretariat did not devote any full time staff to the issue and 
outsourced much of the IPR related work to SNB-REACT. The mere enforcement of 
IPRs was also considered a technical issue separate from the political negotiations 
about the intellectual property rights themselves. This WCO approach to IPR 
enforcement gradually began to change when the issue gained in prominence on the 
global policy agenda. It was on the agenda of the 2003 Annual Meeting of the World 
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Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, where the WCO was represented by its Deputy 
Secretary General, Kunio Mikuriya. Following discussions at the WEF, the PPP 
around the Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy was formed 
(see chapter 7). And when the first congress of that series was held in 2004 at the 
WCO Headquarters, the WCO Secretariat managed this event without seeking help 
from SNB-REACT (Brohm 2010). The issue also became a prominent agenda item 
for the Group of 8 at its 2005 summit in Gleneagles and at subsequent G8 Summits. 
The WCO Secretary General Michel Danet saw this development as a chance 
to increase the relevance of the WCO by making IPR enforcement a top priority of 
the organization (Blakemore 2010, Int.14 2010). Proving the relevance of the WCO 
was not only important for the WCO secretariat when the WTO was founded in 1995, 
but also several years later. An official report of the WCO Policy Commission in 2002 
states that “the WCO was not losing ground vis-à-vis the WTO and that the WCO’s 
competitive edge could be put to good use by other international organizations.” 
(WCO 2003) In such a competitive environment, the WCO emphasized its work in 
areas less related to the work of the WTO. This meant that the WCO embraced the 
role of customs to protect societies from crimes. In the aftermath of the terrorist 
attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, the WCO discussed measures 
for customs agencies to prevent terrorist attacks by improving the customs capability 
to detect smuggled bombs, bomb making material, radioactive substances, and other 
hazardous goods (WCO 2003). These discussions culminated in the SAFE 
Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade, which was adopted 
by the WCO Council in 2005. Similarly, the issue of IPR enforcement was 
increasingly seen as a crime fighting issue and not as a purely economic issue. This 
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made it attractive for the WCO secretariat to embrace this emerging issue as a 
means to increase the relevance of the WCO. 
After the fight against counterfeiting and piracy was discussed at the 2005 G8 
summit in Gleneagles, the WCO Secretary General hosted a Task Force on 
Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy at the WCO headquarters in October 2005. 
This was a public-private conference involving participants who also participated in 
the WCO IPR Strategic Group. The fact that the WCO hosted a new conference 
instead of using the existing PPP as a venue prompted some concern about the 
WCO’s intentions. At a meeting of the IPR Strategic Group, the members expressed 
their confusion about the role of parallel groups with similar membership and similar 
goals (WCO IPR SG 2005). 
In March 2006, Secretary General Michel Danet attended a meeting of the IPR 
Strategic Group and explained his “Task Force Vision” (WCO IPR SG 2006c). He 
assured the members of the WCO IPR Strategic Group that the group continued to 
be an important partner of the WCO and he explained that the subject of 
counterfeiting and piracy became a higher priority for the WCO. He mentioned plans 
to develop a new anti-counterfeiting convention, which was proposed by the 
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at the 2005 G8 Summit in Gleneagles, 
and explained that the WCO could and should play an important role in these 
developments (WCO IPR SG 2006c). As a step in that direction, he wanted the WCO 
to develop a framework of standards for IPR enforcement by customs agencies. His 
plan was to present this framework of standards to the WCO Council in 2007 in the 
form of an IPR Annex to the SAFE Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate 
Global Trade, which was adopted by the WCO Council in 2005 (WCO IPR SG 
2006c). The Task Force on Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy was a project 
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initiated by the WCO Secretariat with the aim of soliciting input for the development 
of a framework of standards. The task force has met three times for this purpose. In 
between, four groups worked on the topics of (1) transit, transshipment, and free 
zones, (2) the destruction and recycling of goods, (3) information exchange, and (4) 
the use of the internet for counterfeiting and piracy (WCO IPR SG 2006c, WCO IPR 
SG 2006a).  
As a result of the increased attention the IPR issue received at the WCO, the 
secretariat also devoted more resources to it and employed full-time staff for the first 
time on this issue. The French customs officer Christophe Zimmermann has been the 
WCO Coordinator for the Fight Against Counterfeiting and Piracy since April 2006. 
He was also in charge of pursuing the new IPR policy of the WCO secretariat and 
developing the framework of standards for IPR enforcement. Input for this framework 
was taken from the third and final meeting of the Task Force on Combating 
Counterfeiting and Piracy in November 2006, a meeting of the WCO Policy 
Commission in December 2006, a meeting of the Enforcement Committee in 
February 2007, and a meeting of the WCO IPR Strategic Group in March 2007 
(WCO IPR SG 2006a, WCO IPR SG 2007a, WCO 2007b). The result was not the 
planned IPR Annex to the SAFE Framework, but an independent document called 
provisional Standards Employed by Customs for Uniform Rights Enforcement 
(SECURE) that was presented to the WCO Policy Commission and the WCO Council 
in June 2007. Confusingly, the cover letter to the SECURE document states that the 
WCO IPR Strategic Group is tasked with the review, maintenance, and updating of 
SECURE, but the document itself states that the “Secretary General will establish a 
SECURE Working Group to supersede all other IPR and related groups at the WCO, 
and those affiliated with the WCO” (WCO 2007b). This decision was also the basis 
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for the end of the IPR Strategic Group. The WCO Secretary General effectively 
terminated this PPP with the following words in a letter to SNB-REACT in June 2007: 
 
“At its 109th/110th Sessions, the Council adopted provisional Standards Employed by 
Customs for Uniform Rights Enforcement (SECURE). […] The Council also decided to 
establish a single SECURE Working Group, consisting of Member's Customs experts and 
private sector representatives, to improve and develop these Standards. 
The secretariat services for this new body will be provided by the WCO Secretariat only, with 
my staff member Mr. C. Zimmerman responsible for co-ordination. 
As a result I am obliged, by means of this letter, to put an end to our co-operation. Therefore I 
must ask that you no longer use our WCO logo, host our IPR Web-site or conduct any training 
in our name.”13 
Letter from WCO to SNB-REACT (2007) 
 
The decision to end the WCO IPR Strategic Group came as a surprise for SNB-
REACT and the private sector members of the group. Considerations to change or 
end the Strategic Group were not discussed at its last meeting in March 2007 and 
they were also not discussed bilaterally between the WCO secretariat and SNB-
REACT (Brohm 2010, Blakemore 2011). The WCO secretariat was able to end the 
outsourcing of IPR activities because it hired new full time staff dedicated exclusively 
to combating counterfeiting and piracy in 2006, which made it less dependent on the 
secretariat services from SNB-REACT. Therefore, the end of the Strategic Group 
also reflected the increased priority the issue of IPR enforcement had for the WCO 
and its willingness to invest more resources in this issue area.  
 There may have been additional reasons for the WCO secretariat to end the 
WCO IPR Strategic Group, including the aim to exercise more control over the 
available private sector funding (Blakemore 2011), and to increase the role of 
customs in the PPP at the expense of the role of the private sector. The WCO 
Coordinator for the Fight Against Counterfeiting and Piracy expressed this with the 
following words: 
                                            
13
 The “109th/110th sessions” are on consecutive days. The WCO Convention requires at least two 
Council sessions per year, but since 1966 they have been held concurrently (WCO 2010b). 
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“The difficulty was that it was a little bit - according to our members - too oriented to the private 
sector and not enough to customs. So when we got more human resources on this issue in 
2006, the Secretary General decided to bring back the dossier to WCO.” 
Christophe Zimmermann (2009), 
WCO Coordinator for the Fight against Counterfeiting and Piracy 
 
While some people involved with the end of the Strategic Group said that the WCO 
secretariat reacted to demands of the WCO members (Zimmermann 2009, Hardy 
2009, Dobson 2010, Heath 2010), others said that it was a secretariat initiative and 
that criticism by WCO members only came up after SECURE was created and not 
before (Brohm 2010, Int.14 2010). However, even the WCO IPR Strategic Group 
members admitted that the group was more driven by the private sector participants 
and that too few representatives of customs agencies were actively and continuously 
involved (Brohm 2011, WCO IPR SG 2004a). Nevertheless, the termination of this 
PPP by the WCO secretariat came as a surprise to the private sector participants. 
They decided to continue their work as a purely private sector business association 
with the name IPR Business Partnership. The secretariat of that business partnership 
continued to be managed by SNB-REACT and continued much of the bilateral 
cooperation with customs agencies in organizing training seminars (Brohm 2010, 
Blakemore 2010). 
 The WCO has also managed many customs IPR training seminars in public-
private partnerships since the end of the Strategic Group, but it separated these 
collaborative PPPs from the more policy-oriented advisory PPP for the updating of 
the standards for IPR enforcement. Thus, the WCO effectively created a PPP 
network consisting of several collaborative PPPs around training seminars and an 
advisory PPP for the SECURE standards.  
  
 
A Study of Transnational PPPs Against IP Crimes 109 
 
The SECURE Working Group 
The provisional Standards Employed by Customs for Uniform Rights Enforcement 
(SECURE), which were adopted by the WCO Council in June 2007, did not actually 
contain many new things compared to what the WCO did previously on IPR 
enforcement. The document contains nine standards concerning “IPR Legislative and 
Enforcement Regime Development” (WCO 2007b) that can also be found in the 
WCO IPR Model Legislation and in the Guidelines on Free Zones. It contains eight 
standards concerning “Risk Analysis and Intelligence Sharing” that are an application 
of existing WCO risk analysis approaches to the issue of IPR and a summary of 
existing WCO intelligence sharing methods, such as the Customs Enforcement 
Network. And the document contains six standards concerning “Capacity Building for 
IPR Enforcement and International Co-operation” that are basically a summary of the 
already existing capacity building measures through training seminars and 
international and public-private cooperation. A noteworthy new idea in the SECURE 
document is the plan to improve the Customs Enforcement Network (CEN) by 
developing a specialized IPR information system for the exchange of information 
between the private sector and customs agencies. This information system was 
launched three years later under the name IPM (see below in this chapter). 
 However, while much of the content of the SECURE document was not new, 
the form of its presentation was. Previously, the WCO secretariat did not make much 
ado about its technical work, which was summarized in the SECURE document. The 
previous WCO IPR Model Legislation was only presented to the WCO Enforcement 
Committee, but never to the WCO Policy Commission or the WCO Council. The new 
thing about the SECURE initiative was that the issue of IPR enforcement was 
brought to the highest decision making bodies of the WCO and was declared a top 
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priority. While SECURE was still non-binding, the WCO secretariat asked the WCO 
members to indicate their political will to implement SECURE with a letter of intent. 
By February 2008, the WCO received such letters of intent from 34 members (WCO 
2008a). This procedure is similar to that of the SAFE Framework of Standards and 
much more formal than that of the WCO IPR Model Legislation, which was simply 
disseminated as a recommendation. 
The WCO secretariat also heavily advertised the new SECURE initiative vis-à-
vis its members. It declared the fight against counterfeiting and piracy as the WCO 
theme of the year 2007 (WCO 2007a) and an entire issue of the WCO News, the 
member magazine of the WCO, was dedicated to this topic. It used very strong 
language to condemn counterfeiting and piracy, even referring to it as “economic 
terrorism” (WCO 2007a). 2007 was also the year when the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development released a first draft of their study on the 
economic impact of counterfeiting and piracy. The WCO contributed to this OECD 
study by sending a questionnaire to customs officials (OECD 2007). 
The WCO promoted not only the issue but also itself as an important 
organization in the fight against counterfeiting and piracy, and it was successful in 
getting high level attention. Only three weeks before the 2007 WCO Council started, 
the G8 held their summit in Heiligendamm and issued a statement welcoming the 
development of an IPR enforcement information exchange system in cooperation 
with the WCO (G8 2007). The Japanese proposal for a new Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement (ACTA), first proposed at the G8 summit in 2005, had meanwhile 
resulted in preliminary talks involving Japan, the USA, the EU, Switzerland, and 
Canada (USTR 2009). It was the plan of WCO Secretary General Michel Danet that 
the WCO SECURE standards could also serve as a basis for the negotiations about 
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the new anti-counterfeiting trade agreement (WCO IPR SG 2006b). Therefore, the 
SECURE document was quickly adopted as “provisional standards” (WCO 2007b) 
that could be presented, but that need further discussion and development in the 
SECURE Working Group. The WCO SECURE document explicitly refers to 
discussions about IPR enforcement at the G8 summits in its introductory section that 
explains the reasons for the SECURE initiative (WCO 2007b). 
The WCO secretariat effectively pursued a strategy of raising the profile of the 
WCO by cooperating with the G8 and the OECD in a new IPR enforcement initiative. 
As it became clear that ACTA would be negotiated outside of the WTO, this was also 
a way for the WCO to compete with the WTO. However, this strategy was 
problematic for the WCO, as the majority of its members are neither in the G8 nor in 
the OECD. When the preliminary talks about ACTA shifted to official negotiations in 
June 2008, the initiative was already watched critically by several countries and 
organizations that were not involved in the negotiations. This critical attention was 
also extended to the WCO SECURE initiative. For example, the South Centre, an 
intergovernmental organization of developing countries, criticized both ACTA and 
WCO SECURE as initiatives of IP-rich countries at the expense of developing 
countries (South Centre & CIEL 2008a, South Centre & CIEL 2008b, Biadgleng & 
Munoz Tellez 2008, Li 2008, Li & Correa 2009). 
The new critical attention on the WCO also affected the composition of the 
SECURE Working Group. Not only were several countries represented in the group 
that were not represented in its predecessor, but also the kind of representation 
changed. While the IPR Strategic Group was considered a technical group where 
customs officers meet with the private sector, the new SECURE Working Group also 
involved diplomats who came because they considered IPR enforcement a political 
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matter. Table 9 shows an overview of the members of the SECURE Working Group. 
All national delegations that included diplomats are marked with a star. Especially 
noteworthy is the Brazilian delegation, which even included the Brazilian 
Ambassador to the EU Maria Celina de Azevedo Rodrigues. The following is a report 
about a statement she made at the third meeting of the SECURE Working Group in 
April 2008:  
 
“The Brazilian Ambassador requested the floor and made a statement concerning the position 
and concerns of the Brazilian Government about the scope of the SECURE Working Group. 
She stated that she is a head of delegation which is composed of Customs officers and 
diplomats. The Brazil delegation believes the work of SECURE Working Group is in a political 
realm. […] According to the Brazilian position, the WCO is going beyond its mandate by 
creating a sort of "TRIPS plus". The fact that the standards are being offered as voluntary 
measures doesn't exclude the fact that the standards could become legally binding 
eventually.” 
Draft Report of the 3rd meeting of the SECURE Working Group, WCO (2008b) 
 
 
By identifying the SECURE discussions as a political matter, she justifies her own 
presence and that of the other diplomats in a group, where others only expected the 
presence of technical customs experts. She even considered the drafting of “TRIPS 
plus” standards as so highly political that such an activity would be beyond the 
mandate of the WCO, which is usually considered a more technical and less political 
organization. This criticism led the WCO secretariat to commission an external legal 
opinion from the French law professor Alain Pellet, who confirmed that the SECURE 
standards fall within the mandate of the WCO (WCO 2008b). The Brazilian 
Ambassador also expressed her concern that the non-binding standards could 
evolve into binding standards, for example, by reference to them in bilateral trade 
agreements. She thus rejected requests by other delegates for Brazil not to block the 
SECURE negotiations from proceeding if it had no intention to adopt the voluntary 
SECURE standards anyway (WCO 2008b). 
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Table 9: WCO SECURE Working Group 
Founded 2007, Terminated 2009 
Secretariat:   WCO 
Co-chairs:  Customs Senegal and Philips 
Vice-chair:  Customs Israel 
Successors: WCO CAP Group and WCO RHC Group 
Public Sector Members 
WCO Members: Angola, Argentina*, Australia, Austria, 
Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil*, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Chile*, China, Congo (DR), Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba*, 
Denmark, Ecuador*, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Hong Kong, 
Iceland, India*, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Malaysia, Mexico*, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Paraguay, Poland, Russia,  
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, 
Slovenia, South Africa, Sudan, Switzerland, 
Thailand, UAE, UK, Ukraine, Uruguay*, USA,  
Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
International Org: World Customs Organization (WCO) 
European Union (EU), 
Council of Europe (CoE), 
South Centre 
Other:   La Poste, France (also speaking for the Universal Postal Union) 
Private Sector Members: 
Associations: Belgian Association Against Counterfeiting (ABAC-BAAN), 
Business Alliance for Secure Commerce (BASC), 
BusinessEurope, 
European Association for Forwarding, Transport, Logistic and 
 Customs Services (CLECAT), 
European Brands Association (AIM), 
Global Express Association (GEA), 
International Bureau of Mechanical Rights Societies (BIEM), 
International Chamber of Commerce Business Action to Stop 
 Counterfeiting and Piracy (ICC BASCAP), 
International Federation of Freight Forwarders Associations 
 (FIATA), 
International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), 
The International Air Cargo Association (TIACA), 
Union des Fabricants (Unifab) 
Companies:  Beiersdorf, Daimler, DHL, 
Eli Lilly & Company, Hutchison Whampoa, 
Philips, Rouse & Co. International, 
Sanofi Aventis, Sony Ericsson 
Source: Own account based on WCO 2008b. The list may be non-exhaustive. 
*) Marked delegations included diplomatic representatives, while the standard representation is 
   through customs agency representatives. Also this list may be non-exhaustive. 
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Brazil was the most vocal opponent of SECURE, but it was not alone. It received 
support from Ecuador and the South Centre (WCO 2008b). And Brazil managed to 
build an even broader coalition against SECURE when it addressed procedural 
issues. The SECURE Working Group never adopted any terms of reference (Moraes 
2009: 173) and hence different participants had different opinions on the rules of 
procedure and the status of the different participants of the meetings (Mara 2008a). 
Many of the members of the SECURE Working Group were previously members of 
the IPR Strategic Group. Notable new members on the public sector side were 
diplomatic representatives from foreign affairs departments. On the private sector 
side, new representatives came from transport associations who regularly attend the 
WCO Council sessions as accredited observers (table 7). 
The WCO Secretariat treated the SECURE Working Group as a public-private 
partnership. As it was a successor of the WCO IPR Strategic Group, they continued 
to act according to the established rules of procedure of the predecessor PPP. For 
example, the group elected two chairpersons: the Senegalese Director General of 
Customs Jean-Jacques Armand Nanga as public sector chair and the Philips Vice 
President Jef Vandekerckhove as private sector chair. The equal relationship 
between public and private participants appeared normal to those delegates who 
were used to the WCO IPR Strategic Group, but it was irritating for some new 
participants. For example, the Brazilian delegate Henrique Choer Moraes, a career 
diplomat at the Brazilian Mission to the EU, complained that “member states and 
representatives of the private sector, predominantly from rights-holders, act on the 
same footing, presenting proposals and commenting on each other’s positions” 
(Moraes 2009: 173). Working in the SECURE Working Group without having agreed 
on terms of reference was especially irritating to him, but he also complained about 
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unclear rules of procedure and a lack of transparency at the WCO as a whole, as 
expressed in the following quote: 
 
“WCO work in the area of IPRs in general – and the SECURE project in particular – is moving 
at the expense of informed debates. More often than not, discussions are conducted under 
murky or non-existing rules of procedure in an environment of poor transparency, where 
access to documents is restricted to a small number of actors, which includes rights-holders 
but excludes public interest organizations and interested intergovernmental organizations.” 
Henrique Choer Moraes (2009: 162), 
Brazilian diplomatic representative in the SECURE Working Group 
  
 
The Brazilian delegate also accused the WCO secretariat of using unclear rules and 
a lack of transparency in order to steer the SECURE process instead of moderating it 
(Moraes 2009: 172). He assumed that the provisional SECURE document was only 
adopted at the 2007 WCO Council because “not everyone was fully aware of what 
was being proposed” (Moraes 2009: 179). By addressing these procedural aspects, 
Brazil was successful in forming a coalition against the SECURE process. When the 
WCO secretariat submitted a Report of the SECURE Working Group (WCO 2008b) 
to the WCO Policy Commission and the subsequent WCO Council in June 2008, a 
coalition of Argentina, Brazil, China, Cuba, Ecuador, and Uruguay criticized this 
document as not reflecting the position of the Working Group. According to them, the 
group had not reached an agreement, and they criticized the entire SECURE process 
as being too driven by the WCO Secretariat (Mara 2008a). The SECURE opponents 
were successful in preventing the WCO Policy Commission and the Council from 
adopting any SECURE document in 2008 (Li 2008). 
 The debate about SECURE coincided with the regular five-yearly election of a 
new WCO Secretary General. The WCO Council in June 2008 elected Kunio 
Mikuriya as the new Secretary General and his term started in January 2009. He 
promised a reform policy with the aim of “strengthening  Members’  participation  in  
the WCO  decision-making  process,  by  applying  the  principle that sharing 
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information, rather than withholding it, is the source of the Secretariat’s power” 
(Mikuriya 2008). This policy directly addressed the criticism that was expressed by 
the opponents of the SECURE process and it also marked the beginning of the end 
of the SECURE Working Group. After the 2008 Council, the SECURE Working 
Group met only one more time in October 2008, but it could not agree on terms of 
reference for the group (Moraes 2009: 182). Subsequently, the Policy Commission 
and the Council decided to terminate the WCO SECURE Working Group because of 
the deadlock. They created the Counterfeiting and Piracy (CAP) Group as a 
successor, which is composed exclusively of public sector members and has a 
mandate that excludes any legislative proposals (WCO 2009a). 
 As it turned out, the policy of the previous WCO Secretary General Michel 
Danet was not successful. By pursuing a high profile enforcement agenda, the WCO 
did not become more relevant, but actually lost reputation and discretion (Int.14 
2010, Dobson 2010). Before SECURE, the secretariat had a high degree of 
discretion with regard to IPR enforcement as was shown through the activities of the 
WCO IPR Strategic Group. The WCO Enforcement Committee criticized some 
aspects of a draft of the WCO IPR Model Legislation (WCO IPR SG 2002a), but later 
took note of an updated version without notifying the WCO Policy Commission or the 
WCO Council about the activity (Int.14 2010). The WCO Secretariat effectively 
promoted a TRIPS-plus approach without interference from WCO members. This 
changed when the WCO promoted its IPR enforcement activities through the 
SECURE project and attracted attention outside the customs community. Critics of 
the SECURE project not only criticized the SECURE document itself but also other 
WCO activities in the IPR area, including the IPR Model Legislation (Moraes 2009: 
168, South Centre & CIEL 2008b). The WCO Secretariat used its discretion in a way 
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that has led several WCO members to examine the secretariat’s activities more 
thoroughly and to reduce its discretion. The mandate for the new CAP group is much 
more limited than that of any predecessor group. The new Secretary General Kunio 
Mikuriya effectively reversed an important aspect of the IPR policy of his 
predecessor: While Michel Danet made the WCO more political, Mikuriya made it 
again more technical (Int.14 2010). This is shown in the activities of the 
Counterfeiting and Piracy (CAP) Group, the Rights Holders Consultative (RHC) 
Group, and the Interface Public-Members (IPM). 
The CAP Group and the RHC Group 
As a result of the SECURE controversy, the WCO Policy Commission decided to 
terminate the WCO SECURE Working Group and draft a very limited mandate for its 
successor (WCO 2009a). According to its terms of reference, which were adopted by 
the WCO Council in June 2009, the Counterfeiting and Piracy (CAP) Group only is a 
“dialogue mechanism on border measures on trademark counterfeiting and copyright 
piracy“ (WCO 2010b). The group is required to respect national IP laws and may not 
engage in any norm setting activity, which explicitly includes “any kind of provisions 
(binding or non-binding), irrespective of the name, such as standards, best practices, 
recommendations, guidelines or any other denomination” (WCO 2010b). The group 
may also discuss WCO activities in the area of capacity building (WCO 2010b), such 
as the many customs training seminars, which the WCO organized since the end of 
the IPR Strategic Group (Zimmermann 2009). The WCO has collaborated closely 
with the private sector on the training seminars. Each seminar involved around 10-15 
IPR holders (Zimmermann 2009). The cooperation with the private sector has 
continued although the WCO alienated its private sector partners twice: in 2007 with 
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the abrupt termination of the IPR Strategic Group and in 2008 and 2009 with the 
problems in the SECURE Working Group and its subsequent termination. The CAP 
Group, according to its terms of reference, was no longer a PPP. It consists only of 
public sector members. Representatives from the private sector can only be invited 
as guests (WCO 2010b). However, it remains to be seen how the CAP Group 
evolves in practice. If the WCO Secretariat invites some guests permanently, then it 
could evolve into an advisory PPP, although with a less prominent role for the private 
sector than in any of its predecessors. The WCO Secretariat is interested in 
continuing cooperation with the private sector in order to have access to private 
sector resources, but it is very careful because of the experience with the SECURE 
initiative. The difficult public-private relationship at the WCO after SECURE is 
expressed in the following two quotes by WCO Chief Legal Officer Philippe Vorreux 
and BASCAP Senior Policy Advisor Bill Dobson: 
 
“The death of the SECURE initiative was for political reasons only. The majority of members 
believed that we should follow on cooperating with the private sector. And of course the 
private sector felt a bit offended by the way SECURE was terminated. So there was this 
common interest of starting again to talk together. Because even if there is a, I would say,  
structural mistrust of members towards private sector, for some good reasons some times, we 
have to work together because we have this common interest. And even if it is not to protect 
the margin of rights holders, at least for consumers it is very important.” 
  Philippe Vorreux (2010a), WCO Chief Legal Officer 
 
“The WCO is still struggling to identify their right model for their ongoing relationship with the 
private sector. I think they recognize that they need the private sector’s involvement. They 
want the private sector's involvement. They recognize that the private sector can be a funding 
source for them, but they keep running up against the demands of their member states and 
they have not figured out a way, from a secretariat standpoint, to manage the member states 
in a way that allows them to develop the programs with the private sector that would benefit 
the WCO and the member states.” 
Bill Dobson (2010), Senior Policy Advisor at the 
Business Action to Stop Counterfeiting and Piracy (BASCAP) 
 
In order to manage this difficult relationship, the WCO created two IPR groups: the 
CAP Group and the Rights Holders Consultative (RHC) Group. The CAP Group had 
its first meeting in October 2009 without any participants from the private sector 
(Zimmermann 2009). The first meeting of the RHC Group was in March 2010 and 
 
A Study of Transnational PPPs Against IP Crimes 119 
 
involved 25 IP rights holders and the WCO Secretariat but no WCO members 
(Vorreux 2010a). Unlike the CAP Group, the RHC Group is not an official committee 
of the WCO but an advisory PPP that was created at the initiative of the WCO 
Secretariat. The WCO Secretariat manages its relationship with the IPR stakeholders 
from the public and the private sector through these two groups. It has also tried to 
bring these two groups closer together. The second meeting of the CAP Group was 
held in May 2010 and involved five RHC Group members as guests (Vorreux 2010a). 
The CAP Group and the RHC Group both meet twice a year and the WCO 
Secretariat plans to synchronize the meetings so that an exchange between the two 
groups becomes easier (Vorreux 2010a). 
However, the relationship between the CAP Group and the RHC Group was 
still evolving when the research for this study was done, but the basic idea is clear. 
Within the PPP network at the WCO, the RHC Group serves as an advisory PPP for 
the WCO Secretariat. The WCO Secretariat can then decide if it wants to present the 
views of the RHC Group members to the CAP Group members itself or if it wants to 
invite some of them as guests to do that directly. Collaborative PPPs continuously 
exist around customs training seminars and a new collaborative PPP was launched 
in 2010 - the information exchange network IPM. 
Information Exchange: from CEN to IPM 
The enforcement of intellectual property rights by customs agencies requires at least 
some information exchange with the IPR holder. The standard procedure is that the 
IPR holder files an application for action with the customs agency and supplies some 
information about how to identify the IPR infringing goods, how to distinguish them 
from genuine goods, and how to contact the rights holder for further information. The 
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rights holder can also inform the customs agency about specific shipments 
containing counterfeit or pirated goods if he has such knowledge, for example, from 
his own investigations. Beyond that, it can also be useful to supply information about 
known legal trade routes and previous cases of illegal shipping, so that this 
information can be used for risk analysis and targeted inspections by customs 
agencies. All this information needs to be made available by rights holders to several 
customs agencies and it also needs to be updated frequently. Therefore, there have 
been several attempts to optimize this information management with the help of 
multilateral organizations such as the WCO. 
 The Customs Enforcement Network (CEN), which the WCO has operated 
since 2000, is a tool for the exchange of information about all kinds of customs 
offences (WCO 2009b). It also contains information about IPR infringements, but this 
information is primarily about previous seizures that can be helpful for future risk 
analysis. There is no specialized tool for the identification of IPR infringing goods in 
CEN and the input of information from the private sector is rather limited. The 
International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) was the first private 
sector organization that supplied information to CEN in 2002 (WCO IPR SG 2002b). 
However, the overall success of CEN has been rather limited in general, including in 
the IPR area (Vorreux 2010a). When it comes to the exchange of sensitive 
information, bilateral cooperation is often preferred over multilateral cooperation 
(Blakemore 2010). Not every customs officer has access to the system to secure the 
information in the CEN. In 2009, only about 2000 officers in 155 countries had 
access (WCO 2009b). This means that the system cannot be used in order to 
disseminate IPR information to all relevant customs officers. 
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 The 2007 SECURE document included a plan to improve CEN by developing 
a specialized IPR information system. When SECURE was aborted, this rather 
uncontroversial plan remained. In 2010, the WCO Secretariat launched this 
information system under the name Interface Public-Members (IPM) – where 
“members” stands for WCO members and “public” refers to non-member entities from 
the private sector. IPM is a database that allows private IP rights holders to submit 
and update information for the identification of genuine and counterfeit goods to one 
central point of reference for all participating customs agencies around the world. 
While this basic information is the primary function of IPM, rights holders can also 
upload more detailed information for risk analysis (Vorreux 2010a, Vorreux 2010b). 
IPM is financed through subscription fees from the private rights holders that 
range between 2800 EUR and 8800 EUR depending on the rights holders’ sales 
revenue. Participation is free of charge for the customs agencies (Vorreux 2010b). 
Private rights holders have been able to subscribe to IPM since September 2010 and 
the access for customs agencies was established successively since early 2011. It 
still remains to be seen how successful IPM will be.14 However, it can serve as a 
communication platform for all kinds of IP related information, such as dates of RHC 
Group meetings or training seminars, which could make this collaborative PPP a 
central node in the PPP network at the WCO.  
Key Findings about the Development of WCO PPPs 
The World Customs Organization’s involvement with IP crime started when the 
TRIPS Agreement was signed in 1994 and subsequently has been implemented in 
several phases. In 1994, the WCO Council adopted its first recommendation 
                                            
14
 In August 2012 the WCO reported the participation of 43 countries and 400 brands in IPM (Molle 
2012). 
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concerning IP rights enforcement and, thereby, indirectly mandated the WCO’s 
activity in this area. The TRIPS Agreement triggered the increased WCO activity in 
two ways: First, the TRIPS agreement was the first agreement to define an 
international minimum standard of IP rights. It provided a common ground for 
international cooperation for their enforcement. Second, the agreement explicitly 
requires customs agencies to enforce IPRs at the border and to do so in cooperation 
with IP rights holders. This new responsibility for customs agencies also became a 
matter for the WCO, as it facilitates global transgovernmental cooperation between 
customs agencies. 
 The TRIPS Agreement was signed in concurrence with the Agreement 
Establishing the WTO. The emergence of this new international organization has led 
to concerns at the WCO that the WCO might lose ground vis-à-vis the WTO or might 
even be subsumed within the WTO. As a means to improve its competitive position, 
the WCO emphasized activities that are less related to the work of the WTO, such as 
the role of customs agencies to protect societies from crime. This made the fight 
against IP crime an attractive issue area for the WCO. 
 In the late 1990s, the most important activity for the WCO in the area of IP was 
the organization of customs training seminars to help countries implement the 
enforcement procedures required by the TRIPS Agreement. These seminars were 
organized in collaboration with IPR owners who financed the seminars and 
participated as trainer. Despite of this support from the private sector, the WCO had 
difficulty keeping up with the demand for such training due to a lack of human 
resources at the WCO Secretariat. This problem worsened when the demand for 
customs training increased as a result of the end of the transition period in 2000, 
when developing countries and countries in transition needed to implement TRIPS. 
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To address this resource problem, the WCO formed the IPR Strategic Group in 2000, 
which was a collaborative PPP with a very strong role for the private sector partners. 
The business association SNB-REACT managed the majority of the secretariat work 
for this PPP from organizing meetings of the PPP in different venues, hosting a 
website for the PPP, managing all communication with the private sector partners, to 
organizing customs training seminars including their financing. The WCO only 
needed to handle the communication with the customs agencies and to send a WCO 
employee to the training seminars, but even the travel expenses were covered by the 
private sector partners. 
The WCO thus managed to establish itself as an important provider of 
services related to IPR enforcement. It had those services organized in its name, 
although it hardly invested any of its own resources. It mainly contributed its 
reputation, its credibility, and its access to customs agencies all around the world. 
Those customs agencies contributed their human resources, their information, and, 
most importantly, their legitimacy to inspect goods at borders. The resources 
contributed to the PPP by the private partners were human resources, money, and 
information that was necessary to find and identify IPR infringing goods. 
The WCO secretariat formed the IPR Strategic Group without seeking an 
explicit mandate by its members to do so. It had a high degree of discretion for 
activities that were perceived as technical and non-political. However, being limited to 
technical, non-political work did not prevent the WCO IPR Strategic Group from 
drafting legislative proposals that went beyond the minimum IPR enforcement 
standards required by TRIPS. A draft of this WCO IPR Model Legislation was 
criticized for being too demanding by the WCO Enforcement Committee in 2002. 
However, another, yet similar, version in 2004 was noted by the same committee 
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without forwarding it to a more political decision making body, such as the WCO 
Policy Commission or the WCO Council. 
In 2005, the Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi brought up the idea of 
a new IPR enforcement convention at the G8 Summit and this initiative eventually 
resulted in negotiations about the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). The 
WCO Secretariat recognized that the Japanese proposal could lead to a major 
change in the international IPR enforcement system. Therefore it developed a 
strategy with the aim to increase the relevance of the organization by becoming a 
major actor in these new developments. In doing so, the WCO Secretariat used its 
discretion in a way that eventually resulted in resistance by WCO members. 
In pursuit of its new strategy, which was meant to ensure long term gains by 
improving the competitiveness of the WCO, the WCO secretariat decided that it was 
worth investing more resource into IPR enforcement related activities. It hired its first 
full-time staff dedicated exclusively to the fight against counterfeiting and piracy. The 
newly available in-house human resources made the WCO less dependent on the 
services of SNB-REACT for the WCO IPR Strategic Group. As a result, the WCO put 
an end to the outsourcing of activities to SNB-REACT by terminating the IPR 
Strategic Group in 2007 and replacing it with the SECURE Working Group, whose 
secretariat was managed exclusively by the WCO. By reducing the role of its 
partners in the partnership, the WCO Secretariat increased its own control over its 
IPR enforcement activities. This strategy alienated several private sector partners, 
and the very assertive leadership of the WCO Secretariat subsequently alienated 
several WCO members. When it became increasingly obvious that the WCO 
Secretariat was using its discretion for political work instead of just technical work, a 
coalition emerged with the aim of reducing the discretion of the WCO Secretariat. 
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A side effect of the termination of the IPR Strategic Group was that the 
collaborative PPP was replaced with a PPP network. This network consisted of the 
SECURE Working Group, which was as an advisory PPP that continued to work on 
the various proposals in the SECURE document, and several smaller collaborative 
PPPs around customs training seminars, which the WCO organized together with 
private sector partners. 
The change in the PPP structure and the change of the policy of the WCO 
secretariat also resulted in a new representation of stakeholders in the PPP, as well 
as at the WCO itself. The WCO IPR Strategic Group consisted of representatives of 
customs agencies and of IP rights holders. It drafted legislative proposals for IPR 
enforcement without the involvement of other stakeholders in IP policy and without 
seeking their attention. When essentially the same legislative proposals were 
presented in the SECURE document to the WCO Policy Commission and the WCO 
Council in 2007, the representatives of customs agencies in these decision making 
bodies adopted the document. However, as the WCO advertised itself as in important 
actor in IP policy, the WCO and the SECURE Working Group also attracted attention 
from other stakeholders. The SECURE Working Group included diplomatic 
representatives in addition to the customs officers; it also included transport 
associations in addition to the rights holders’ representatives. The opposition against 
the SECURE initiative was mainly organized by the diplomatic representatives, who 
thereby effectively reversed the previous commitments of the customs 
representatives. As decision making in the SECURE Working Group was blocked, 
the WCO members decided to terminate it and create the CAP Group as its 
successor in 2009. 
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 The very limited mandate of the CAP group was the WCO members’ reaction 
to the way the WCO Secretariat previously used its discretion. The CAP group may 
neither engage in the drafting of legislative proposals nor in any standard setting. It 
may only discuss various national approaches to IPR enforcement and the capacity 
building measures of the WCO, such as customs training seminars. In order to 
prevent private sector representatives from having too much influence, they may not 
join the CAP group; only some may be invited as guests. However, as the WCO 
continued to depend on private sector resources for IPR enforcement work, it created 
new PPPs following the end of the SECURE Group: The RHC Group serves as an 
advisory PPP for the WCO Secretariat and the IPM is a collaborative PPP for the 
exchange of information between rights holders and customs agencies and it 
generates funding for the WCO. In addition, the WCO continues to organize customs 
training in collaborative PPPs. 
This shows how different IPR enforcement policies can lead to more or less 
political controversy. The drafting of legislative proposals first led to mild criticism.  
When those proposals were presented as global standards, it resulted in a major 
political controversy, which was bad for the reputation of the WCO, reduced the 
discretion of its secretariat, and killed its advisory PPP. On the other hand, the 
collaborative PPPs that focused on training and information exchange were 
uncontested and even continued while SECURE was attacked. Measures to improve 
the enforcement of existing standards seem to be significantly less controversial than 
the setting of new standards.  
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6. World Intellectual Property Organization 
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is a public international 
organization dedicated to the worldwide promotion of the protection of intellectual 
property15. It pursues this aim by negotiating and administering international treaties 
and by facilitating direct transgovernmental cooperation between intellectual property 
offices. The WIPO’s primary concern relating to IP protection has been and continues 
to be the protection of IP by the law. The issue of law enforcement has only been 
addressed recently and is only a minor part of the overall work of the WIPO. In 2002, 
the WIPO created an Enforcement and Special Projects Division and it held the first 
meeting of the Advisory Committee on Enforcement (ACE) in 2003. This committee 
can be considered an advisory PPP based on the very broad definition for this PPP 
type used in this study. However, the role of the private sector in the ACE is rather 
small compared to all other PPPs examined in this study. Therefore, some people 
may refer to the ACE as another form of public private cooperation than a PPP. 
 This chapter starts with the relevant background about the WIPO and then 
analyzes how the WIPO became active in the area of IPR enforcement. The 
subsequent section is dedicated to the Advisory Committee on Enforcement and the 
work of the Enforcement and Special Projects Division. A further section analyzes 
how the WIPO Development Agenda affects the enforcement related work. The final 
section then analyzes the key findings from the WIPO case study with a view to 
explaining the developments. 
  
                                            
15
 IP protection is the primary objective of the WIPO as stated in the convention establishing the 
WIPO, but this purpose is being questioned as part of the WIPO Development Agenda, which is 
described further down in this chapter.   
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Background on the World Intellectual Property Organization 
In 2009, the WIPO had 184 member states and a staff of more than 1200. Its 
secretariat in Geneva operated with an annual budget of 304 million CHF (app. 
201m EUR or 280m USD) (WIPO 2010b). The WIPO has a source of income that 
distinguishes it from all other international organizations in this study. About 74% of 
its income is derived from fees for processing patent applications based on the  
Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), and about 15% of the income comes from fees for 
processing trademark applications based on the Madrid System16 (WIPO 2010b). 
Each of these agreements allows individuals or organizations to apply for an 
intellectual property right with a national patent and trademark office and indicate that 
protection is also sought in other participating countries. The WIPO then charges 
fees for processing these applications. With additional fees for processing industrial 
design applications (Hague Agreement) and geographical indication applications 
(Lisbon Agreement) the total income from fees is about 90% of the total WIPO 
budget. Contributions from member states only account for about 6% (WIPO 2010b). 
As the WIPO is generally rather well funded (Wollgast 2010), it could probably 
sustain itself without any contributions from member states. 
 In spite of its financial independence from member states contributions, the 
WIPO is an intergovernmental organization. The existence and the activities of WIPO 
are based on several international IP treaties that have been negotiated and further 
developed at the WIPO. However, the WIPO also employs transgovernmental means 
of cooperation as it facilitates direct cooperation between IP offices, for example, for 
the processing of applications for international IP protection. 
                                            
16
 The term Madrid System refers to the Madrid Agreement of 1891 and the Madrid Protocol of 1989 
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 The WIPO has a rather complex governance structure, because it serves as 
the secretariat for several international unions, each established by an international 
treaty. When the WIPO Assemblies meet once a year, 20 assemblies convene at the 
same time: several union assemblies, such as the Patent Cooperation Treaty Union 
Assembly and the Madrid Union Assembly, as well as additional governing bodies. 
The WIPO Conference consists of all 184 WIPO member states. The WIPO General 
Assembly consists of 176 WIPO member states, which are also members of at least 
one union administered by the WIPO. It has the right to appoint the Director General 
based on a recommendation of the WIPO Coordination Committee, whose 83 
members consist of and are appointed by the Executive Committees of the Paris 
Union and the Berne Union (WIPO 2010a, WIPO 1979a). 
This complex governance structure evolved over more than 100 years. The 
predecessor of the WIPO was the BIRPI (Bureaux Internationaux Réunis pour la 
Protection de la Propriété Intellectuelle, French for United International Bureau for 
the Protection of Intellectual Property). The 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection 
of Industrial Property and the 1886 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works first established individual bureaus. Both bureaus were united in 
1893 and thereby formed the BIRPI (Bogsch 1992: 8). The BIRPI was located in the 
Swiss capital Berne and was under the supervision of the Swiss government, which 
was also responsible for its finances. Major developments for the BIRPI included the 
1891 Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks and the 
1925 Hague Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Industrial 
Designs. As each agreement created a new international union with its own 
membership, the BIRPI became the united bureau for an increasing number of such 
unions (Bogsch 1992: 9). 
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 When the United Nations and its specialized agencies were founded after 
World War II, the BIRPI faced competing international organizations that also 
addressed the issue of IP. In 1952, the Universal Copyright Convention was signed 
at the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). 
As this convention was less demanding, it attracted states that were not party to the 
Berne Convention at that time, such as the Soviet Union and the United States 
(Bogsch 1992: 21). In 1961, Brazil introduced a resolution to the Economic and 
Financial Committee of the UN General Assembly with the aim of adjusting the 
international patent system in order to make technology transfers to developing 
countries easier (Menescal 2005: 765). The resolution was adopted in a mitigated 
form and resulted in a 1964 report on “The Role of Patents in the Transfer of 
Technology to Developing Countries”, which was drafted in cooperation with the 
BIRPI (Menescal 2005: 773). This issue was subsequently debated at the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which issued a report 
about the topic in 1974 (Menescal 2005: 773). 
 When the BIRPI faced such a competitive environment and attempts to 
decrease the level of international IP protection for the sake of technology transfers, 
it secured its position as the primary international organization for intellectual 
property protection with three steps: First, the BIRPI moved from Berne to Geneva in 
1960, where it was physically closer to many other international organizations 
including the Geneva office of the United Nations (Bogsch 1992: 8). Second, the 
BIPRI was reformed to become the WIPO, an international organization that is no 
longer under the supervision of the Swiss government but has its own governance 
structure, which made it more accountable to the member states. The Convention 
Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization was signed in 1967 and 
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entered into force in 1970 (Bogsch 1992: 11). And third, the WIPO signed an 
agreement with the UN to become a specialized agency in the UN system in 1974. 
This last step was controversial. Some industrialized countries were 
concerned that they could be outnumbered by developing countries within WIPO 
(Bogsch 1992: 19). Decolonization had already led to an increasing number of 
developing countries joining WIPO, and it was assumed that the status of a UN 
agency could attract even more developing countries who could try to weaken the 
protection of IP for the sake of technology transfers to developing countries. 
However, the view prevailed that accommodating developing countries interests was 
a price worth paying for a more unified global IP system (Bogsch 1992: 19). As a 
concession to developing countries, the agreement between the UN and WIPO 
declares that WIPO cooperates with the UN “in promoting and facilitating the transfer 
of technology to developing countries” (WIPO & UN 1974: Art. 10). In practice, 
however, the WIPO interpreted this agreement not as a mandate to decrease patent 
protection, but as a mandate to stimulate the industrialization of developing countries 
by assisting them in establishing legislation and administration for the protection of 
intellectual property (May 2007: 27, 45). 
After WIPO joined the UN system, it faced less competition and was 
increasingly successful. The Patent Cooperation Treaty, which was signed in 1970, 
entered into force in 1978. It became one of the most successful treaties of the WIPO 
and its fees serve as its main funding source. However, several industrialized 
countries aspired to increase the level of international IP protection in the 1980s and 
90s. They pursued this aim not at the WIPO but at the Uruguay trade round of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which eventually led to the 
adoption of the TRIPS Agreement and the creation of the WTO. The forum for IP 
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negotiations was changed for three reasons: First, developing countries were less 
influential at the GATT trade round than at WIPO. Second, linking IP with other trade 
issues allowed industrialized countries to achieve a higher standard of IP protection 
by making concessions on other trade issues, most importantly market access for 
textile products. And third, the dispute resolution mechanism at the WTO is a much 
stronger way of ensuring adherence to the agreement because it includes sanctions 
(Helfer 2004: 20, Musungu & Dutfield 2003: 10). 
The signing of the TRIPS Agreement in 1994, and the subsequent founding of 
the WTO to administer it, again challenged the position of the WIPO as the primary 
international organization responsible for IP protection. The TRIPS Agreement 
included all the principles of the WIPO-administered Paris and Berne conventions as 
well as several further provisions. The Paris and Berne conventions became, as a 
result, only relevant to the small and decreasing number of state parties that were not 
WTO members17. However, other WIPO treaties did not become obsolete: most 
importantly the PCT for international patent applications and the Madrid System for 
international trademark applications. Also, new treaties were concluded that went 
beyond the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. Especially relevant are the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, which were 
signed in 1996. They both included provisions against the circumvention of copyright 
protection technology, such as digital rights management. 
The WIPO also adjusted to the emergence of the TRIPS Agreement by 
concluding an agreement with the WTO in 1995. The WIPO thereby acquired a role 
in the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement, although it is actually administered 
by the WTO. According to the agreement, the secretariats of the WIPO and the WTO 
                                            
17
 From 2008 until 2012 those were 32 states, of which only 5 did not apply to become WTO 
members: Micronesia, Monaco, North Korea, San Marino, and the Vatican (WIPO 2011d, WTO 
2011e). 
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“shall  enhance  cooperation  in  their  legal-technical  assistance  and  technical 
cooperation  activities  relating  to  the  TRIPS  Agreement  for  developing  
countries” (WIPO & WTO 1995: Art. 4.2). The agreement effectively mandates the 
WIPO to assist all developing countries with TRIPS implementation if they are a 
member of either of the two organizations18. By taking up the responsibility to assist 
with TRIPS implementation, the WIPO has managed to remain an important actor for 
IP-related assistance to developing countries (Musungu & Dutfield 2003: 16). The 
WTO also has a role in providing TRIPS implementation assistance to developing 
countries, but it does so mostly in collaboration with the WIPO. The relationship that 
evolved between the WIPO and the WTO with respect to TRIPS implementation in 
developing countries could be described as a division of labor: the WIPO assists 
developing countries with TRIPS implementation, and the WTO administers the 
procedure in which the TRIPS implementation is evaluated (Starein 2010, Huther 
2010, WIPO 1999b). One could assume that such a division of labor increases the 
popularity of the WIPO among developing countries and decreases the popularity of 
the WTO, because support comes from the WIPO and potentially unpopular 
decisions come from the WTO. However, the WIPO continued to be a target of 
developing countries’ criticism about international IP policy, not least because it 
became a forum where TRIPS-plus measures are discussed (Musungu & Dutfield 
2003: 10). Examples include the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty. The conflict between advocates for higher 
standards and for lower standards of IP protection continues to be a defining 
characteristic of the WIPO.     
                                            
18
 Art. 4.1 of the WIPO-WTO Agreement is literally only a reciprocal non-discrimination clause that 
requires the WIPO to provide the same TRIPS implementation assistance to WTO members as to 
WIPO members and vice versa. Effectively this mandated the WIPO to assist in the implementation of 
a WTO treaty, while it only mandates the WTO to assist non-members with the implementation of a 
WTO treaty (WIPO & WTO 1995, WIPO 1999b). 
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The WIPO and IPR Enforcement 
The WIPO deals primarily with the protection of intellectual property by the law. 
Questions related to the enforcement of the law used to be of minor importance for 
WIPO’s work, but they became increasingly relevant around the year 2000. There 
are two major reasons for this: First, that year marked the end of the transition period 
for developing countries and countries in transition to implement the TRIPS 
Agreement. As the WIPO acquired a mandate to assist developing countries with 
TRIPS implementation, and as the TRIPS Agreement includes enforcement 
provisions, the WIPO increasingly had to deal with the issue of law enforcement 
(WIPO 1998: 9, WIPO 1999a: 16). And second, the WIPO increased its activities in 
an area that is not specifically addressed by the TRIPS Agreement: the protection of 
IP with regard to the internet and digital media. Enforcement provisions have been an 
important aspect of this work. The WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty included enforcement provisions against the 
circumvention of copyright protection technology, such as digital rights management. 
Both treaties were signed in 1996 but did not enter into force until 2002. In 1999, the 
WIPO General Assembly adopted a Digital Agenda (WIPO 1999d), which included 
the promotion of the WIPO treaties of 1996 and addressed several other issues 
related to the internet and digital media. It also endorsed recommendations 
concerning the registration of internet domain names that are identical with registered 
trademarks. The WIPO recommendations concerning this practice, known as 
cybersquatting, eventually led to the adoption of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute 
Resolution Policy by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, for 
which the WIPO provides arbitration services (ICANN 1999, WIPO 1999c). 
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 As part of the overall WIPO strategy to address problems of IP protection with 
regard to the internet and digital media, the WIPO formed two new committees in 
1998: the “Advisory Committee on Protection of Industrial Property Rights in Global 
Electronic Commerce”, which was part of the WIPO Program for “Development of 
Industrial Property Law”, and the “Advisory Committee on Management of Copyright 
and Related Rights in Global Information Networks”, which was part of the WIPO 
Program for “Development of Copyright and Related Rights” (WIPO 2002a). As both 
committees recognized that enforcement related questions were important for their 
work, it was included in their mandates in 2000 and this was also reflected by 
changing the names of the committees to include “enforcement”. In 2001, a joint 
meeting of the “Advisory Committee on Enforcement of Industrial Property Rights” 
and the “Advisory Committee on Management and Enforcement of Copyright and 
Related Rights” was held (WIPO 2002a). Such a joint meeting was held only once 
and can be considered the prelude to the creation of the Advisory Committee on 
Enforcement (ACE). 
The WIPO Advisory Committee on Enforcement (ACE) 
The Advisory Committee on Enforcement was the first WIPO committee dedicated to 
the enforcement of IPRs in general. The decision to form the ACE was made at the 
WIPO General Assembly in September 2002 after the decision was prepared at a 
consultation meeting ten days before the General Assembly (WIPO 2002b). A major 
point of contestation was the scope of the mandate of the ACE. The delegation from 
the United States suggested establishing it as a “permanent committee”, which 
would, similar to other permanent committees at the WIPO, also discuss the further 
development of existing laws. Such a norm setting mandate for the ACE was 
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opposed by the delegations of Algeria, Argentina, Barbados, Belarus, Brazil, 
Cameroon, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela (WIPO 2002b). They 
argued that it was already very difficult for many countries to implement the 
enforcement provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. Therefore, the ACE should focus 
on helping developing countries with TRIPS implementation and should not discuss 
TRIPS-plus measures. The General Assembly also discussed the proposal that the 
ACE could develop a model law for the implementation of the enforcement provisions 
of the TRIPS Agreement, but this was also rejected.19 The opponents of a norm 
setting mandate were finally successful in acquiring a mandate for the ACE that 
explicitly excludes norm setting and limited the committee to technical assistance and 
coordination and (WIPO 2002b). 
 The ACE was established as a unified committee to replace the “Advisory 
Committee on Enforcement of Industrial Property Rights” and the “Advisory 
Committee on Management and Enforcement of Copyright and Related Rights”, 
which already had a joint meeting in 2001. The General Assembly therefore 
discussed whether this unification of committees should also be reflected by a new 
unified enforcement division within the WIPO Secretariat. However, the decision of 
how to reorganize the secretariat was left to the discretion of the Secretary General 
(WIPO 2002b). He decided to establish the Enforcement and Special Projects 
Division following the General Assembly session (WIPO 2003a: 2). The purpose of 
the new division was to serve as a secretariat for the ACE and to coordinate 
enforcement related activities at WIPO also beyond the immediate suggestions made 
by the ACE (WIPO 2003a). The German lawyer Wolfgang Starein was the first 
                                            
19
 The idea of the model law was introduced at the General Assembly as an issue that was discussed 
at the consultation meeting before the GA. Unfortunately, the records of the consultation meeting do 
not specify which delegation introduced the idea of a model law there. However, it is interesting that 
the model law idea was introduced at the WIPO at a time when a draft version of such a model law 
was discussed at the WCO (see previous chapter). 
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director of the Enforcement and Special Projects Division until his retirement in 2008 
(Starein 2010).  
The mandate of the ACE, as adopted by the General Assembly, includes 
cooperation with other international organizations, with law enforcement agencies of 
WIPO members, and with the private sector in order to include the experiences with 
IPR enforcement of all relevant actors (WIPO 2002b). For this purpose, the WIPO 
Secretariat was responsible for inviting delegates from the private sector and 
international organizations, and the WIPO members were encouraged to send 
delegations to the ACE that include representatives from government agencies 
responsible for IPR enforcement, such as police, customs, and prosecutors (WIPO 
2002a). In practice, however, law enforcement officers and prosecutors were only 
rarely included in state delegations to the ACE. The usual delegation consisted of a 
diplomatic representative from the permanent mission of the WIPO member state in 
Geneva and often a so-called national expert from the patent and trademark office of 
that member state or from the national ministry responsible for IP matters (WIPO 
2011b, Int.22 2010). As it was often difficult for developing countries to finance the 
participation of a national expert at the ACE, their delegations often consisted only of 
representatives from the permanent mission in Geneva. In order to address this 
problem, the WIPO secretariat has set up a scheme by which it pays the travel 
expenses of 15 developing countries, and the recipient countries rotate with each 
session of the ACE (Wollgast 2010). 
Only WIPO members are members of the ACE. All other participants can be 
invited as a guest for a particular session of the ACE or they can be accredited as 
permanent observers and then come to every ACE session (Wollgast 2010). 
However, observers are not limited observing the meeting. They may also participate 
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in the debate; they can either react to an ongoing debate or they can actively 
introduce a topic at the ACE if they are invited as speakers. For example, at the 2006 
meeting of the ACE, a representative of the International Trademark Association 
(INTA) gave a presentation on “Education & Awareness-Building Initiatives of INTA 
on Trademark Protection and Enforcement” (Aung 2006) and a representative of the  
International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) gave a presentation on 
“IFPI's Work on Education, Training and Awareness Building in the Area of 
Enforcement of Rights” (Decker 2006). And at the 2009 ACE meeting a 
representative of the IPR Business Partnership gave a presentation on “Addressing 
costs and Balancing Rights” (Brohm 2009) and a representative of the development 
policy think tank IQsensato gave a presentation on “The Contribution of, and costs to, 
Right Holders in Enforcement, Taking Into Account Recommendation 45 of the WIPO 
Development Agenda” (Musungu 2009). 
More than 200 NGOs and more than 50 public international organizations are 
accredited as observers at the WIPO (WIPO 2011c). However, not all of them come 
to the ACE, and not all observers at the ACE participate actively as speakers. Many 
literally remain observers. A list of the most active observers at the ACE is shown in 
table 10. The WIPO regulations only allow associations to qualify as observers, not 
individual companies. However, business associations may also include 
representatives of members companies in their delegations (WIPO 2011a, Wollgast 
2010). They are invited to contribute their experience as IPR holders with IPR 
enforcement (Starein 2010). 
  
 
A Study of Transnational PPPs Against IP Crimes 139 
 
  Table 10: WIPO Advisory Committee on Enforcement (ACE) 
Founded 2002, First meeting 2003 
Secretariat: WIPO 
Chair: Sweden (2003, 2004, 2006), Egypt (2007), 
Romania (2009), Angola (2010, 2011) 
 (Election among WIPO members at each session until following session) 
Public Sector Members 
All 184 WIPO members 
Public Sector Partners 
WIPO has accredited more than 50 public IOs as observers, of which the following 
participated most actively in the ACE: 
European Union*, 
International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), 
World Customs Organization (WCO), 
World Health Organization (WHO) 
Private Sector Partners 
WIPO has accredited more than 200 NGOs as observers, of which the following 
participated most actively in the ACE: 
Global Anti-Counterfeiting Group (GACG), 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), 
International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), 
International Trademark Association (INTA), 
IPR Business Partnership (since 2007), 
IQsensato (since 2009) 
Source: Own account based on WIPO 2011b and WIPO 2011c 
*) Since 2006 the EU is not only an observer, but a non-voting member of the ACE 
 
The first meeting of the ACE took place in June 2003. It has since met six times in 
eight years with a duration of two to three days per meeting (WIPO 2011b). The ACE 
meetings mainly served two purposes: First, they were a forum to discuss IPR 
enforcement between WIPO members and partners. And second, the ACE oversaw 
the activities of the WIPO Enforcement and Special Projects Division. The division 
reported its past activities at each ACE session and took requests from the ACE for 
future activities. However, the activities of the division were not only determined by 
ACE decisions. Due to divergent views on IP policy, the ACE often required a long 
debate to agree even on a program for the following session of the ACE as well as a 
detailed program for the Enforcement and Special Projects Division (WIPO 2011b). 
 
140 Christopher Paun: Globalization of Law Enforcement 
 
Therefore, the division had some discretion to initiate activities without an explicit 
request from the ACE, but it always needed to be careful to stay within its limited 
mandate. 
Since the founding of the division in 2002, it continued the enforcement related 
TRIPS implementation assistance for developing countries. This was done by 
different divisions within WIPO before a specialized enforcement division was 
created. The Enforcement and Special Projects Division conducted about eight 
capacity building seminars around the world per year and also participated in 
seminars and conferences organized by other national and international 
organizations. Its primary partners for the organization of seminars were the national 
IP offices and the judiciary of the states that requested assistance. A smaller number 
of WIPO seminars also involved police and customs officers (WIPO 2011b). Such 
seminars also involved participants from the private sector, mostly because of their 
expertise in identifying counterfeit goods (Wollgast 2010). However, the WIPO did 
not accept funding from private sector organizations for its seminars nor for other 
activities. As the WIPO is rather well funded, it does not require external funds for its 
activities (Wollgast 2010, Starein 2010). Besides not being dependent on additional 
funding, the WIPO also wants to avoid the impression that it could be influenced by 
such funding. This is expressed in the following quote by the former director of the 
Enforcement and Special Projects Division: 
 
“The ACE is being managed as neutrally as possible. We do not want to create the impression 
that it could be influenced in any way by any donor.”* 
  Wolfgang Starein (2010), former Director of the 
WIPO Enforcement and Special Projects Division (2002-2008) 
*) This quote is translated. The original interview language was German. 
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Due to the limited role of the private sector in the ACE, some people refer to the ACE 
as another form of public private cooperation rather than a public-private partnership. 
Wolfgang Starein also considers the term PPP inadequate to describe the ACE 
(Starein 2010). However, after having described divergent views on the meaning of 
the term PPP in chapter 2, I decided to use a rather broad definition of a PPP and 
use a typology to distinguish between types of PPPs. Based on this definition and 
typology, the ACE qualifies as an advisory PPP because it is a form of continuous 
cooperation between actors from the public and the private sector in which public 
actors rely on nonpaid advice from private actors for public policy decisions. 
However, as the role of the private sector in the ACE is very small compared to all 
other PPPs examined in this study, the ACE can be considered a borderline case of 
a PPP. There are two important reasons for the limited role of the private sector in 
the ACE: First, the WIPO is rather well funded and does not depend on additional 
funds. Therefore, funding from the private sector is not a way for the private sector to 
increase its role in the relationship with the WIPO. And second, IP policy is highly 
contested at the WIPO. The conflict between advocates for higher standards and for 
lower standards of IP protection makes it difficult for the WIPO to take decisive 
actions. Such a limited ability to act makes the WIPO a difficult partner for the private 
sector. This difficulty arising from the conflict about IP policy is also expressed in the 
following quote by the BASCAP Senior Policy Advisor Bill Dobson:  
 
“WIPO has been consistently the most difficult [public international organization] to work with, 
but that difficulty has been driven by their hyper-sensitivity to their member states interests, 
and not only to their member states interests but their member states vocal protests in WIPO 
forums. […] WIPO has a relationship with the private sector and they recognize that they are 
there to protect the interest of the private sector, because they are registering patents and all 
that. So their business is all about protecting private intellectual property. But you would never 
know it from working with WIPO. When I work with WIPO it is all about bureaucracy and 
diplomacy and avoiding confrontation with their member states. So how they get anything 
done or whether they get anything done is a real question to me. I mean, I don't see how they 
get anything done.” Bill Dobson (2010), Senior Policy Advisor at the 
ICC Business Action to Stop Counterfeiting and Piracy (BASCAP) 
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The struggle between advocates for higher standards and for lower standards of IP 
protection peaked when the idea of a Development Agenda for WIPO was presented 
in 2004 and adopted in 2007. This agenda attempts to change the entire orientation 
of the WIPO and is also relevant for its IPR enforcement work. 
The WIPO Development Agenda and IPR Enforcement 
In 2004, the General Assembly of the WIPO discussed a proposal for the 
establishment of a development agenda (WIPO 2004a). The document was 
presented by the delegations of Argentina and Brazil one month before the start of 
the General Assembly. It proposed a re-orientation of the WIPO towards 
development policy goals. The furthest reaching proposal in this document was to 
change the convention establishing the WIPO so that the objective of the WIPO 
would not only be the promotion of the protection of intellectual property but also the 
consideration of the development needs of WIPO member states. However, even if 
the convention were not changed, the document argues that development is already 
an objective of the WIPO based on its agreement with the UN and the UN 
development goals. The document does not explicitly demand lower standards of IP 
protection for developing countries, but it paves the way for such demands by stating 
that a country-specific IP policy is to be preferred over a worldwide harmonized IP 
system. This is expressed, for example, in the following passage of the document: 
  
“Intellectual property protection cannot be seen as an end in itself, nor can the harmonization 
of intellectual property laws leading to higher protection standards in all countries, irrespective 
of their levels of development. The role of intellectual property and its impact on development 
must be carefully assessed on a case-by-case basis. IP protection is a policy instrument the 
operation of which may, in actual practice, produce benefits as well as costs, which may vary 
in accordance with a country’s level of development.” 
   Development Agenda Proposal by Argentina and Brazil (WIPO 2004a: 1) 
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The underlying idea of the development agenda proposal is not new. That high 
standards of IP protection could be disadvantageous for developing countries was 
already the underlying idea of Brazil’s resolution introduced in 1961 to the Economic 
and Financial Committee of the UN General Assembly (Menescal 2005: 765). The 
debate about the relationship between intellectual property and development has 
remained relevant for the WIPO and the introduction of the development agenda 
proposal marked a new high for this debate. 
The General Assembly decided that the proposal needed to be discussed 
further, and several intergovernmental meetings were held from 2004 until 2007 to 
discuss a possible development agenda for WIPO. The antagonists of this debate 
were organized as the “Friends of Development” on one side, consisting of the 
delegations of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Iran, Kenya, Peru, 
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uruguay and Venezuela (WIPO 2006), and the 
“Group B” on the other, consisting of the delegations of Australia, Canada, Japan, 
Monaco, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, the United States, the 
European Union and the EU member states20. The latter wanted to avoid radical 
reforms to the WIPO and keep IP protection as its primary objective (Scherer 2004). 
The negotiations took almost three years until a compromise was reached. 
The WIPO General Assembly in September 2007 adopted a Development 
Agenda consisting of 45 recommendations (WIPO 2007: 151). 19 of those 
recommendations were chosen for immediate implementation. These were either 
straightforward measures, such as to “increase human and financial allocation for 
technical assistance programs” (WIPO 2007: 258), or they reaffirmed existing 
principles, such as that “WIPO’s technical assistance staff and consultants shall 
                                            
20
 The exact composition of the group opposing a radical WIPO reform was in flux as the EU was 
enlarged in 2004 and 2007 and as not all Group B members were equally active. 
(cf. Scherer 2004, New 2007, New 2009, Saez 2011) 
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continue to be neutral and accountable” (WIPO 2007: 158). The remaining 26 
recommendations either describe medium or long-term objectives or they are so 
vague that they leave room for different interpretations about their implementation. 
One of these vague recommendations is the only one that explicitly addresses IPR 
enforcement: 
 
“To approach intellectual property enforcement in the context of broader societal interests and 
especially development-oriented concerns, with a view that ‘the protection and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and 
to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and 
users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, 
and to a balance of rights and obligations’, in accordance with Article 7 of the TRIPS 
Agreement.”*  WIPO Development Agenda Recommendation 45 (WIPO 2007: 157) 
   *) The quotation marks within the recommendation mark the quotation 
    of Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement 
 
The Recommendation 45 on IPR enforcement is not a new agreement, but it 
reaffirms Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement. It also leaves ample room for different 
interpretations about how IP policy is influenced by a context of broader societal 
interests and development-oriented concerns. In order to discuss this and other 
aspects of the implementation of the Development Agenda, the General Assembly 
created a Committee on Development and Intellectual Property, which consists of all 
WIPO members (WIPO 2007: 152). Therefore, the adoption of the Development 
Agenda did not mark an end to the debate. The Friends of Development re-organized 
themselves in 2010 as the Development Agenda Group21 with the aim of 
mainstreaming development concerns throughout all of WIPO’s work (Mara & New 
2010). And Group B continued their policy to keep the protection of IP as the primary 
                                            
21
 When the Development Agenda Group (DAG) was founded in 2010 it consisted of the delegations 
of Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Iran, South Africa and Uruguay, which were also previously in the 
Friends of Development (FoD) Group, and of the delegations of Algeria, Djibouti, Guatemala, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Yemen, which were not 
previously in the FoD. It did not include the previous FoD members Argentina, Bolivia, Kenya, Peru, 
Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Venezuela (Mara & New 2010, WIPO 2006). 
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objective of the WIPO as a specialized agency, while development policy was to be 
confined to specialized committees and divisions within the WIPO (Saez 2010). 
 The struggle over the implementation of the Development Agenda also 
influenced the IPR enforcement work of the WIPO and the Advisory Committee on 
Enforcement. The Enforcement and Special Projects Division was renamed in 2009 
to the “Building Respect for IP Division” in order to reflect the new approach to 
enforcement in the context of broader societal interests (Wollgast 2010). A 
representative of the development policy think tank IQsensato was invited to give 
presentations at the 2009 and the 2010 session of the ACE (Musungu 2009, 
Musungu 2010), balancing the more IP owner oriented presentations of the IPR 
Business Partnership (Brohm 2009), the International Trademark Association (Heath 
2009), and the International Chamber of Commerce (Hardy 2010). 
The 2010 session of the ACE was influenced by a debate around the question 
of how prominently the implementation of the Development Agenda should be 
discussed at the ACE22. The Development Agenda Group demanded a dedicated 
agenda item, while the Group B rejected this demand. Therefore the ACE started 
with a provisional agenda and then was interrupted several times for consultation 
meetings to discuss the final agenda. An agreement was finally reached in the 
afternoon of the second day of the two-day meeting, which renamed an existing 
agenda item to “work of the ACE” with the understanding that the Development 
Agenda implementation could be discussed under this agenda item. By debating so 
much about the formal agenda, the Development Agenda topped the effective 
agenda of the ACE meeting and left very little time to discuss the work of the ACE 
and the work of the Building Respect for IP Division. The ACE gathered several 
                                            
22
 Information about the 2010 ACE has been obtained by a participant observation. 
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recommendations about the future work of the ACE from the delegations, but it 
postponed the decision about a work program to the next session of the ACE and 
decided to continue working with the old program in the meantime. 
In principle, the WIPO rules of procedure allow majority decisions in WIPO 
bodies (WIPO 1979b). In practice, however, a consensus approach is sought in order 
to be more inclusive (Int.22 2010). This consensus approach avoids a further 
fragmentation of international IP policy, but it can also delay or prevent decision 
making as in the case of the 2010 ACE and many other WIPO bodies. With the 
continuous conflict about the relationship between IP protection and development, 
many people perceive the WIPO as a deadlocked organization, which can administer 
existing treaties but is unable to achieve any change in terms of international IPR 
enforcement policy (Dobson 2010, Huther 2010). 
Key Finding about the WIPO PPP 
The World Intellectual Property Organization is primarily concerned with the 
protection of IP by the law and only to a small extent with the enforcement of the law. 
The relevance of IPR enforcement for the WIPO increased after the TRIPS 
Agreement entered into force in 1995 and after the transition period for its 
implementation in developing countries and countries in transition ended in 2000. 
The TRIPS Agreement triggered the increased WIPO activity in IPR enforcement in 
two ways: First, the TRIPS Agreement includes specific enforcement provisions. It 
requires procedures for customs seizures and it requires the criminalization of 
trademark and copyright infringements on a commercial scale. Thereby, it made IPR 
enforcement an important aspect of international IP policy. And second, the fact that 
the TRIPS Agreement is administered at the WTO instead of the WIPO challenged 
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the relevance of the WIPO. It reacted to this challenge by signing an agreement with 
the WTO, which gave the WIPO a mandate to assist developing countries with 
TRIPS. This became increasingly relevant when the transition period for TRIPS 
implementation in developing countries ended in 2000. The WIPO also reacted to the 
TRIPS challenge by taking on issues that were not addressed by the TRIPS 
Agreement, such as the enforcement of IPRs with regard to the internet and digital 
media. As part of this Digital Agenda, the WIPO formed two specialized committees 
to discuss the protection of different IPRs with regard to electronic commerce and 
information networks. Both committees received an enforcement mandate in 2000 
and they held a joint meeting in 2001. 
 In 2002, the WIPO decided to unify its various IPR enforcement activities, 
which had evolved since the late 1990s. It created the Advisory Committee on 
Enforcement (ACE) and the Enforcement and Special Projects Division as its 
secretariat. The ACE was explicitly mandated to cooperate with a variety of 
stakeholders in IPR enforcement, such as other international organizations, law 
enforcement agencies, and the private sector. The private sector, especially IPR 
owners and their associations, was recognized as relevant for IPR enforcement. 
Access to private sector actors’ knowledge about IPR enforcement was the main 
reason for the WIPO to cooperate with them and to invite them to the ACE. 
 Based on the typology of PPPs in chapter 2, the ACE qualifies as an advisory 
PPP. It is a form of continuous cooperation between actors from the public and the 
private sector in which public actors rely on nonpaid advice from private actors for 
public policy decisions. However, the role of the private sector in the ACE is very 
small compared to all other PPPs examined in this study. Therefore the ACE can be 
considered a case of a PPP that is very close to not being a PPP. 
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 The ACE has existed continuously since it held its first meeting in 2003. It was 
neither terminated nor reformed. There are two reasons for this continuity: First, the 
WIPO is rather well funded. Therefore, access to additional funding from the private 
sector is not a motivation for increasing the role of the private sector in the PPP, as is 
the case in other PPPs. And second, the mandate for the ACE is rather detailed, 
which does not leave much room for discretion. Hence, the WIPO secretariat needs 
approval from the WIPO members for any major changes. And such an approval is 
rather unlikely, as IP policy is highly contested at the WIPO. Advocates of higher IP 
protection and of lower IP protection oppose each other and make it very difficult to 
achieve any change. There were only minor changes as part of the Development 
Agenda. The Enforcement and Special Projects Division was renamed to Building 
Respect for IP Division and the composition of the most active private sector 
participants in the ACE changed a little. Private sector actors that are critical about 
IPR enforcement took part as observers in the ACE since its founding, but since 
2009 they were also invited as speakers. 
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7. Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting & Piracy 
The Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting & Piracy has been hosted about 
every one and a half years since 2004. It is organized as a collaborative public-
private partnership. Unlike the other PPPs in this study, it is not led by a single public 
international organization, but three public IOs contribute equally to this PPP: 
Interpol, the WCO, and the WIPO. As these three IOs have been introduced in the 
previous three chapters, this chapter starts by introducing the private sector 
members of the Global Congress: the International Trademark Association (INTA), 
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and its Business Action to Stop 
Counterfeiting and Piracy (BASCAP), the International Security Management 
Association (ISMA), and the Global Business Leaders Alliance Against Counterfeiting 
(GBLAAC). Subsequently, the main section of this chapter analyzes the founding and 
the working of the Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy. The 
final section of this chapter summarizes the key findings of this case study with a 
view on explaining the developments. 
The International Trademark Association (INTA) 
The International Trademark Association is an international business association that 
also functions as a professional association. The regular INTA members are 
trademark owners. In its function to represent those trademark owners, the INTA is a 
lobbying association “dedicated to the support and advancement of trademarks and 
related intellectual property” (INTA 2011). However, the INTA also has associate 
members and academic members, such as IP law firms, IP service providers, and IP 
scholars. The INTA serves those non-trademark owning members primarily as a 
network of IP professionals. The Annual Meetings of the INTA are attended by 
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several thousand IP professionals and serve as trade fairs that bring together IP 
owners, IP lawyers, and other IP professionals.23 In 2010, the INTA had 5789 
members, of which about 40% were from North America, 27% from Europe, and 16% 
from the Asia Pacific Region (INTA 2010). The INTA has its headquarters in New 
York City and operates further offices in Brussels, Geneva, Mumbai, Shanghai, and 
Washington D.C. (INTA 2009).  
 The INTA was originally founded 1878 in New York City as the United States 
Trademark Association (USTA) and remained a U.S. association for a long time. Its 
international activities increased when it was registered as an observer at the WIPO 
in 1980 and when it participated in the conference where the Madrid Protocol was 
concluded in 1989 (INTA 2011). In 1993, the USTA changed its name to INTA to 
reflect the internationalization of the association. However, it took the association 
until 2003 to host its first annual meeting outside North America in Amsterdam and to 
open its first office outside the United States in Shanghai (INTA 2011). In the same 
year that the INTA opened its office in China, it also increased its activities on the 
issue of trademark counterfeiting, for example, by creating an INTA Anti-
Counterfeiting Committee (GBLAAC 2004). 
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and its Business Action to Stop 
Counterfeiting and Piracy (BASCAP) 
The International Chamber of Commerce is an international business association that 
consists of companies and of national business associations, which are referred to as 
ICC National Committees in the ICC terminology. Through those National 
Committees, the ICC has a presence in 91 countries around the world and its 
headquarters is located in Paris, France (ICC 2011a). On the one hand, the ICC is a 
                                            
23
 Information about the INTA has also been obtained by a participant observation of the 2008 INTA 
Annual Meeting and an INTA Anti-Counterfeiting Conference in 2010. 
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lobbying organization with the aim “to promote open international trade and 
investment across frontiers” (ICC 2011a). On the other hand, the ICC provides 
several services for its members, such as arbitration services and standardized terms 
for international trade contracts. 
 The decision to establish the ICC was made in 1919 in Atlantic City, USA, and 
it was then founded in 1920 in Paris, France (ICC 2011b). The ICC Secretariat was 
subsequently established in Paris, where the ICC International Court of Arbitration 
was also founded in 1923 (ICC 2011b). During World War II, the ICC relocated to 
neutral Sweden and then returned to Paris afterwards. In 1946, the ICC obtained 
consultative status with the United Nations and has established relations with an 
increasing number of public international organizations since then (ICC 2011b). In 
the 1980s, the ICC established several specialized anti-crime service bureaus in 
London. They exist under the umbrella of the ICC Commercial Crime Services but 
have an independent membership structure. For example, the International Maritime 
Bureau provides services related to risks with international shipping, such as 
maritime piracy, and the Counterfeiting Intelligence Bureau provides services related 
to document and product counterfeiting (ICC 2011b). 
 The Business Action to Stop Counterfeiting and Piracy (BASCAP) was 
founded in 2004 at the ICC World Congress in Marrakesh, Morocco, and it became 
operational in 2005 (Hardy 2009, Heath 2010). While the ICC’s Counterfeiting 
Intelligence Bureau already provided operational services against counterfeiting for 
its members, the ICC BASCAP was primarily founded as a specialized lobbying 
organization with the aim of getting policy makers to do more against counterfeiting 
and piracy (Faustin 2008). 
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The International Security Management Association (ISMA) 
The International Security Management Association is a professional association of 
security managers. It was founded in 1983 and has its office in Buffalo, Iowa. Of its 
470 individual members, 81% are from the United States (ISMA 2010). The ISMA is 
rather selective in accepting members. Only one security manager per company may 
join the ISMA. It has to be the most senior security executive in that company and the 
company needs to operate internationally and have assets or sales exceeding 500 
million USD annually (ISMA 2010). In addition, the security manager needs to have a 
college degree and needs to be recommended by three other ISMA members. The 
ISMA is so selective in order to provide its members a “trusted network for resource 
sharing” (ISMA 2010). It organizes several conferences, some also including security 
professionals from public sector agencies, such as the Overseas Security Advisory 
Council of the U.S. Department of State (ISMA 2010). The ISMA also has several 
working groups that specialize on specific business security issues, such as a 
working group on “Animal Rights and other Activists” and a working group on 
“Intellectual Property / Counterfeiting” (ISMA 2010). 
The Global Business Leaders Alliance Against Counterfeiting (GBLAAC) 
The Global Business Leaders Alliance Against Counterfeiting was a lobbying 
association for the issue of trademark counterfeiting from 2002 until 2007. While the 
issue of copyright piracy has already had a strong and globally active lobby with the 
Motion Picture Association (MPA) and the International Federation of the 
Phonographic Industry (IFPI), the  founders of the GBLAAC desired an equally strong 
and global lobby for the issue of trademark counterfeiting (Heath 2010, Dobson 
2010). They apparently did not consider the INTA as an adequate organization for 
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this task at the time, because the decision to found the GBLAAC was made on the 
fringes of the 2001 INTA Annual Meeting in San Francisco (Heath 2010). GBLAAC 
started operating in 2002. It was managed from an office in Cincinnati by the 
Executive Director, Bill Dobson, who previously was Vice President at Procter & 
Gamble (Dobson 2010). By the end of 2003, GBLAAC had 16 member companies: 
Allied Domecq, British American Tobacco, BP, Coca-Cola, DaimlerChrysler, General 
Motors, Gillette, Heineken, Henkel, Japan Tobacco International, Novartis, Pentland 
Group, Philip Morris International, Procter & Gamble, Sara Lee, and Unilever 
(GBLAAC 2004). 
 Major activities of the GBLAAC included lobbying for an OECD study on the 
effects of counterfeiting and piracy and to support that study (Dobson 2010), which 
was released in 2007 (OECD 2007), to draw the attention of the World Economic 
Forum to the anti-counterfeiting issue, and being a founding member of the Global 
Congress on Combating Counterfeiting in 2004 (Dobson 2010). After the ICC 
founded their BASCAP initiative in 2004/2005, the GBLAAC cooperated closely with 
BASCAP. And as the ICC is a much larger and more established organization that 
already had relations with many public international organizations, the GBLAAC 
decided to merge with BASCAP and thereby ceased to exist as an independent 
organization in 2007 (Dobson 2010) 
 
The Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting & Piracy 
One of the first activities of the GBLAAC after its founding was to draw the attention 
of the World Economic Forum (WEF) to the issue of trademark counterfeiting. They 
managed to get a session about this topic on the agenda of the 2003 WEF Annual 
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Meeting in Davos (Dobson 2010, Heath 2010). Participants of that session included 
GBLAAC members and Kunio Mikuriya, who was then WCO Deputy Secretary 
General and eventually became WCO Secretary General in 2009. They decided that 
the issue needed more attention by policy makers in order to improve legislation and 
enforcement. They identified the customs, the police, the IP offices, and the IP 
owners as important stakeholders. As Richard Heath, who was Head of Corporate 
Trade Marks at Unilever at the time, explained: 
 
“We sat down at the 2003 [WEF] meeting and said: Who are the key public sector 
stakeholders with this issue? This is principally the police, customs and the IP community - 
and we in the private sector. So what do we need to do to get the issue raised higher up on 
the public policy agenda? What do we need to do to get governments take notice of this 
serious problem? They have taken notice of the drugs problem, for example, but they are not 
taking much notice of counterfeiting and piracy - this was in 2003. So we said, if we get the 
governing bodies for the police, customs, and IP globally together with the private groups, we 
can hopefully have a strong policy making voice. That was really the genesis of the Global 
Congress.”   
Richard Heath (2010), former Head of Corporate Trade Marks (1997-2006) 
and former Vice President (2006-2010) at Unilever 
 
The 2003 WEF Annual Meeting in Davos was not only the starting point for further 
sessions about counterfeiting at the WEF but also the starting point for discussions 
about a congress exclusively dedicated to the issue (Mikuriya 2005). The WCO 
offered to host such a congress with the participation of other stakeholders. Interpol 
and the WIPO were involved as the public international organizations representing 
the police and the IP offices. The GBLAAC was initially the main private sector 
behind the organization of the congress, but the INTA was also involved, 
representing more IP owners than GBLAAC. The ISMA represented the corporate 
security managers dealing with this problem (table 11). The first Global Congress to 
Combat Counterfeiting took place in May 2004 at the WCO headquarters in Brussels 
and involved more than 300 delegates (GCCC 2004). Copyright piracy was not 
included on the agenda of this first congress. This was a result of the fact that 
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GBLAAC was the driving private sector organization behind this congress and 
GBLAAC’s focus was trademark counterfeiting, not copyright piracy (Dobson 2010). 
 However, this congress was not a single event. A Global Congress Steering 
Group was set up as a collaborative PPP to organize a series of such congresses. 
Members of this steering group at the beginning were Interpol, the WCO, the WIPO, 
the GBLAAC, the INTA, and the ISMA (table 11). After the ICC’s BASCAP was 
founded, it was also involved and became a member of this PPP in 2005 (Hardy 
2009). The BASCAP was not only concerned about trademark counterfeiting but also 
about copyright piracy. Also Interpol’s IP Crime Action Group was concerned about 
copyright piracy, not least because the International Federation of the Phonographic 
Industry was the co-chair of that PPP (table 4). And so the topic of the second 
congress was widened. It was hosted under the name “Global Congress on 
Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy“ in November 2005 near the Interpol 
headquarters in Lyon and involved more than 500 delegates (Interpol 2005a). 
The chair of the Global Congress Steering Group rotated among the three 
public sector members, thus rotating primary responsibility for the organization of the 
congress. The congress was held at the WCO headquarters in Brussels in May 2004, 
near the Interpol headquarters in Lyon in November 2005, and near the WIPO 
headquarters in Geneva in January 2007 (table 11). Then the cycle started again, 
though the congress was held in different places around the world, involving 
additional local hosting organizations: in Dubai it was hosted by the WCO and Dubai 
Customs in February 2008, in Cancun by Interpol and the Mexican Intellectual 
Property Office in December 2009, and in Paris by the WIPO and the French 
Intellectual Property Office in February 201124 (table 11).  
                                            
24
 Information about the Global Congress on Combatting Counterfeiting & Piracy in 2009 and 2011 
has been obtained by participant observations. 
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Table 11: Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting & Piracy 
Founded 2004 
Chair of Steering Group: rotating among public sector members with each congress 
 May 2004 Brussels: WCO 
 November 2005 Lyon: Interpol 
 January 2007 Geneva: WIPO 
 February 2008 Dubai: WCO 
 December 2009 Cancun: Interpol 
 February 2011 Paris: WIPO 
Public Sector Members 
International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) 
World Customs Organization (WCO) 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
Private Sector Members: 
International Trademark Association (INTA) 
International Chamber of Commerce 
    Business Action to Stop Counterfeiting and Piracy (ICC BASCAP) (since 2005) 
International Security Management Association (ISMA) (until 2009) 
Global Business Leaders Alliance Against Counterfeiting (GBLAAC) (until 2007)* 
Source: Own account based on GCCCP 2011 
*) GBLAAC ceased to exist as an independent association when it merged with BASCAP in 2007. 
 
The Global Congress Steering Group decided that the chair should rotate only 
among the public sector members and should not go to one of the private sector 
members. The decision to have public sector leadership was seen as beneficial by 
the private sector members as it was their aim to convince the public sector of the 
need to do more against counterfeiting and piracy (Hardy 2009). And it was also 
seen as beneficial by the public sector members of the steering group, because they 
did not want to appear as being driven by the private sector, as explained by John 
Newton, Interpol’s IP Crime Program Manager: 
 
“I was one of the founding members of the steering group of the congress. […] The strength of 
this process is the three international organizations standing together on this subject. And also 
it's quite important for us not to be seen to be in the pocket of the private sector. So I think it's 
a very strong political statement that we made the decision that the chair would always rest 
with the international organizations. And the international organizations are essentially the 
main drivers for it. But that's not to minimize the role of the private sector organizations. We 
are equal partners within the steering group.” 
John Newton (2009a), Interpol Intellectual Property Crime Program Manager 
 
 
A Study of Transnational PPPs Against IP Crimes 157 
 
There is a division of labor within the Global Congress Steering Group. While the 
public sector side contributed manpower and their reputation to this PPP, the private 
sector side assured the financing of the congress. However, this does not mean that 
only the private sector members of the steering group paid for the congress. The fees 
from congress sponsors, from exhibitors at the congress, and the congress 
participation fees from private sector delegates make the congress self-sustaining 
(Newton 2009a). The funds of the congress are also sufficient to pay for the travel 
expenses of some public sector participants from developing countries, to waive the 
participation fee for many public sector participants, and to charge only a reduced 
participation fee from all remaining public sector participants (Newton 2009a). 
 From 2004 until 2006, the Global Congress Steering Group also hosted 
smaller regional conferences in Rome, Shanghai, Rio de Janeiro, and Bucharest 
(GCCCP 2011). However, these regional events were discontinued when the Global 
Congress started to be hosted at other locations than those of the IO headquarters. 
The three public international organizations remained the only IOs in the steering 
group of the congress. Representatives of other public IOs, such as the WTO and the 
WHO, were invited to give presentations at the Global Congress, but were never 
involved in its steering group. There was some fluctuation on the private sector side 
of the steering group. The ICC BASCAP joined in 2005, increasing the number of 
private sector members to four. In 2007, the GBLAAC ceased to exist as an 
independent organization after it merged with BASCAP. And the ISMA left the 
steering group between the congress in 2009 and the congress in 2011, reducing the 
number of private sector members to two. As the ISMA is a rather small professional 
organization with limited capacities, it was the least active organization within the 
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steering group in terms of giving presentations and organizing panels for the 
congress. It therefore decided to discontinue its participation (Int.05 2010). 
Key Findings about the Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting & Piracy  
The Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy was initiated in 2004 
in order to complement the ongoing PPP activities of three public international 
organizations. The WCO had its IPR Strategic Group since 2000, Interpol had its IP 
Crime Action Group since 2002, and the WIPO had its Advisory Committee on 
Enforcement since 2003. While all three PPPs addressed the issue of counterfeiting 
and piracy, none was dedicated to bringing the issue to the attention of high level 
policy makers. Interpol’s IP Crime Action Group focused on support for police 
agencies fighting transnational IP crime; it stayed away from any legislative 
proposals. The WCO IPR Strategic Group focused on supporting customs agencies 
to enforce IPRs. They also drafted a model law, but they did this without drawing 
much attention to the issue, at least not in 2004. And the WIPO ACE was a forum for 
the exchange of information about IPR enforcement, especially with a view to 
supporting developing countries with TRIPS implementation. The ACE’s mandate 
explicitly excluded any norm setting. 
 Given this situation in 2003 and 2004, the public and private founding 
members of the Global Congress perceived a gap in the existing global PPPs against 
IP crime. No PPP was dedicated to bringing high level attention to the issue of 
counterfeiting and piracy with the aim of improving legislation and increasing 
resources devoted to fighting IP crime. The Global Congress was then organized as 
a collaborative PPP without one organization permanently leading it. The chair 
rotated only among the public sector members: Interpol, the WCO, and the WIPO. 
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Together with changing local hosting partners since 2008, they formed the public 
sector side of this partnership. They contributed their reputation and human 
resources as organizers to the PPP and they contributed information in the form of 
congress presentations. The private sector side also contributed information and 
human resources to the PPP as well as financial resources. 
 The Global Congress was successful insofar as it got high level policy makers 
involved, such as cabinet level politicians, and heads of customs, police, and IP 
offices. However, it is difficult to say if political attention on the issue, which led to the 
drafting of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), resulted from these 
congresses. 
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8. World Trade Organization 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is a public international organization dedicated 
to the regulation of international trade policies. It is the most intergovernmental 
organization in this study. It facilitates the negotiation of agreements, the monitoring 
of the implementation of these agreements, and the settlement of disputes relating to 
those agreements between its member governments. Non-governmental actors have 
no standing before the WTO and are also not admitted as observers. One of the 
WTO agreements is the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS), which includes enforcement provisions. Therefore, the 
WTO is also concerned with IPR enforcement, but it never created a PPP to address 
this issue. 
 This chapter starts with relevant background about the WTO. It then analyzes 
the WTO’s involvement in IPR enforcement. And the final section summarizes the 
key findings of the WTO case study with a view to explaining why no PPP was 
founded. 
Background on the World Trade Organization 
In 2009, the WTO had 153 member governments, which included 150 fully 
recognized sovereign nation states, Taiwan25, and two semi-independent customs 
territories: Hong Kong and Macau (WTO 2010a: 6). The WTO secretariat in Geneva 
operated with a staff of 638 and an annual budget of 189 million CHF (125m EUR or 
174m USD) (WTO 2010a: 141). It is often stated that the WTO secretariat has very 
little discretion and that the WTO is a “member-driven organization” (Hoekman & 
Mavroidis 2007: 4, Int.04 2010). It only facilitates the intergovernmental negotiation of 
                                            
25
 Taiwan is a WTO member under the name “Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, 
Kinmen and Matsu”, commonly abbreviated as “Chinese Taipei”. 
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agreements and the intergovernmental peer-review of the implementation of these 
agreements. Only the WTO appellate body for the settlement of intergovernmental 
disputes has a considerable amount of discretion as this is necessary for an 
independent judgment (Cortell & Peterson 2006: 272). The WTO is under very close 
scrutiny by its member governments and by the public, especially since large public 
protests drew attention to the 1999 WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle (Hoekman 
& Mavroidis 2007: 2). In spite of the interest in the work of the WTO by the public and 
by interest groups such as labor unions or business associations, such non-
governmental actors have very limited access to the WTO. They mainly try to 
influence the decisions by lobbying governmental delegations to the WTO (Hoekman 
& Mavroidis 2007: 25). 
The supreme governing body of the WTO is its Ministerial Conference, which 
convenes about once every two years. These conferences are attended by large 
governmental delegations, which are usually led by a cabinet level politician (WTO 
2009a). Also several hundred NGO delegates are allowed to attend the conferences 
on the fringes but do not have access to the governmental delegates’ meeting rooms 
and are not invited as speakers (WTO 2009b). NGOs have no chance to be 
accredited as regular observers to attend WTO meetings, neither at the Ministerial 
Conference nor at other decision making bodies. This right is only available for 
governments that are not WTO members and for other intergovernmental 
organizations (WTO 1996). 
The main decision making body of the WTO, apart from the sessions of the 
Ministerial Conference, is the General Council. It convenes about 5-6 times a year as 
the regular General Council and about 50 times a year in its other guises as the 
Trade Policy Review Body and as the Dispute Settlement Body (WTO 2011d). The 
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delegates are usually ambassadors or other representatives from the permanent 
missions of the WTO members in Geneva. In addition, there are several specialized 
councils and committees where governmental delegations regularly meet at the 
WTO, such as the Council for Trade in Goods, the Council for Trade in Services, and 
the TRIPS Council. Non-governmental organizations are not allowed to be accredited 
as observers to these councils. 
However, the WTO has some technical assistance activities, which are not as 
intergovernmental as the core WTO work. It organizes seminars and workshops in 
order to help developing country members participate in global trade. As part of these 
technical assistance activities, the WTO also engages with representatives of 
government agencies that are not embedded in diplomatic delegations. 
Representatives from the private sector are sometimes invited as speakers to such 
events (Int.04 2010). Overall, however, transnational and also transgovernmental 
cooperation is minimal at the WTO compared to the other public international 
organizations in this study. The core activity of the WTO is the facilitation of 
intergovernmental cooperation. 
The WTO is a rather young organization. It was founded in 1995, but it has a 
longer history through its predecessor: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), which was negotiated in 1947. It was originally planned that the GATT would 
be administered by an International Trade Organization (ITO), but the ITO was never 
founded because the U.S. Congress refused to ratify the charter for its establishment 
(Hoekman & Mavroidis 2007: 8). Nevertheless, the GATT evolved into an 
international institution where governments agreed on limits on their tariffs and other 
trade policy measures in order to allow for more international trade. Agreements 
were reached in eight GATT negotiation rounds from 1947 until 1994, the 
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predecessors of today’s WTO Ministerial Conferences (Hoekman & Mavroidis 2007: 
9). The last of these negotiation rounds was the Uruguay round, which lasted from 
1986 until 1994. It was concluded by 128 governments signing the Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, which includes several multilateral trade 
agreements in its annexes including as an update to the GATT, the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and the TRIPS Agreement. Becoming a 
member of the WTO requires accepting all of its multilateral trade agreements26. 
Such a “package deal” allows to link agreements that are sought by some members 
with agreements that are sought by other members. For example, protection for 
intellectual property rights was sought by industrialized countries, while market 
access for textile products was sought by developing countries (Helfer 2004: 20). 
Joining the WTO after its foundation requires an accession process that goes 
beyond accepting all multilateral WTO agreements. As part of the accession 
negotiations, the existing members may require the new member to make additional 
concessions in order to avoid situations where joining is more beneficial for the new 
member than for the existing members (Hoekman & Mavroidis 2007: 18). In this 
respect the WTO differs significantly from other international organizations like the 
WIPO or the WCO, where it is possible to become a member without signing any of 
the substantial agreements administered by the respective organization. 
Nevertheless, the WTO has expanded very successfully: 28 members have acceded 
to the WTO from 1995 until 2008, and a further 30 states have applied to become 
members (WTO 2011c).  
                                            
26
 In addition to the multilateral trade agreements there are also some plurilateral WTO agreements, 
which do not have to be accepted by all WTO members.   
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The WTO and IPR enforcement 
As the WTO administers the TRIPS Agreement, its provisions on intellectual property 
rights and, specifically, IPR enforcement are an aspect of the work of the WTO. 
However, the WTO is primarily dedicated to the regulation of international trade 
policies. Trade related intellectual property rights are a rather small work area 
compared to the WTO’s overall work. Out of 425 cases in the WTO dispute 
settlement system, only 29 (7%) cite the TRIPS Agreement in the request for 
consultations and only 14 (3%) cite an article of its enforcement provisions (WTO 
2011a). From the 638 staff members in the WTO secretariat only 13 (2%) are 
working in the Intellectual Property Division and there is no sub-division for IPR 
enforcement (WTO 2010a: 141). As part of its technical assistance activities for 
developing countries, the WTO secretariat organizes more than 400 seminars and 
workshops per year of which only about 1-2% are dedicated exclusively to intellectual 
property rights and none is dedicated exclusively to IPR enforcement (WTO 2010b, 
WTO 2004). Apparently there is no need for the WTO to increase its activities in this 
area, as other international organizations also provide assistance with TRIPS 
implementation. The WIPO provides assistance with TRIPS implementation based 
on the WIPO-WTO agreement and also offers seminars that are focused on IPR 
enforcement. Also the WCO and Interpol provide IPR enforcement training for 
customs and police agencies (see previous chapters). There is effectively a division 
of labor between the WTO and the other international organizations. The WIPO, the 
WCO, and Interpol provide assistance for the enforcement of IPRs with regard to the 
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement, and the WTO administers the procedure in 
which the TRIPS implementation is evaluated in the Trade Policy Review Body and 
the Dispute Settlement Body. 
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 Private sector involvement with the WTO concerning intellectual property 
rights is minimal. The TRIPS Council, which has about three regular meetings a year, 
does not allow the participation of private sector representatives. Members of the 
TRIPS Council discussed the idea to invite guests from the private sector in order to 
speak on specific issues as experts, but this idea was rejected arguing that the WTO 
should remain a member-driven organization (Int.04 2010). Participants from the 
private sector would probably make the council sessions more difficult by challenging 
the status quo and demanding changes to the TRIPS agreement, either in the 
interest of IPR owners or in the interest of IPR-poor developing countries. With the 
two interests opposing each other and consensus-based decision making at the 
WTO, it is rather unlikely that any change to the TRIPS Agreement can be achieved, 
at least without major issue linkages. Especially with respect to IP, the WTO is 
similarly deadlocked as the WIPO. This is a reason why proponents of higher 
standards for IPR enforcement negotiated the Anti-Counterfeiting Agreement outside 
of the WIPO and the WTO. This may also be a reason why the intergovernmental 
delegates who maintain the TRIPS status quo at the WTO were not keen on inviting 
private sector representatives who would challenge this status quo. 
Although the WTO secretariat has very little influence on the decision making, 
its staff is occasionally approached by interest group representatives advocating a 
certain position (Int.04 2010, Huther 2010). The secretariat is also occasionally 
involved with the private sector when it invites private sector representatives as 
speakers to its workshops for developing countries as part of the technical assistance 
activities. Apart from this episodic interaction with the private sector, there is no WTO 
forum for continuous public-private cooperation that would resemble a public-private 
partnership (Int.04 2010). However, the WTO does send participants to PPPs of 
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other international organizations: The WTO participates with speakers in the Global 
Congress on Combating Counterfeiting & Piracy. It is a participant of the International 
Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce (IMPACT) of the World Health 
Organization. It is also an observer at the WIPO ACE, and WTO representatives 
occasionally visit PPP meetings at the WCO as a guest. The WTO is not involved 
with any of the Interpol PPPs. Altogether, however, the WTO activities in those PPPs 
led by other organizations are minimal. It participated occasionally, but it did not 
assume any function in the working of a PPP (Int.04 2010).  
Key Findings about the Absence of a PPP at the WTO 
The World Trade Organization administers the TRIPS Agreement, which is currently 
the primary multilateral agreement concerning intellectual property rights and their 
enforcement. Therefore, the WTO has a basis for becoming active in this issue area. 
Nevertheless, its involvement with the private sector to address IPR enforcement is 
minimal and it has not founded any public-private partnership. There are two 
important reasons for this: First, the WTO secretariat never received an explicit 
mandate to form a PPP on IPR enforcement and it does not have sufficient discretion 
to engage in such activities. As different views on IP policy oppose each other in the 
intergovernmental WTO decision making bodies and as the decision making is 
consensus based, it would be rather difficult to achieve a mandate for a PPP that 
could influence IP policy. The WTO secretariat could not afford to take any initiative 
that could jeopardize its reputation as a neutral facilitator of intergovernmental 
negotiations as it is under very close scrutiny by its members and by the public. Only 
the cautious participation in PPPs led by other international organizations was 
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possible, as coordination with other international organizations is one of the tasks the 
WTO secretariat has a mandate for. 
 And second, the WTO has not been dependent on private sector resources as 
many of the activities that would require access to such resources have been taken 
up by other international organizations. The WTO occasionally invites 
representatives from the private sector as speakers to its TRIPS workshops for 
developing countries, but this seldom happens and has never sparked a continuous 
relationship with the private sector that would resemble a PPP. The WTO is under no 
pressure to increase such activities, as the WIPO, the WCO, and Interpol all provide 
assistance to developing countries with regard to IPR enforcement.  
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9. World Health Organization 
The World Health Organization (WHO) is a public international organization 
dedicated to the “attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health” 
(WHO 2009a). It pursues this aim using intergovernmental, transgovernmental, and 
transnational cooperation. The working area of the WHO overlaps with intellectual 
property policy in two ways: First, the patent protection of medicine is one factor 
influencing access to medicine. It may encourage research that leads to new 
medicines, but it may also increase the price of patent protected medicines. And 
second, the counterfeiting of medicine may harm patients if the counterfeit medicine 
does not contain the correct ingredients. The WHO addressed the counterfeit 
medicine issue by forming a PPP in 2006, but this was criticized by several WHO 
member states because they were afraid that the anti-counterfeiting work could 
overlap with patent issues and thereby have a negative impact on access to 
affordable medicine. 
 This chapter starts with relevant background information about the WHO and 
then two sections give an overview of the WHO’s approach to patents and to 
counterfeit medicine. The next section of this chapter is dedicated to the WHO 
International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce (IMPACT) and its work. 
A subsequent section analyses how IMPACT was supported by some actors but 
opposed by others and how this changed the character of this PPP. The final section 
summarizes the key findings of the WHO case study with a view to explaining the 
developments. 
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Background on the World Health Organization 
In 2009, the WHO had 193 member states and an annual budget of 1971 million 
USD (app. 1418m EUR) (WHO 2010b). It had more than 8000 employees in its 
headquarters in Geneva, its six regional offices and its 147 country offices (WHO 
2007). Compared with the other public international organizations in this study, the 
WHO is the largest with the most staff and the most money. However, this needs to 
be put in perspective with the resources required for the WHO’s work. It performs a 
wide variety of tasks related to public health: It develops and administers 
international conventions such as the International Health Regulations and the 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. It administers international standards 
such as the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health 
Problems. It also supports health research and facilitates transgovernmental and 
transnational cooperation between health administrations and health professionals. 
And the WHO provides technical assistance for developing countries and aid in 
emergencies (WHO 2007). 
Work in the areas of development aid and emergency relief requires a high 
amount of resources and acquiring those resources is an important aspect of the 
work of the WHO. The statutory contributions of member states only account for 
about 24% of the WHO budget. Additional funding sources are voluntary 
contributions from the member states (about 36%), from other public international 
organizations (about 12%), and from the private sector27 (about 22%) (WHO 2010b). 
The WHO secretariat has limited discretion for the use of all these voluntary 
contributions, because they are usually earmarked for specific projects or even for 
                                            
27
 The WHO financial report shows private sector, NGOs and foundations as separate categories of 
contributors. However, in line with the use of the term private sector in this study (for-profit and not-for-
profit non-governmental organizations), these entities are all considered private sector. 
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specific purposes within projects (Lee 2009: 102). This also means that the World 
Health Assembly (WHA) has limited control over the WHO. In theory, the WHA is the 
supreme governing body of the WHO, which convenes once a year and consists of 
WHO members states delegations that are usually led by the health minister or 
another high ranking representative of the national health administration. In practice, 
however, much of the work of the WHO needs to be negotiated with the donors 
outside of the WHA. This can be a very difficult task as preferences about health 
policies can differ from state to state and from donor to donor (Lee 2009: 26). 
 Struggles about the appropriate health policy of the WHO have been a feature 
of the organization throughout its history. The WHO was founded in 1948 as a 
specialized agency of the United Nations and as the successor of the League of 
Nations Health Organization, which existed since 1920 (Lee 2009: 14). The 
constitution establishing the WHO was signed in 1946 and entered into force in 1948. 
It defines the objective of the WHO as “the attainment by all peoples of the highest 
possible level of health” (WHO 2009a), whereas health is defined as “a state of 
complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of 
disease or infirmity” (WHO 2009a). If health is understood so broadly, it is affected 
not only by medical care, but also by nutrition, sanitary conditions, working 
conditions, and overall economic and social conditions. This provides the WHO with 
a very broad mandate. In practice, however, the WHO’s ability to address such a 
broad mandate was limited by a lack of resources and by political controversies 
about how broad or how focused the WHO’s work should be (Lee 2009: 17). 
Interference with the wider area of social policy was especially controversial during 
the ideological confrontation of the Cold War. Less controversial was the fight against 
communicable diseases, as these diseases can cross national borders and thereby 
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make international cooperation especially relevant. Therefore most of the work of the 
WHO was focused on such diseases as smallpox, polio, malaria, tuberculosis, and 
HIV/AIDS (Lee 2009: 17). 
  The activities of the WHO overlap with those of other international 
organizations, especially in the area of health related development aid, where many 
organizations are active. Examples are the United Nations Children's Fund 
(UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, 
and also many non-governmental charitable organizations. Therefore, the WHO has 
to compete with these organizations for donor funding, but it often cooperates with 
them as well (Lee 2009: 19, 111). About one third of the WHO’s 2008/2009 budget 
was contributed by other public international organizations and by the private sector 
(WHO 2010b). 
As a means to organize this cooperation, the WHO formed several 
partnerships. An example is the Stop TB Partnership, which was formed in 2000 as a 
PPP against tuberculosis and whose secretariat is housed by the WHO (Lee 2009: 
30). However, cooperating with other organizations was not always a success story 
for the WHO as an organization. When donors lost confidence in the WHO Global 
Programme on AIDS, it was replaced with the Joint United Nations Programme on 
HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), where the WHO is only one partner among several public 
international organizations including the UNICEF, the UNDP, and the World Bank 
(Lee 2009: 62). Similar expressions of non-confidence in the WHO were the founding 
of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) in 2000 and the 
founding of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) in 
2002. Both are public-private partnerships where the WHO is one of several partners 
and not the leading organization (Lee 2009: 53, 117). 
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The WHO and Patent Policy 
The signing of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) in 1994 marked a significant change in international intellectual 
property policy that was also relevant to the work of the WHO. The TRIPS 
Agreement is flexible with respect to pharmaceutical patents, for example, by 
allowing compulsory licensing, but it also reduces the discretion that WTO members 
have compared to the situation before the TRIPS implementation. Developing 
countries and countries in transition had to implement TRIPS until 2000. Least 
developed countries originally had to implement TRIPS until 2006, but this deadline 
was later extended until 2013 and for pharmaceutical patents until 2016. 
 The WHO Secretariat was concerned that the TRIPS Agreement could have a 
negative impact on access to essential medicines and issued a report on 
“Globalization and Access to Drugs – Implications of the WTO/TRIPS Agreement” 
(WHO 1999a). After the first version of this report in 1997 was criticized by the U.S. 
government and by the pharmaceutical industry, a revised version was published in 
1999 (Lee 2009: 122). However, the new version of the report also expressed 
concern that the TRIPS Agreement may have a negative impact on access to 
essential medicines and recommends that developing countries should use the 
flexibilities allowed in the TRIPS Agreement:    
 
“By 2005 at the latest, all developing countries will have to grant legal protection by patents to 
pharmaceutical products. Such a monopoly situation could lead to an increase in drug prices. 
That is why developing countries that are WTO Members should make the fullest use of the 
periods of transition they have been granted to transcribe the provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement into their domestic law. [...T]he law should cover the possibility of authorizing 
parallel importation of patented drugs sold at lower prices in another country, or establish - as 
has been done by the Group of Andean Countries - that a drug on the WHO Model List of 
Essential Drugs should be the object of a compulsory licence for public health reasons, under 
the conditions laid down in the TRIPS Agreement.”  
WHO Report on Globalization and Access to Drugs – 
Implications of the WTO/TRIPS Agreement (WHO 1999a: 41) 
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The 1999 version of the report also included contributions from three public 
international organizations (the WTO, the WIPO, and the South Centre) and from 
three private international organizations (the International Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations (IFPMA), the International Generic 
Pharmaceutical Alliance (IGPA) and Health Action International) (WHO 1999a). The 
cooperation between the WTO and the WHO was intensified since 1999 and resulted 
in a joint WHO/WTO study on “WTO Agreements and Public Health” in 2002 (WHO & 
WTO 2002). As a result of the involvement of the WTO secretariat, the 2002 report 
was more politically neutral than previous and later reports that were issued by the 
WHO alone (Lee 2009). 
 The debate about the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and public 
health also led to some important agreements in WTO decision making bodies. In 
2001, the WTO Ministerial Conference adopted the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, which reaffirms and clarifies TRIPS flexibilities with 
regard to public health crises such as severe problems with HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 
and malaria (WTO 2001). Besides the clarifications, the Doha Declaration also is the 
basis for two changes to the TRIPS Agreement: First, least developed countries did 
not have to implement TRIPS provisions concerning pharmaceutical patents until 
2016. And second, it led to a change to the compulsory licensing provisions in the 
TRIPS Agreement. The Ministerial Conference recognized that some states cannot 
use the compulsory licensing exception if they do not have domestic pharmaceutical 
companies that could produce the required medicine, as the TRIPS Agreement 
required that compulsory licenses “shall be authorized predominantly for the supply 
of the domestic market” (TRIPS §31.f). Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration 
instructed the WTO TRIPS Council to address this problem and present the agreed 
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solution to the WTO General Council. As a result of this mandate, the WTO General 
Council in 2003 adopted a waiver of the export restrictions, so that generic medicine 
that was produced under a compulsory license can be exported to countries in need 
(WTO 2006b). 
 The WHO also continued to address the question of the relation between IP 
protection and access to medicines. In 2003, the World Health Assembly created a 
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health (CIPIH). 
This commission published a report in 2006. Among other things, this report came to 
the conclusion that IP protection mainly encouraged innovation to address health 
issues that are prevalent in high-income countries, while health problems of poor 
countries, such as malaria, are insufficiently addressed. It states that this problem 
cannot be solved by relying on market mechanisms alone, but that a “worldwide 
mobilization of resources, both public and private, and political commitments at all 
levels, is necessary” (WHO 2006e: 174). The report also encourages countries to 
use the flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreement, especially with regard to compulsory 
licensing. The 2006 WHA established an intergovernmental working group to discuss 
the implementation of the recommendations of the CIPIH report (WHO 2006d). 
Based on the report of this working group, the 2008 WHA adopted a “Global Strategy 
and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property” (WHO 
2008). This discussion coincided with ongoing deliberations about the endorsement 
of the WHO International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce (IMPACT). 
Both discussions were linked to intellectual property. This issue linkage, from access 
to essential medicine via intellectual property to anti-counterfeiting, contributed to the 
non-endorsement of the WHO PPP against counterfeit medical products.  
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The WHO and Counterfeit Medicines 
The World Health Organization’s concern with counterfeit medicines began a few 
years before the World Health Assembly passed its first resolution addressing the 
issue in 1988 (Kopp 2010a). This resolution on the rational use of drugs included a 
paragraph that mandated the WHO to “initiate programmes for the prevention and 
detection of export, import and smuggling of falsely labeled, spurious, counterfeited 
or substandard pharmaceutical preparations” (WHO 1992: 20). As can be seen from 
this grouping of issues, the WHO’s approach to counterfeit medicines was not 
through trademark counterfeiting or the protection of other intellectual property rights, 
but rather as a violation of drug regulations and as a possible danger to patients. This 
is evident when looking at the definition of counterfeit medicines that the WHO used 
since 1992: 
 
“A counterfeit medicine is one which is deliberately and fraudulently mislabelled with respect to 
identity and/or source. Counterfeiting can apply to both branded and generic products and 
counterfeit products may include products with the correct ingredients, wrong ingredients, 
without active ingredients, with insufficient quantity of active ingredients or with fake 
packaging.”  
WHO definition of counterfeit medicine (WHO 1992: 1)  
 
The above definition was adopted at an international conference that was organized 
by the WHO and the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & 
Associations (IFPMA) in 1992. Participants discussed whether a draft version of the 
TRIPS Agreement could be helpful against counterfeit medicines (WHO 1992: 9). In 
1994, the year when the TRIPS Agreement was signed, the WHA reaffirmed its 
mandate and asked the WHO again to assist member states in ensuring the quality 
of medicines, including activities against counterfeit drugs (WHO 1999b: 8). Based 
on this mandate, the WHO started a project on counterfeit drugs in 1995 that was 
financed by the government of Japan. This project resulted in a study of the issue 
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and guidelines on how to address it, which were published in 1999 (WHO 1999b). 
This project, as well as several WHO conferences on counterfeit drugs, involved 
cooperation with pharmaceutical manufacturers, but no permanent PPP was set up 
at the time. 
 Besides the World Health Assembly, another body also asked the WHO to 
become active against counterfeit drugs: the International Conference of Drug 
Regulatory Authorities (ICDRA). Unlike the intergovernmental WHA, where diplomats 
and representatives of the ministries of health meet, the ICDRA is a 
transgovernmental conference where representatives of drug regulatory agencies 
meet. Diplomats are not among the delegates as the ICDRA intends to do more 
technical and less political work (Int.17 2010, WHO 2011). The ICDRA meets about 
every two years. It is not an official decision making body of the WHO, but it is 
associated with it as the WHO secretariat also serves as the secretariat of the ICDRA 
(WHO 2011). 
 Since 1994, the ICDRA requested that the WHO assist its member states with 
measures against counterfeit drugs (Kopp 2010a). In 2004, the ICDRA 
recommended that the “WHO, in collaboration with other stakeholders, should 
develop a draft concept paper for an international convention on counterfeit drugs” 
(WHO 2004). However, it became clear during informal negotiations that no 
consensus could be reached on such a convention28 (Kopp 2010b). As an alternative 
to the convention, the International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce 
(IMPACT) was founded in 2006 to pursue other ways to combat counterfeit medical 
products.  
                                            
28
 While the WHO was not successful in drafting a convention against counterfeit drugs, the Council of 
Europe (CoE) was. The CoE addressed the issue since 2004, and since October 2011 the “Council of 
Europe Convention on the counterfeiting of medical products and similar crimes involving threats to 
public health” is open for signature (CoE 2010). 
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The International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce (IMPACT) 
When it became obvious that a consensus on a convention against counterfeit 
medicines was not within reach, the WHO brought together several stakeholders in 
order to find alternative approaches to the issue. At a conference in Rome in 
February 2006 these stakeholders formed the International Medical Products Anti-
Counterfeiting Taskforce as a PPP network consisting of several collaborative PPPs 
with one steering PPP at the top. The IMPACT terms of reference clearly state that 
decisions should be made through a consensus-based approach, hence giving equal 
rights to members from the public and the private sector (WHO IMPACT 2009). 
The membership of the IMPACT is comprised of public international 
organizations, government agencies from WHO member states, and of private 
international associations. Table 12 shows a list of all IMPACT members according to 
IMPACT documents, but not all of them have been equally active and some active 
participants are not listed as members. For example, individual companies are not 
members of the IMPACT, but the member associations like IFPMA send individual 
experts from member-companies to meetings of IMPACT working groups. Therefore, 
employees of many major research based pharmaceutical companies have been 
present at many IMPACT meetings (Int.17 2010, Int.08 2010). The most active 
IMPACT members are in the IMPACT planning group, which consists of the IMPACT 
chair, the vice-chairs, and the chairs of the five IMPACT working groups (table 12). 
Another indicator of active support for IMPACT is funding. IMPACT had a regular 
budget of 2.6 million USD during the period from 2006 to 2009, of which 28% came 
from the WHO and 68% from the European Union, Australia, Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands (WHO 2010a). The IFPMA contributed an additional 4% (Int.17 2010). 
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Table 12: WHO International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce 
(IMPACT) 
Founded:  2006 
Chair:  World Health Organization (WHO) 
Vice-Chairs: National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control 
(NAFDAC) of Nigeria and Health Sciences Authority of Singapore 
Secretariat: WHO (2006-2010), 
Interim secretariat hosted by the Italian drug regulatory agency 
Agenzia Italiana del Farmaco (AIFA) since August 2010 
Public Sector Members 
WHO and government agencies of its member states, 
Permanent Forum on International Pharmaceutical Crime (PFIPC)*, 
Interpol, WCO, 
WIPO, WTO, 
World Bank, OECD, 
European Union, Council of Europe, 
Commonwealth of Nations, ASEAN 
Private Sector Members: 
International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations, 
International Pharmaceutical Federation, 
International Alliance of Patients Organizations, 
International Council of Nurses, 
International Federation of Pharmaceutical Wholesalers, 
International Generic Pharmaceuticals Alliance, 
Partnership for Safe Medicines, 
Pharmaceutical Security Institute*, 
Pharmaciens sans frontiers, 
World Medical Association, 
World Self-medication Industry, 
Asociacion LatinoAmericana de Industrias Farmaceuticas, 
European Association of Pharmaceutical Full-line Wholesalers 
Working Groups: 
Legislative and Regulatory Infrastructure 
Chair: Federal Ministry of Health, Germany 
Regulatory Implementation 
Chair: Food and Drug Administration, USA 
Enforcement 
Chairs: Interpol and Therapeutic Goods Administration, Australia 
Technology 
Chair: International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations 
Communication 
Chair: International Pharmaceutical Federation 
Source: Own account based on AIFA 2011, WHO IMPACT 2008a, WHO IMPACT 2008c 
*) A member list of PFIPC and PSI is available in table 13. 
 
 
180 Christopher Paun: Globalization of Law Enforcement 
 
At the IMPACT founding conference, 57 national drug regulatory agencies were 
represented (WHO 2010a) together with representatives from private associations 
and public international organizations. However, some of the international 
organizations mentioned on the list do not consider themselves founding members. 
Representatives of the WIPO and the WTO said that their role in IMPACT is more 
that of an observer (Wollgast 2010, Int.04 2010). After the IMPACT founding 
conference 2006 in Rome, there were three additional IMPACT general meetings: 
2006 in Bonn, Germany, 2007 in Lisbon, Portugal, and 2008 in Hammamet, Tunisia 
(AIFA 2011: 21). In addition, there were several regional and topic centered IMPACT 
conferences. The IMPACT working groups also discussed issues by e-mail and by 
telephone during the time between these conferences (Int.08 2010). Five working 
groups have been formed in 2006, which can be regarded as sub-PPPs in the larger 
IMPACT PPP network. 
The Working Group on Legislative and Regulatory Infrastructure addressed 
the national legislative frameworks concerning counterfeit medical products. Its most 
important output was a document called “Draft Principles and Elements for National 
Legislation against Counterfeit Medical Products” (AIFA 2011: 48). This document 
includes several recommendations that could be considered controversial. For 
example, it recommends “liability  for  Internet  service  providers  and  other  
operators  who  facilitate  advertisement  of  or trade in counterfeit medical products” 
(AIFA 2011: 54). The question if the service providers have reasonable grounds to 
believe that their services are used for such activities should, according to the 
document, only be relevant for criminal sanctions, not for civil liability (AIFA 2011: 
59). The document also recommends that an “adequate legal basis (comprising 
criminal, administrative and civil frameworks)” (AIFA 2011: 54) can also be applied to 
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counterfeit medical products “in transit/transshipment, bonded warehouses, free 
zones and all situations of the international trade” (AIFA 2011: 54). However, this 
needs to be seen in perspective with the definition of counterfeit medical products 
used in the document. In line with the WHO definition quoted previously in this 
chapter, the document explicitly states that patent disputes and parallel imports 
should not be confused with counterfeiting, which is only about falsely representing 
the identity or source of a medical product (AIFA 2011: 51). Therefore, the 
recommendation from IMPACT would not have been relevant for the 2009 WTO 
dispute in which Brazil and India complained about seizures of non-counterfeit, 
though patent-disputed generic drugs in transit from India through the Netherlands to 
Brazil (WTO 2010c). Nevertheless, the work of the IMPACT Working Group on 
Legislative and Regulatory Infrastructure provided the basis for controversy, as will 
be shown later. It was criticized from actors outside of IMPACT, but also some 
IMPACT participants considered the approach of this working group as sometimes 
harsh and undifferentiated (Int.08 2010). 
The Working Group on Regulatory Implementation addressed the question of 
how to secure the supply chain of pharmaceutical products. Its most important 
activity was to make recommendations for a revision of the WHO Good Distribution 
Practices for Pharmaceutical Products with regard to counterfeit medical products 
(WHO 2009b). 
The Working Group on Technology discussed how technology can be used to 
distinguish genuine from counterfeit medical products, especially with regard to 
packaging. Its most important output was a document called “Anti‐Counterfeit 
Technologies for the Protection of Medicines” (AIFA 2011: 144), which provides an 
overview of existing technologies. 
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The Working Group on Communication addressed the question of how to raise 
awareness of the risks involved with counterfeit medical products. Its main activities 
were to develop a communication strategy and communication materials, such as 
brochures, videos and a website (AIFA 2011: 65) 
The Working Group on Enforcement is the most relevant for this study as it 
engaged in the most operational enforcement activities. It is the only IMPACT 
working group that has two chairs: Interpol and the Australian drug regulatory agency 
TGA. The WHO and Interpol were already collaborating before IMPACT, most 
notably in a 2005-2006 investigation of counterfeit malaria medicine in South East 
Asia (chapter 4). This collaboration has intensified since January 2008, when the 
French police officer Aline Plançon was sent from the Interpol headquarters in Lyon 
to the WHO headquarters in Geneva to manage the enforcement activities of 
IMPACT from there (Plançon 2010). Since then, Interpol has become an increasingly 
strong actor in the enforcement working group, making this group increasingly 
independent from the overall IMPACT PPP network. 
The Interpol office at the WHO headquarters effectively served as the 
secretariat of the enforcement working group. It also operated with resources that 
were independent of the overall IMPACT budget. For example, the budget of the 
different enforcement operations carried out under the IMPACT umbrella was 
managed directly by Interpol (Plançon 2010). The Interpol unit that collaborated with 
the WHO IMPACT was the IP crime unit and Aline Plançon was an employee of that 
unit. This changed in January 2010 when she became head of the newly created 
Interpol Medical Products Counterfeiting and Pharmaceutical Crime Unit (Plançon 
2010). This change was also a way to visibly separate the issues of IP enforcement 
and medical products counterfeiting as the link between the two issues became the 
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source of criticism directed at the IMPACT, which will be analyzed in the next section 
of this chapter. 
The members of the IMPACT Enforcement Working Group are shown in table 
13. The most active members are Interpol, the Permanent Forum on International 
Pharmaceutical Crime (PFIPC) and its members, and the Pharmaceutical Security 
Institute (PSI) and its members. The PFIPC is a group of drug regulatory agencies 
and law enforcement agencies from 15 countries. It was founded in 1998 and has 
held annual meetings since then to exchange information about pharmaceutical 
crime. The PSI is an association of research-based pharmaceutical companies that 
focuses on anti-counterfeiting. It was first created in 1992 as an informal network and 
then became more formal in 1997 when 12 member companies formed a consortium 
and set up a permanent office in Italy. In 2002, the PSI office moved to the 
Washington D.C. area, where PSI was incorporated and from where it has operated 
since. In 2010, PSI had 25 member companies and an annual budget of nearly 1 
million USD. It became the primary private sector partner of Interpol in the fight 
against counterfeit medicine and has also supported Interpol financially (Kubic 2010). 
The most important activities of the IMPACT Enforcement Working Group are 
the many enforcement operations, which are each organized as an additional 
collaborative PPP in the overall IMPACT PPP network. Operation Storm is a regional 
enforcement operation in South East Asia, Operation Mamba is a regional 
enforcement operation in East Africa, and Operation Pangea is a global enforcement 
operation focusing on the sale of counterfeit medicines via the internet (table 14). 
These enforcement operations are similar to the other Interpol enforcement 
operations analyzed in chapter 4. They involve training seminars, where public sector 
law enforcement officers learn how to find and identify counterfeit medical products, 
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and subsequent raids with seizures and arrests. However, as IMPACT has a public 
health focus rather than an IP focus and is funded primarily from public sector 
source, these PPPs are more driven by the public sector than the PPPs at Interpol or 
the WCO (Plançon 2010).  Nevertheless, the private sector plays an important role 
by contributing information and human resources, as the Interpol-IMPACT Project 
Manager explained: 
 
“When we do these enforcement activities, we are bringing along the private sector with the 
PSI. We cooperate quite a fair bit with them. And as Interpol we are really putting together the 
public sectors - police, customs, regulatory authorities - together, to enhance actions. […] So 
we are on the thin line between working fully with the public sector, but still needing the 
expertise from the private sector and acknowledge that they are doing a great job, as far as 
disrupting the criminals, getting info, intelligence, and all this kind of enforcement work that 
requires a lot of time and money and expertise. They can be very relevant to a fight.”  
Aline Plançon (2010), Interpol-IMPACT Project Manager 
 
 
Table 13: IMPACT Enforcement Working Group 
Founded:  2006 
Chairs:  Interpol 
and Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA), Australia 
Secretariat: WHO (2006-2008) 
Interpol office at the WHO headquarters (since 2008) 
Public Sector Members 
Interpol, WCO, WHO, 
Permanent Forum on International Pharmaceutical Crime (PFIPC) 
representing government agencies of 15 states: 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, UK, USA 
Private Sector Members: 
Pharmaceutical Security Institute (PSI) 
representing its 25 member companies: 
Abbott Laboratories, Amgen, Astellas Pharma, AstraZeneca, 
Bayer-Schering, Baxter International, 
Boehringer-Ingelheim, Bristol-Myers Squibb, 
Eisai, Eli Lilly and Company, Forest Laboratories, 
Genzyme, Glaxo-Smith-Kline, Hoffmann-La Roche, 
Johnson & Johnson, Lundbeck, 
Merck Sharp & Dohme, Merck KGaA, 
Novartis International, Novo Nordisk, Pfizer, Purdue Pharma, 
Sanofi-Aventis, Servier Laboratories, Takeda Pharmaceutical 
Source: Own account based on McIntosh 2010, Plançon 2010, Kubic 2010 
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Table 14: Enforcement Operations in IMPACT 
No. Time Countries Results 
Operation Storm 
I Apr 
- Sep 2008 
Cambodia, China, Laos, 
Myanmar, Singapore, 
Thailand, Vietnam 
27 arrests, more than 16 million 
pills seized 
II Jul  
- Nov 2009 
Previous 7 plus Indonesia 33 arrests, about 20 million pills 
seized, more than 100 shops 
closed 
Operation Mamba 
I Sep 
- Oct 2008 
Tanzania, Uganda 22 shops closed 
II Aug 2009 Previous 2 plus Kenya 83 cases opened, at least 4 
convictions 
III Jul 
- Aug 2010 
Previous 3 plus Burundi 
and Rwanda 
80 arrests, at least 10 tons of 
medical products seized 
Operation Pangea 
I 12 Nov 08 Australia, Canada, 
Germany, Ireland, Israel, 
New Zealand, Singapore, 
Switzerland, UK, USA 
Websites shut down and pills 
seized 
II 16 - 20 Nov 
2009 
Previous 10 plus Austria, 
Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, France, Italy, 
Liechtenstein, 
Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, Thailand 
72 websites shut down, 
about 167,000 pills seized 
III 5 - 12 Oct 
2010 
Previous 24 plus Angola, 
Azerbaijan, Brazil, Bolivia, 
China, Colombia, Croatia, 
Cuba, Estonia, Finland, 
Iceland,  Japan, Jordan, 
Malta, Mexico, Poland, 
Peru, Romania, Russia, 
Slovak Republic, Uruguay 
290 websites shut down, 
over 1 million pills seized 
IV 20 - 27 Sep 
2011 
81 countries about 13,500 websites shut down, 
about 2,4 million pills seized, 
55 individuals under investigation 
Source: Own account based on AIFA 2011, Interpol 2009g, Interpol 2010g, Interpol 2008f, Interpol 
2009c, Interpol 2010a, Interpol 2008a, Interpol 2009d, Interpol 2010c, Interpol 2011c 
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Mixed Reactions to the IMPACT 
The International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce was immediately 
welcomed by the transgovernmental ICDRA in 2006 (WHO 2006b). IMPACT was 
also endorsed by the Interpol General Assembly in 2008 along with the decision to 
second an Interpol officer to the WHO headquarters (Interpol 2008g). However, the 
World Health Assembly (WHA) has not given such an explicit endorsement of 
IMPACT. The WCO secretariat used rather general resolutions requesting actions 
against counterfeit medicine as the justification for its activities in the IMPACT (WHO 
2010a). An attempt to get a more explicit endorsement was made at the WHA in 
2008. A resolution from Nigeria received support from several African, European, 
East Asian and North American countries, but was blocked due to opposition from 
several Latin American, South Asian and South East Asian countries. The discussion 
about the proposed IMPACT endorsement coincided with the discussion about the 
“Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual 
Property” (WHO 2008) at the same WHA. The discussion of these two IP-related 
issues may have contributed to a critical attitude of some actors towards the 
IMPACT. It was feared that this PPP on counterfeit medicines could interfere with 
patent policy (Int.17 2010). When no consensus could be reached, the WHO 
Executive Board was asked to solve the issue (Reggi 2008). 
However, the issue was not solved and erupted in a heated debate at the 
WHA in May 2010. The supporters and opponents in 2010 were the same as in 
2008: While many African countries and OECD member countries supported the 
IMPACT, opposition came from Latin American, South Asian and South East Asian 
countries (WHO 2010c). Several of these opposing countries criticized the WHO 
secretariat for hosting this public-private partnership without an explicit mandate from 
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the WHA. The WHO secretary general Margaret Chan defended the secretariat 
saying that it is common practice at the WHO for the secretariat to take specific 
actions on the basis of general requests from the WHA. As an example, she pointed 
to the UNITAID partnership for the purchase of drugs against HIV/AIDS, Malaria and 
Tuberculosis, which the WHO hosts without being asked by the WHA to do so (WHO 
2010c: 14). More specific and vocal criticism directed at the IMPACT came from 
Brazil and India, which accused the WHO secretariat of being unduly influenced by 
big pharmaceutical companies and of protecting private intellectual property instead 
of public health. This accusation and the reaction of the WHO secretariat are 
illustrated by the following quote from the records of the 2010 WHA: 
 
“Ms FARANI AZEVÊDO (Brazil) observed that there were two dimensions to the term 
“counterfeit medicines”,  one  concerning  trade  and  commerce  and  the  other  public  
health. [...] Some Member States had disguised their commercial and economic interests 
under a false public-health perspective. She claimed that certain private companies, with the 
Secretariat’s support, were waging a war against generic medicines. [...] 
The DIRECTOR-GENERAL [MARGARET CHAN] said that she understood clearly 
what Member States were asking of her: WHO should focus on its mandate and address the 
public health aspects of counterfeit medicines. [...] Referring  to  the specific  assertion  made  
by  the  delegate  of  Brazil that  private  companies,  with the  support of WHO, were waging a 
war against generic medicines, she urged Brazil to provide her with the evidence.” 
 Records of the 63rd World Health Assembly (WHO 2010c: 9) 
 
 
Several countries do not have a coherent policy towards the IMPACT. This is most 
obvious with Brazil. While Ms. Farani Azevêdo, a career diplomat, criticized the 
IMPACT heavily, the Brazilian drug regulatory agency ANVISA (Agência Nacional de 
Vigilância Sanitária) supported the IMPACT with their active participation in IMPACT 
meetings (WHO IMPACT 2008b, Int.17 2010) and with their participation in Operation 
Pangea (table 14). ANVISA representatives also participated in the 2006 
International Conference of Drug Regulatory Authorities, which endorsed the 
IMPACT (WHO 2006a). 
 The participants of the 2010 WHA were not able to reach an agreement on the 
role of the WHO within the IMPACT. Therefore they decided to set up an 
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intergovernmental working group without private sector participants to find a solution 
to the issue. This working group was not able to solve the issue until the 2011 WHA 
and a decision is not yet in sight. One option on the table is that Interpol could take 
over the leadership of the IMPACT from the WHO, because Interpol is more 
supportive of the IMPACT than the WHO and the issue is less controversial there 
(Kopp 2010b, Plançon 2010, Int.17 2010). 
Interpol’s role within the WHO IMPACT has significantly increased over the 
years, while the role of the WHO itself has declined. IMPACT started as a WHO led 
partnership in 2006 and the full-time executive secretary was the WHO employee 
Valerio Reggi. Since 2009, the WHO did not dedicate any full-time staff to IMPACT. 
The new executive secretary was Sabine Kopp, who managed IMPACT ad interim 
besides other responsibilities (Kopp 2010b). In August 2010, the ad interim 
secretariat was transferred to the Italian drug regulatory agency Agenzia Italiana del 
Farmaco (AIFA 2011). Since that time, Interpol has invested more resources into the 
IMPACT than the WHO and this makes Interpol a more active player within this PPP 
than the WHO. As a result, the enforcement working group has endured the 
controversy around IMPACT better than any other partnership within the IMPACT 
PPP network. It continues to be active, while the other working groups are more or 
less halted. This is also expressed in the following quote from Interpol’s IP Crime 
Program Manager: 
 
“I don't think it's any secret that the law enforcement side of IMPACT is the strongest and the 
most vibrant and productive. And it's no coincidence that Interpol is in there. […] Our focus is 
transnational organized criminals. That's where we are comfortable. And that's where the 
focus of our activities is. Discussions about the definition of counterfeit and the wider political 
issues is not really our business. It's a matter for the health community and WHO and their 
member countries.”  
John Newton (2009a), Interpol Intellectual Property Crime Program Manager 
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Key Findings about the Development of the WHO PPP 
The WHO’s involvement with intellectual property crime is limited to counterfeit 
medical products and its primary concern is not intellectual property but drug 
regulation and public health. However, in the fight against this specific area of IP 
crime, the WHO has emerged as an important player on the global level. The World 
Health Assembly mandated the WHO to become active in the area of counterfeit 
medicines in 1988 and then reaffirmed this mandate in 1994, the year when the 
TRIPS agreement was signed. After 1994, WHO activity in this issue area peaked 
and this activity also involved cooperation with the pharmaceutical industry. However, 
these activities were project based and no permanent PPP was set up at the time. 
 Since 1994, the International Conference of Drug Regulatory Authorities has 
repeatedly requested the WHO to assist member states with measures against 
counterfeit drugs. In 2004, the ICDRA recommended that the WHO should draft a 
convention against counterfeit drugs. When it became clear that a consensus on 
such a convention could not be reached, the WHO brought together several 
stakeholders from the public and the private sector to pursue other means than a 
convention in the fight against counterfeit medicine. These stakeholders formed the 
first WHO PPP against counterfeit medicine: the International Medical Products Anti-
Counterfeiting Taskforce. This PPP was built on common ground, specifically, on an 
agreed definition of counterfeit medicine and on a shared understanding that there is 
a need to address this problem. Yet this PPP was also built due to the fact that there 
was no consensus about the correct means to address this problem. This partial 
agreement and partial disagreement led the WHO secretariat to set up a PPP with 
several stakeholders that were willing to address the issue. 
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 The IMPACT was set up as a PPP network from the beginning. Several 
working groups were set up as collaborative PPPs within the PPP network in order to 
address the issue of counterfeit medicines from different angles. In addition, the 
enforcement working group started different enforcement operations, each organized 
as a collaborative PPP within the overall PPP network of the IMPACT. The role of the 
private partners within IMPACT is rather low, compared to the Interpol IP Crime 
Action Group or the WCO IPR Strategic Group. This can be seen, for example, from 
the private contribution to the IMPACT funding of only 4%. In addition to this 
unevenly shared funding, the public and private partners also contributed human 
resources and specific information to the PPP. Several public partners also brought 
their legitimacy as a public drug regulatory agency or law enforcement agency to the 
partnership. The WHO itself contributed its reputation and its coordinating function by 
providing secretariat services from 2006 until 2010. 
 The IMPACT PPP significantly changed since 2008. One important factor for 
that change is the management of this PPP. When the WHO brought together the 
IMPACT partners and managed this PPP, it did so based on a rather general 
mandate from the WHA to address the problem of counterfeit medicines. An attempt 
to achieve a more explicit mandate from the WHA failed in 2008. In the same year, 
Interpol seconded an officer to the WHO headquarters and thereby assumed more 
responsibilities in IMPACT. In 2009, the WHO reduced the resources invested into 
hosting the IMPACT secretariat and, in 2010, it fully transferred the secretariat 
services to the Italian drug regulatory agency AIFA as a provisionary measure until a 
decision about the future of IMPACT. With this distancing of the WHO from IMPACT 
and the IMPACT support from Interpol, the enforcement part of this PPP became the 
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most active, while the activities of the rest of the network have been more or less 
halted by the political controversy around the IMPACT. 
 The different policies in the different working groups resulted in different 
degrees of controversy. The mere enforcement of existing laws in the law 
enforcement working group was uncontroversial. The drafting of principles for 
national legislation in the working group on legislative and regulatory infrastructure, 
on the other hand, was the most controversial part of the IMPACT PPP network. 
 Last but not least, the representation of stakeholders in the IMPACT was an 
important factor that led to controversy influencing the development of this PPP. All 
WHO members are listed as partners in this PPP network, but exactly who would 
represent a country was disputed. For example, Brazil was represented by its drug 
regulatory agency ANVISA in several IMPACT meetings and in Operation Pangea. 
However, diplomatic representatives did not consider this adequate representation 
and decided to attack IMPACT as outsiders who were not represented in IMPACT. 
Together with several other diplomatic representatives, they have shifted the 
discussion about the future of the IMPACT from the IMPACT itself to an 
intergovernmental working group which consisted only of diplomatic delegations and 
did neither include drug regulatory agencies nor representatives from the private 
sector. 
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10. Comparison of Cases 
The six case studies in chapters four through nine show some similarities as well as 
some differences. There are specific factors in each case study that explain the 
development of the PPPs in each case. The purpose of this chapter is to identify 
more general patterns that can be observed across many cases. A comparison of 
similarities and differences, in terms of circumstances and results in each case study, 
allows making inferences about the reasons for the creation, and the continuation or 
change of transnational PPPs against IP crimes. 
 This chapter starts with a comparison of the results of each case, whereas 
result refers to the question of whether a PPP has been founded, which type of PPP 
it was, and how it developed over time: whether it was continued or changed. The 
second part of this chapter identifies five factors that have been relevant for the 
development of PPPs in several cases. Those are (1) cooperation in the pursuit of 
resource gains, (2) common ground, (3) the PPP management, (4) the 
representation of stakeholders, and (5) the PPP policy. The final section of this 
chapter is dedicated to the development of generalizable hypotheses about which 
combination of these factors leads to which result in terms of the creation, the choice 
of type, and the continuation or change of transnational PPPs against IP crimes. 
Comparison of PPPs 
If one compares the different PPPs in chapters four to nine with the PPP typology 
developed in chapter two, the most obvious result is that none of these PPPs is of a 
contractual or consulting type. Apparently, all the private sector partners were 
sufficiently interested in the PPP to participate in it without being paid by the public 
partners for their participation. Among the cases examined, the PPP network evolved 
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as the most prevalent type of PPP. Interpol, the WCO, and the WHO use this PPP 
type since 2007. However, while the WHO started directly with a PPP network in 
2006, Interpol and the WCO chose different PPP types at the beginning and then 
changed to a PPP network later (figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Paths of Different PPPs Against IP Crimes 
 
Source: own illustration 
 
 
Interpol started with the Interpol IP Crime Action Group as an advisory PPP in 2002. 
It then gradually evolved into a PPP network consisting of an advisory PPP and 
several collaborative PPPs. The transition phase went from about 2004, when the 
first Operation Jupiter was started, to about 2007, when the collaborative PPPs with 
Underwriters Laboratories and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce showed effects on 
the Interpol IP crime program. Although the Interpol PPP changed over time, it was 
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very durable. From all the cases examined, Interpol has the longest lasting PPP that 
has not been terminated and replaced, which happened twice at the WCO. Interpol 
avoided the political controversies that affected the WCO and the WHO by focusing 
on law enforcement as opposed to law making. 
The World Customs Organization set up its IP Rights Strategic Group as a 
collaborative PPP in 2000. The role of the private sector in this PPP was 
astonishingly high, as major secretariat functions were outsourced to the private 
sector. However, the strong role of the private sector and legislative proposals 
coming from the group has led to controversy. The WCO decided to devote more 
resources in-house to the issue of IP rights and stop the outsourcing, which 
terminated this PPP in 2007. The SECURE working group was set up as a new 
advisory PPP while continuing customs training with several collaborative PPPs. 
Thus, the WCO created a PPP network consisting of one advisory PPP and several 
collaborative PPPs. However, the continuous drafting of legislative proposals in the 
advisory PPP led to controversy. This controversy in combination with discussions 
about the appropriate representation of stakeholders in the PPP resulted in a major 
conflict and, finally, to the termination of this PPP within the PPP network only two 
years later. The secretariat continued the collaborative sub-PPPs and has set up a 
new advisory and a new collaborative PPP within the PPP network since then. 
However, while there were several changes to the PPP at the WCO after 2007, the 
overall PPP type was not changed. It remained a PPP network since 2007. 
 The World Health Organization was also troubled with conflicts about its PPP 
concerning its policy and the representation of stakeholders. The WHO International 
Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce (IMPACT) was set up as a PPP 
network with several collaborative sub-PPPs from the beginning. These sub-PPPs 
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were not only focused on enforcement, but they were also concerned with legislative 
guidelines. However, as a result of the conflicts about this PPP network, many parts 
of it have been halted since 2010. Only the enforcement sub-PPP continues to be 
very active, which is mostly managed by Interpol. In 2008, an Interpol officer was 
transferred to the WHO headquarters to support the IMPACT secretariat. However, 
while the IMPACT secretariat was initially hosted by the WHO, it was transferred to 
the Italian drug regulatory agency AIFA in 2010 as a temporary measure until the 
conflict is resolved. Interpol has become an increasingly strong player within this PPP 
since the beginning of the conflict in 2008, and it has invested more resources in the 
IMPACT than the WHO since the transfer of the IMPACT secretariat to AIFA. These 
changes are a challenge for the leadership role of the WHO in the very PPP it 
founded. However, in spite of these changes, the PPP type remained that of a PPP 
network. 
 As seen in the examples of the WCO, Interpol, and the WHO, the PPP 
network type is very flexible and can accommodate many changes. It is more flexible 
than a unitary PPP of an advisory or collaborative type. This can be seen by the 
earlier experiences of Interpol and the WCO. Interpol had to develop its advisory 
PPP into a PPP network in order to be more flexible and accommodate the different 
ways individual partners want to work with Interpol. The WCO did not even try to 
reform its collaborative PPP as they considered it inappropriate for future challenges. 
They terminated it and replaced it with a more flexible PPP network. 
 However, this study also contains cases of PPPs that were neither founded as 
a PPP network nor developed into one. The World Intellectual Property Organization 
had the first meeting of its Advisory Committee on Enforcement in 2003. It was 
founded as an advisory PPP and remained this type. There were some changes in 
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terms of the membership of the ACE but this could be accommodated without 
changing the type of the PPP. 
 The Global Congress on Combatting Counterfeiting and Piracy was founded 
as a collaborative PPP in 2004 and it also remained this type of PPP. The activities 
of this PPP were limited to the organization of congresses. While the venues of the 
congresses and the participants changed, there was no change to the type of the 
PPP that organized them. 
 This study also includes a case where no PPP has been founded at all: the 
World Trade Organization. Although the WTO is concerned with Intellectual Property 
crime, it never had a mandate nor sufficient discretion to found a PPP against IP 
crime. 
Relevant Factors for PPP Formation, Type, and Development 
When analyzing the development of each case in this study over time and comparing 
them with each other, five major factors can be identified that influence the formation 
of PPPs and their development. (1) cooperation in the pursuit of resource gains, 
(2) common ground, (3) the PPP management, (4) the representation of 
stakeholders, and (5) the PPP policy. 
 
1) Cooperation in the pursuit of resource gains 
In all cases of this study where a PPP was founded (all cases but the WTO), 
cooperation in the pursuit of resource gains was an important factor. Different kinds 
of resources have been pursued, such as human resources, financial resources, 
information, advice, credibility, reputation, legitimacy, and access to further actors. 
The funding of public sector partners by private sector partners is a frequently seen 
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reason for the creation of PPPs, as is explained in the following quote by a 
participant of several PPPs against IP crimes: 
 
“The PPPs are great because in a way the public sector thinks that the private sector has got 
lots of money and therefore anything they want to do can be funded by the private sector. (…) 
But of course the private sector only funds them if they think it is worthwhile." 
  Richard Heath (2010), former Head of Corporate Trade Marks (1997-2006) 
and former Vice President (2006-2010) at Unilever  
 
 
While many members of PPPs pursued absolute resource gains, others also pursued 
relative resource gains, what could also be referred to as competitive advantage. The 
entire idea behind the protection of intellectual property, from an entrepreneurial 
perspective, is to gain and protect a competitive advantage. Hence many private 
sector members of a PPP participate because they pursue such relative resource 
gains. However, this is not only true for private sector participants. Public sector 
members also compete at times with other public sector actors and, therefore, seek 
resource gains relative to that competitor. Whether relative or absolute resource 
gains are pursued, and what kind of resources are pursued, does not only influence 
the creation of a PPP but also which kind of PPP is founded and how it develops. 
This can be seen in each case: 
 Interpol noticed that they had very little information about IP crime when the 
TRIPS agreement was signed in 1994. When they tried to get more information, they 
realized that private sector actors had significant information about the subject. 
Therefore, Interpol started cooperating with the private sector, but no PPP was 
established at first. When the cooperation intensified, Interpol sought a mandate from 
its member states, which it received at the General Assembly in 2000. Based on this 
mandate and the pursuit of information gains, Interpol created an advisory PPP in 
2002. In addition to the information and advice, Interpol also wanted to receive 
material resources from the private sector for their activities against IP crime. 
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However, Interpol did not succeed in transforming the advisory PPP into a 
collaborative PPP where all those resources are pooled. Private sector members 
hesitated to invest financial resources into a PPP as they saw the risk that the funds 
could be used in a way that did not sufficiently benefit them and was possibly even 
more beneficial to their competitors. As a result of this competitive behavior – a 
concern with relative resource gains and losses – they chose to invest in specific 
Interpol projects. Each of these projects was set up as a collaborative PPP. What 
evolved thereby was a PPP network consisting of one advisory and several 
collaborative PPPs. 
 Competition between IOs also prevented a joint Interpol-WCO PPP. It was 
proposed more than once to merge the PPPs of Interpol and the WCO, but this was 
rejected by Interpol and the WCO, most likely because they did not want to lose 
control over the PPP as a tool to get private sector funding (Huther 2010, Int.14 
2010). This preference for several overlapping PPPs instead of one joint PPP is also 
a reason for the development of the PPP network. 
 The WCO started organizing customs training seminars for TRIPS compliant 
IPR enforcement in the late 1990s. The demand for such training seminars increased 
when the transition period for TRIPS implementation expired in several countries. As 
the WCO did not have sufficient capacity to keep up with the demand, they decided 
to intensify the ongoing cooperation with a private sector association by creating a 
collaborative PPP. The private sector partners contributed information, financial 
resources, and human resources. As a result of this PPP, the collaboration in terms 
of human resources was so close that some parts of the WCO against IP crime was 
effectively outsourced to the private sector association. 
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After the necessary resources became available in-house at the WCO, the 
outsourcing was stopped by terminating the PPP and replacing it with a PPP 
network. This new PPP network was more closely controlled by the WCO than its 
partly outsourced predecessor. This remained true also after the architecture of this 
PPP network was changed by the termination of the SECURE Working Group and 
the creation of the CAP Group, the RHC Group and the IPM. The effect of these 
changes was that public sector members increased their control of the WCO 
activities at the expense of private sector influence. 
Such concerns about relative gains influenced the WCO PPP development 
from the beginning. After the WTO was created, there were concerns at the WCO 
that the WCO might be subsumed within the WTO. As a means to improve its 
competitive position, the WCO emphasized activities that are less related to the WTO 
area of activities. This also meant increased activities in the area of border security, 
including border measures against IP crime. It was especially convenient for the 
WCO that it was possible to gain this competitive advantage at almost no cost, 
because the customs training seminars were organized by a PPP which was fully 
funded by the private sector. In 2006, the WCO decided that this low-cost strategy 
was no longer optimal in order to improve the competitive position of the WCO. It 
invested more resources into IPR enforcement activities, hired its first full time staff 
for this area, and terminated the outsourcing of activities one year later. It did so with 
the aim of improving the competitive position of the WCO by becoming a more active 
player in the development of the new Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). 
This strategy eventually failed when the WCO member states did not approve it. 
Nevertheless, the re-organization of the PPPs against IP crime at the WCO in 2007 
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was driven by the pursuit of relative resource gains, even if this aim was not 
achieved. 
 The WIPO was also concerned with its competitive position. When the TRIPS 
Agreement was reached outside of the WIPO, it lost its position as the only global 
organization for intellectual property regulation. In reaction, WIPO negotiated an 
agreement with the WTO, which gave the WIPO a role in the implementation of the 
TRIPS Agreement. In addition, the WIPO started initiatives in areas that were not 
addressed by TRIPS, such as the enforcement of IPRs with regard to the internet 
and digital media. As part of this initiative, the WIPO intensified its contact with the 
private sector in matters of IPR enforcement. The WIPO sought information and 
advice from the private sector and thus founded an advisory PPP. As the WIPO has 
sufficient funding for its activities, it never sought private sector funding and hence 
never attempted to create a collaborative PPP. 
 The Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy was first held in 
2004 and established as a permanent collaborative PPP to host further congresses. 
The costs of organizing the congresses were shared by pooling financial resources 
and by rotating the chair of this PPP. The collaborative PPP type is well suited for 
such an endeavor between public and private partners. 
 The World Trade Organization did not make any attempt to pursue resource 
gains by approaching intellectual property rights holders concerning IPR enforcement 
and there was no such public-private partnership at the WTO. 
 The World Health Organization wanted to bring together several stakeholders 
from the public and the private sector in order to explore how the issue of counterfeit 
medicines could be addressed in a variety of ways other than an intergovernmental 
convention. For that purpose, information and material resources have been pooled. 
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However, as not all stakeholders were able or ready to support every aspect of the 
fight against counterfeit medicines, a PPP network has been set up consisting of 
several smaller collaborative PPPs. This allowed the stakeholders to contribute to 
specific work areas they consider important and have a certain influence on the way 
their resources are used in such a smaller collaborative PPP, but still be part of a 
larger PPP network that brings together many more stakeholders. 
 As can been seen from the different cases, the pursuit of resource gains is 
very important to explain the founding of PPPs, the type of PPP chosen, and their 
development over time. Advisory PPPs are chosen if only information or advice is 
pursued. Collaborative PPPs are chosen if financial or other material resources are 
also pursued. PPP networks are useful if concerns with relative gains result in 
cooperation problems that make it difficult to collaborate in one large unitary PPP. 
However, cooperation in the pursuit of resource gains is necessary but not sufficient 
for PPP creation. Other factors also come into play. 
 
2) Common ground 
The PPPs analyzed in this study emerged over a relatively short period of time. The 
WCO started their PPP in 2000, Interpol in 2002, and the WIPO in 2003. These three 
organizations then started the Global Congress as a joint PPP in 2004. The TRIPS 
Agreement and its implementation was a relevant factor in the PPP development in 
these four cases. It was less relevant for the WHO, which founded their PPP only in 
2006. In the case of the WHO, the definition of counterfeit medicines served as the 
basis for activities against them. This definition was agreed upon at a WHO 
conference in 1992. What the WHO and all the other cases have in common is that 
there was a common ground the different partners could refer to. The TRIPS 
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Agreement served as the written manifestation of this common ground in all cases 
but the WHO. The World Health Organization, together with private sector 
representatives, developed its own definition of counterfeit medicine, which serves as 
the basis for further activities. 
 Interpol began activities against IP crime when the TRIPS Agreement was 
signed in 1994. It then increased those activities in 2000 when the TRIPS Agreement 
became increasingly relevant as the transition period for its implementation ended in 
many countries. The continuing increase in Interpol’s activity against IP crime then 
led to the founding of an advisory PPP, which subsequently evolved into a growing 
PPP network. The TRIPS Agreement provided two reference points that were 
relevant for the development of PPPs against IP crime at Interpol: First, it was the 
first agreement to regulate an international minimum standard for IP rights, which 
served as the basis for their transnational enforcement. And second, the TRIPS 
Agreement requires member states to criminalize trademark counterfeiting and 
copyright piracy on a commercial scale, which served as the basis for public law 
enforcement agencies to get involved in transnational IPR enforcement.  
 The WCO also started its IPR enforcement activities when the TRIPS 
Agreement was signed in 1994. It also significantly increased those activities when 
the TRIPS Agreement became increasingly relevant in 2000. The same year, it 
created its first collaborative PPP for IPR enforcement with the primary purpose to 
assist member states with TRIPS implementation. The fact that the TRIPS 
Agreement was the first agreement to regulate an international minimum standard for 
IP rights was an important aspect in explaining these developments at the WCO. In 
addition, the TRIPS Agreement explicitly requires customs agencies to enforce IPRs 
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at the border and to do so in cooperation with IP rights holders. This also was an 
important basis for the PPP development at the WCO. 
 The WIPO was also affected by the signing of the TRIPS Agreement in 1994, 
as this landmark intellectual property agreement was reached outside the WIPO, 
which previously was the primary global organization for IP matters. In reaction, the 
WIPO reached an agreement with the WTO in 1995, which gave the WIPO a 
mandate to assist developing countries with TRIPS implementation. The minimum 
IPR standard of the TRIPS Agreement and its new enforcement provisions 
concerning criminalization and border measures then served as the basis for new 
IPR enforcement activities by the WIPO after 1995. When the TRIPS agreement 
became increasingly important as a result of the expiring transition periods in several 
countries, the WIPO activities concerning IPR enforcement also increased. A new 
enforcement division within WIPO was created in 2002 and an advisory PPP for this 
division had its first meeting in 2003. 
 After Interpol, the WCO, and the WIPO created their PPPs, they jointly 
launched the Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy as a 
collaborative PPP. The TRIPS Agreement served as a basis also for this PPP by 
defining trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy and by listing some agreed 
elements of combating counterfeiting and piracy, such as criminalization and border 
measures. 
 Interestingly, the WTO itself did not found a PPP against IP crime. Although it 
directly administers the TRIPS Agreement, which served as a basis for several PPPs 
and could also do so for a WTO PPP, it did not lead to the same result in this case. 
This shows that common ground is necessary but not sufficient for PPP creation. 
Other factors are also relevant. 
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 The WHO started their activities against counterfeit medicines in 1988 and 
increased these activities in 1994, when the TRIPS Agreement was signed. 
However, the basis for these activities was not the TRIPS Agreement but a definition 
of counterfeit medicines reached at a WHO conference in 1992. A permanent PPP 
network against counterfeit medicines at the WHO was set up only in 2006. Although 
this is 14 years later, the 1992 definition served as the basis for the PPP in 2006. 
Transnational PPPs in this study involve diverse participating organizations 
from diverse countries. In order to work together as partners, their views on a given 
issue do not necessarily need to be identical, but they need to share some basic 
understanding about a problem to serve as a common ground for the partnership. 
 
3) PPP management 
Based on the PPP definition in chapter 2, one of the defining characteristics of PPPs 
is that they are set up in order to continuously exist over a long period of time. This 
makes it necessary that at least one partner in a PPP provides the day-to-day 
management in the form of a secretariat for the PPP, so it can operate between 
meetings. The regular providers of such management and secretariat services for 
global PPPs, at least in this study, are public international organizations. Exceptions 
were the WCO IPR Strategic Group, where the secretariat was jointly managed by 
the World Customs Organization and the private association SNB-REACT, and the 
WHO IMPACT, where the secretariat was transferred from the World Health 
Organization to the Italian drug regulatory agency as an interim measure during an 
ongoing conflict about the future of this PPP. 
 In any case, there needs to be at least one provider of such management 
services. On the one hand, the members of the PPP need to agree that one 
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organization is the legitimate manager. They can either make this decision explicitly 
in a meeting of the PPP or they can approve the self-proclaimed management of an 
inviting organization by accepting the invitation and join the PPP. On the other hand, 
the PPP managing organization also needs the explicit or implicit approval from its 
regular constituents to perform the management for the PPP. For public international 
organizations, these regular constituents are the member states represented in the 
general assembly of that organization. Their approval is even more crucial than the 
approval of other stakeholders. If only a few stakeholders do not approve the PPP 
management, the PPP can still exist with fewer members. But even a few member 
countries in a general assembly with consensus decision making can end a PPP if 
they do not approve its management by the public international organization. This 
has been shown in the case of the WCO and the WHO. Therefore, the approval of 
the member states – expressed by a mandate or by giving discretion – is crucial for 
the availability of PPP management, which is a necessary factor for the existence of 
the PPP. 
 Interpol is the most successful organization in terms of PPP management in 
this study. Its member states continuously granted Interpol a high degree of 
discretion, which never changed after PPPs were founded or reformed. Interpol also 
received explicit mandates for its activities. The general assembly mandate in 2000 
approved previous discretionary cooperation with the private sector against IP crime 
and it was the basis for the founding of a PPP. Subsequent changes to the PPP were 
made without explicit mandates due to the high degree of discretion. An exception is 
the Interpol participation in WHO IMPACT, which involved sending an Interpol officer 
to the World Health Organization headquarters. This measure was approved by the 
Interpol General Assembly in 2008 with an explicit mandate. 
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 The PPP management of the World Customs Organization was very 
successful at the beginning, but then it came into serious difficulties later. The first 
PPP against IP crime was founded in 2000. It was based on a high degree of 
discretion and a general mandate from 1994, which demands activities for IPR 
enforcement. Even several years after the PPP was founded, the WCO did not seek 
ex-post approval with an explicit mandate from its member states. The member 
states granted the WCO such a high degree of discretion that it was able to manage 
the PPP without an explicit mandate. Only when the WCO wanted to become an 
important player in the development of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, did 
they seek the approval of their member states for their SECURE plans, which also 
involved a change to their relationship with the private sector. When this plan was 
approved in 2007, the WCO terminated the existing PPP and replaced it with a new 
PPP network. However, this mandate for SECURE was later challenged by 
diplomatic delegates of the member states, which resulted in a reduction of the 
discretion granted to the WCO. With this reduced discretion, the WCO was no longer 
able to proceed as planned. In 2009, the WCO member states agreed on another 
explicit mandate, which terminated the SECURE Group, replaced it with the new 
CAP Group, and granted the WCO secretariat only a low amount of discretion. 
  The World Intellectual Property Organization continuously had a very low 
degree of discretion for its PPP management. In 2002, its member states approved 
an explicit mandate establishing an advisory PPP, which first came together in 2003. 
The WIPO did not have enough discretion to create a PPP earlier or to change the 
existing PPP after it was founded. 
 The Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy was first hosted 
by the WCO in 2004, which had a very high degree of discretion at the time. The 
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same year, the decision was made to host several such conferences organized by a 
collaborative PPP whose management rotates among the WCO, Interpol, and the 
WIPO. Every time the management was transferred to a new partner, the parameters 
of the PPP management changed. However, the simple organization of a congress 
was so uncontroversial that every managing organization received the approval of its 
member states. The WCO and Interpol had a high degree of discretion for their 
activities. The WIPO reported their activities to the Advisory Committee on 
Enforcement in 2004 and received approval there. 
 The World Trade Organization has no mandate to manage a PPP against IP 
crime. It also has a very low degree of discretion to re-interpret existing mandates 
and initiate new activities. As a result, the WTO did not manage any PPP for IPR 
enforcement.   
 The World Health Organization ran into troubles with their PPP management 
only two years after they founded their first PPP against counterfeit medicines. The 
WHO did not have an explicit mandate to found this PPP network, but they based it 
on a general mandate demanding activities against counterfeit medicines and the 
common practice at the WHO to engage with the private sector and form PPPs. The 
PPP was endorsed by the International Conference of Drug Regulatory Authorities 
(ICDRA), which, however, has no authority to mandate the WHO. The WHO 
generally has a medium degree of discretion from its member states. However, the 
issue of intellectual property rights enforcement was controversial at the WHO 
because it also involves pharmaceutical patent policy. Due to this controversy, 
resolutions with explicit mandates for the WHO PPP were neither passed by the 
general assembly in 2008 nor in 2010. The controversy also significantly reduced the 
discretion of the WHO secretariat for everything related to this PPP. Based on the 
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ongoing conflict, the lacking explicit mandate, and the reduced discretion, the WHO 
transferred the management of this PPP to the Italian drug regulatory agency in 
2010. 
 It has been shown that the availability of management for a transnational PPP 
is a necessary factor. The managing organization either needs an explicit mandate or 
sufficient discretion to interpret a general mandate as the basis for the PPP 
management. If neither exists, no PPP is founded. If the existing mandate and the 
discretion for the PPP management are challenged, this also jeopardizes the PPP. 
  
4) Representation of stakeholders 
As has been shown in this study, a variety of stakeholders have an interest in IP 
policy. If they are not adequately represented, they may choose to oppose the PPP 
from the outside. However, not every opposition to a PPP is equally important for its 
existence. Opposition is especially effective if it results in a lack of approval for a PPP 
by the member states of an international organization that manages that PPP. This 
has already been mentioned in the previous considerations concerning PPP 
management. Things are further complicated by the fact that states are not always 
uniform actors, but that different agencies of a state can pursue different policies. 
Therefore, it does not only matter if a state is represented, but also which state 
agencies are represented. This is true for the PPP itself, but also for the decision 
making bodies in the public international organizations that mange those PPPs. This 
is explained by the following quote by the Interpol IP Crime Program Manager: 
"In Brazil, for example, the diplomatic level is very anti-patents and that sort of thing. But Brazil 
has always been the strongest country in Operation Jupiter with fantastic support from the 
police and customs there. And I think it's because we are not operating at the political level. 
We are operating at the tactical level. And I think that's why we are able to deliver success. 
Whereas, I think, the constraints for WHO, WIPO, and WCO is that they are very much 
constrained by the political dimensions of their organizations.” 
John Newton (2009a), Interpol Intellectual Property Crime Program Manager 
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Brazil is not the only example of a country with an inconsistent policy towards 
transnational PPPs against IP crimes, but this example is especially striking as 
different representatives of Brazil have pursued very contradictory policies in different 
cases of this study. Interpol received very good support from the Brazilian police and 
the Brazilian customs. Brazil, together with Argentina and Paraguay, was a founding 
member of Operation Jupiter, which started the operational work of Interpol against 
IP crime. The Brazilian customs also participated in training seminars of the WCO 
IPR Strategic Group in 2003 and 2006. And the Brazilian customs delegation 
supported the mandate for the SECURE PPP in the Customs Cooperation Council in 
2007. However, the Brazilian policy at the World Customs Organization changed 
when diplomatic representatives joined the ranks of the delegation. They criticized 
the SECURE group and formed a coalition to oppose it. Under their influence, the 
work of the SECURE group was halted and the group was eventually terminated. 
 At the World Intellectual Property Organization, the Brazilian delegation was a 
leader of the Friends of Development Group and the Development Agenda Group, 
which both have a very critical position concerning IPR enforcement. However, as 
this critical approach towards IP was not new for the WIPO, there was also no new 
influence on its PPP. The Advisory Committee on Enforcement was already rather 
constrained from the beginning.  
 The World Health Organization also experienced the contradictory Brazilian 
policy. The Brazilian drug regulatory agency ANVISA supported the WHO IMPACT 
PPP by participating in different working groups of that PPP network. ANVISA also 
supported the decision to endorse IMPACT at the International Conference of Drug 
Regulatory Authorities. However, the diplomatic representatives at the Brazilian 
mission in Geneva pursued a different policy. They heavily criticized the IMPACT 
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PPP at the WHO and they are a key player in blocking IMPACT endorsing 
resolutions at the World Health Assembly. The opposition resulted in a partial halt of 
the IMPACT activities, the transfer of the PPP management to the Italian drug 
regulatory agency, and it may result in a major change of this PPP. 
 All these examples show that the representation of stakeholders is an 
important factor that influences the development of a PPP once it exists. It matters 
not only if a stakeholder is represented but also how. For example, it matters by 
which agency a state is represented. If certain stakeholders are not adequately 
represented on certain decisions, they may choose to oppose the decision 
afterwards. Such opposition is especially relevant if those opposing stakeholders 
have access to official decision making bodies of the public international organization 
that manages the respective PPP. The degree to which the representation of 
stakeholders is accepted can be considered as the input legitimacy of the PPP. 
 
5) PPP policy 
Another factor that can influence the development of PPPs is the policy of that PPP. 
The degree to which the PPP policy is accepted can be considered as the output 
legitimacy of the PPP. Different policies can lead to more or less political conflict, 
which then can constrain or terminate a PPP. While all PPPs examined in this study 
want to do something against IP crime, they have chosen different policies in pursuit 
of this aim.  
Interpol has presented itself as an expert in avoiding political conflict. It 
focused on activities that support the enforcement of existing rights and stayed away 
from drafting any new legislative proposals or setting new standards. Interpol claims 
to be purely technical and non-political, but its activities have an effect on IP 
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protection through the allocation of resources to IP crime fighting. Conflicts about the 
allocation of resources are avoided as those resources are contributed on a voluntary 
basis from public and private actors. Thus, the PPP makes policies feasible that 
would otherwise be too costly. 
The WCO also began with a focus on the enforcement of existing rights. It 
organized customs training seminars with support by the private sector. The purpose 
of these seminars was to assist with TRIPS implementation. However, the WCO later 
began drafting legislative proposals that went beyond TRIPS and it sought to 
introduce these proposals into the discussion about the new Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement. This has brought the political conflict about IP policy to the WCO. 
As a result of this conflict, the PPP network at the WCO was constrained and the 
discretion of the WCO Secretariat was reduced. 
 The WIPO Advisory Committee on Enforcement was very constrained 
from the beginning. The policy of this PPP has just been to exchange information 
about IPR enforcement. This did not result in further conflicts. The Global Congress 
on Combatting Counterfeiting and Piracy is also rather constrained. Its policy is 
limited to organizing the conference itself with the aim of getting the attention of high 
level policy makers on the issue of counterfeiting and piracy. This has not resulted in 
any major conflict. 
The World Health Organization’s IMPACT PPP pursued a variety of means to 
address the issue of counterfeit medicines. Those means included legislative 
proposals, which led to controversy. The only working group within the IMPACT PPP 
network that continues to be active in spite of the political conflict around IMPACT is 
the enforcement working group. This group, managed by Interpol, focuses on the 
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enforcement of existing rights and stays away from the drafting of new legislative 
proposals or the setting of new standards. 
It can be seen from these developments that the policy of a PPP matters for 
the development of that PPP. Legislative proposals and standard setting have led to 
conflict at the WCO and the WHO. The results of these conflicts were changes to 
these PPPs to stop them from pursuing those policies. Less controversial policies are 
the enforcement of existing laws, the exchange of information, and the organization 
of conferences with the purpose of getting attention for an issue. PPPs that pursued 
such policies avoided political conflicts strong enough to severely harm the PPP. 
Hypotheses about PPP Formation, Type, and Development 
The studies of the six cases in chapters 4 through 9 and the comparison of those 
cases in this chapter has led to the identification of five factors that have been 
relevant for the development of transnational PPPs against IP crime: (1) cooperation 
in the pursuit of resource gains, (2) common ground, (3) the PPP management, (4) 
the representation of stakeholders, and (5) the PPP policy. The final step of this 
study is to identify which combination of these factors leads to which results and the 
formulation of hypotheses that can be generalized and applied to cases that are not 
included in this study. 
 Table 15 shows the combination of these factors and the result in terms of 
PPP formation in all six cases. Common ground was present in all cases. In the 
cases 1 through 5, this common ground was expressed with the TRIPS Agreement. 
In the case of the WHO, it was expressed with the definition of counterfeit medicines. 
As this factor was present in all cases, the comparison alone does not allow 
conclusions. 
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However, the study of each individual case has shown that such a common 
ground was needed as a basis for the PPP formation. The fact that a common 
ground did not lead to a PPP formation in the case of the WTO shows that it is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition. 
 Cooperation in the pursuit of resource gains and the availability of a PPP 
management, based on either an explicit mandate or sufficient discretion to interpret 
a general mandate, was given in all cases but the WTO. The study of each case has 
shown how both factors are necessary for the PPP formation. These case studies 
and their comparison allow the generation of the following hypothesis: 
  The factors (1) cooperation in the pursuit of resource gains, (2) common 
ground, and (3) PPP management are each necessary for the formation of a PPP. 
Together, they are sufficient for the formation of a PPP, if their continuous existence 
is anticipated. 
If a PPP is founded, the type of the PPP is influenced by the pursuit of 
resource gains. Interpol and the WIPO pursued information and advice and founded 
advisory PPPs. The WCO and the Global Congress pursued financial resources and 
human resources and they founded collaborative PPPs. The WHO also pursued 
material resources, but they founded a PPP network as there were cooperation 
problems among the diverse members. Cooperation problems also led to the 
transformation of the advisory PPP at Interpol into a PPP network. Its members were 
not willing to share resources (information and funding) with all other PPP members. 
Cooperation problems also led to the termination of the collaborative PPP at the 
WCO and its replacement with a PPP network (table 16). These case studies and 
their comparison allow the generation of the following hypothesis: 
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An advisory PPP is chosen if the public sector partners seek only information 
or advice and a collaborative PPP is chosen if they also seek financial or other 
material resources. A unitary (advisory or collaborative) PPP is chosen if the planned 
PPP activities do not involve cooperation problems. If, however, the planned 
activities involve cooperation problems, then the more flexible and conflict-resistant 
PPP network is the PPP type of choice. 
Once a PPP is founded, changes to the first three factors as well as to 
additional factors determine how the PPP develops over time. Table 16 shows the 
combination of these factors and the result in terms of PPP continuation or change 
(whereas change means either termination or reform) in five cases. The WTO is 
excluded here, as there was no PPP in this case that could have developed over 
time. In the cases of the WIPO and the Global Congress, the PPPs were continued 
without major changes. The WIPO Advisory Committee on Enforcement remained an 
advisory PPP and the Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy 
remained a collaborative PPP. In both cases, there were no major changes to the 
first three factors, the representation of stakeholders was unchallenged, and the PPP 
policy was limited to uncontroversial activities like information exchange and getting 
the attention of policy makers on the issue.  
Interpol’s PPP was reformed from an advisory PPP to a PPP network, as the 
resources pursued changed from mere advice to include also funding and as 
cooperation problems emerged. After this change, the PPP network at Interpol grew 
and remained stable. There were no more major changes to the first three factors, 
the representation of stakeholders was unchallenged, and the PPP policy was limited 
to law enforcement. 
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The WCO replaced its collaborative PPP with a PPP network in 2007 because 
cooperation problems emerged. An advisory PPP within this PPP network was again 
terminated in 2009 for several reasons: the representation of the stakeholders in the 
PPP was challenged; its policy of drafting legislative proposals led to conflict; and the 
discretion of the PPP management was reduced. 
The PPP network at the WHO ran into similar problems when the 
representation of the stakeholders in the PPP was challenged, its policy of drafting 
legislative proposals led to conflict, and the discretion of the PPP management was 
reduced. Although the WHO did not make an official decision about reform or 
termination of this PPP, its activities are partly halted, the PPP management was 
transferred, and a change to this PPP appears to be very likely. 
These case studies and their comparison allow the generation of the following 
hypotheses: 
A PPP is continued if the factors that led to its formation remain stable, its 
representation of stakeholders is unchallenged, and its policy does not include 
controversial activities such as the drafting of legislative proposals. A PPP is 
changed (reformed or terminated) if there are relevant changes to the factors that led 
to its formation, its representation of stakeholders is challenged, or its policy includes 
controversial activities such as the drafting of legislative proposals. 
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11. Conclusion and Outlook 
This study provides an analysis and a comparison of the public-private partnership 
activities against intellectual property crimes of Interpol, the World Customs 
Organization, the World Intellectual Property Organization, the Global Congress on 
Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy, the World Trade Organization, and the World 
Health Organization. The study delivers several contributions to the state of research, 
which are summarized in the subsequent section of this concluding chapter. The final 
section is dedicated to the weaknesses of this study and some open questions that 
could be the basis for further research. 
Contribution to the State of Research 
The public-private partnerships against intellectual property crimes covered by this 
study were directly involved in the arrests of more than 1800 suspects and the 
seizure of several tons of counterfeit goods. Beyond those PPP-coordinated 
operations, they facilitated transnational public-private law enforcement cooperation 
in many more cases. Although these PPPs have a considerable effect on people’s 
liberty, on their property, and on the nature of international law enforcement 
cooperation, there was no study about them available. This study not only fills this 
research gap, but it provides a comprehensive and systematic survey of all PPPs 
against IP crime that involve global public international organizations. 
Much of the information presented in this study was either not publicly 
available or the information was only available in an unsystematic way scattered 
across several primary documents. Therefore, the empirical description and analysis 
of these PPPs in six case studies is itself a contribution to the state of research on 
this issue. 
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In the course of systematizing the information about the PPPs, a working 
definition of the term PPP was needed. Unfortunately, research about PPPs in 
general has failed to come up with a commonly agreed definition or typology of 
PPPs. Therefore, the PPP definition and typology provided by this study are also a 
contribution to the state of research. 
 Based on the process tracing in each individual case study and on the 
comparison of these cases, this study developed theory explaining the formation, 
type, and development of transnational PPPs against IP crimes. Five relevant 
influencing factors have been identified: 
 
1) Cooperation in the pursuit of resource gains. 
PPPs are used to pursue different kinds of resources, such as human 
resources, financial resources, information, advice, credibility, reputation, 
legitimacy, and access to further actors. Besides the pursuit of absolute 
resource gains, the pursuit of relative resource gains (relative to competitors) 
is also often important. Such competitive behavior can create cooperation 
problems, which are also relevant for PPPs. 
 
2) Common ground. 
In order to come from cooperation to a partnership, the partners need to reach 
an agreement, which requires at least some common ground. This common 
ground may involve but does not require common interest. The partners’ views 
on a given issue do not necessarily need to be identical, but they need to 
share some basic understanding about the issue to be addressed by the PPP. 
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3) The PPP management. 
A defining characteristic of a PPP is that it is set up in order to continuously 
exist over a longer period of time. This makes it necessary that at least one 
partner in a PPP provides the day-to-day management so that the PPP can 
continuously exist between meetings. 
 
4) The representation of stakeholders 
If some stakeholders are not adequately represented in the PPP, they may 
choose to oppose it from the outside. Such opposition is especially relevant if 
the opposing stakeholder has access to decision making bodies of the 
organization that manages the respective PPP. The degree to which the 
representation of stakeholders is accepted can be considered as the input 
legitimacy of the PPP. 
 
5) The PPP policy 
The development of a PPP can be influenced by its policy. The degree to 
which the PPP policy is accepted can be considered as the output legitimacy 
of the PPP. Controversial PPP policies are, especially, the drafting of 
legislative proposals and the setting of standards. Less controversial policies 
are improvements to the enforcement of existing laws, the exchange of 
information, and the organization of conferences and seminars. 
 
Based on these five factors, three hypotheses have been developed from this study, 
which explain the formation, type, and development of transnational PPPs against IP 
crimes: 
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A) Formation 
The factors (1) cooperation in the pursuit of resource gains, (2) common 
ground, and (3) PPP management are each necessary for the formation of a 
PPP. Together they are sufficient for the formation of a PPP, if their 
continuous existence is anticipated. 
 
B) Type 
An advisory PPP is chosen if the public sector partners seek only information 
or advice and a collaborative PPP is chosen if they also seek financial or other 
material resources. A unitary PPP is chosen if the planned PPP activities do 
not involve cooperation problems. If, however, the planned activities involve 
cooperation problems, then the more flexible and conflict-resistant PPP 
network is the PPP type of choice. 
 
C) Development 
A PPP is continued if the factors that led to its formation remain stable, its 
representation of stakeholders is unchallenged, and its policy does not include 
controversial activities such as the drafting of legislative proposals. A PPP is 
changed (reformed or terminated) if there are relevant changes to the factors 
that led to its formation, its representation of stakeholders is challenged, or its 
policy includes controversial activities such as the drafting of legislative 
proposals. 
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Weaknesses, Open Questions, and Outlook to Further Research 
While this study makes several contributions to the state of research, it also has 
some weaknesses and leaves some open questions that could direct further 
research. 
 The most important weakness of this study is the problem of indeterminacy 
associated with the relatively large number of influencing factors and a small number 
of cases (King et al. 1994: 118). Although this study is a comprehensive survey in its 
field, it was not possible to study all possible configurations of the influencing factors, 
as certain configurations do not exist in reality. This weakness was addressed as 
much as possible with process tracing and contrafactual reasoning, but some 
uncertainties remain. For example, in both cases where the representation of 
stakeholders of a PPP was challenged, the policy of this PPP included legislative 
proposals. Therefore, it is not possible to say with absolute certainty if a combination 
of both factors is necessary to trigger a change of the PPP or if one factor is 
sufficient.  
 Another important question is of course whether the theoretical findings of this 
study can be generalized and applied to a wider context: to other transnational law 
enforcement PPPs, to other transnational PPPs, and possibly even to PPPs in 
general. The research for this study has also revealed information about several 
cases that were not the focus of this study. Some of those cases show striking 
similarities to those that are included in this study. The most similar cases are 
probably those where transnational PPPs against IP crimes do not involve a global 
IO. For example, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) 
founded the Intellectual Property Rights Advisory Group (IPR AG) in 1999. This 
collaborative PPP organized trainings mostly in Eastern Europe. The management of 
 
224 Christopher Paun: Globalization of Law Enforcement 
 
this PPP was outsourced by UNECE to a private sector consultancy, which collected 
funding from IPR holders. This outsourcing was stopped in 2006, when UNECE 
decided to terminate the IPR AG and manage its successor, the Team of Specialists 
on Intellectual Property (TOS-IP), in-house (UNECE 2003, UNECE 2006, Baker 
2012, Int.03 2010). These developments appear to be very similar to those at the 
WCO, where the management of the WCO IPR Strategic Group was outsourced to 
SNB-REACT and then brought back in-house. 
 Other examples of transnational, though non-global PPPs against IP crimes 
are the project on counterfeiting and piracy of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), which was started in 2005, and the European 
Observatory on Counterfeiting and Piracy of the European Union (EU), which was 
started in 2009. Both these PPPs’ purpose is getting more accurate information 
about counterfeiting and piracy. At least in the case of the OECD, the pursued 
resources were not limited to information but also included funding. There was a 
debate about this topic at the OECD, where public sector representatives hesitated to 
accept financial support offered by the OECD Business and Industry Advisory 
Committee (BIAC), because they were afraid of undue influence from the private 
sector (Dobson 2010). 
 It would also be worth examining whether the findings of this study hold for 
transnational law enforcement PPPs in other crime areas. Some cases have already 
shown this. For example, Interpol and credit card companies started a collaborative 
PPP against payment card fraud in 1999. Interpol received funding from the credit 
card companies based on a five year PPP agreement. However, this agreement was 
not extended due to cooperation problems (Madsen 2002, Int.06 2010). 
Nevertheless, this PPP also served as an example for Interpol to seek a 
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transformation of the Interpol IP Crime Action Group from an advisory PPP to a 
collaborative PPP. 
Another example of a transnational law enforcement PPP is the partnership 
between Interpol and the international football federation FIFA (Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association). The purpose of this collaborative PPP is the 
fight against corruption in football, match-fixing, and illegal football gambling. Based 
on the partnership agreement signed in 2010, FIFA is supporting Interpol with 20 
million Euro over the period of 10 years. This is the largest grant that Interpol has 
ever received from a private sector organization (Interpol 2011b). This is another 
example of how relevant the pursuit of resource gains is for the formation of PPPs. 
However, it also shows how concerns about undue influence from a private sector 
organization can harm the reputation of a public sector organization, especially as 
the FIFA was involved in several corruption scandals before it decided to influence 
Interpol’s activities against corruption. 
 There are many more transnational law enforcement PPPs worth studying, 
such as PPPs with insurance companies against the theft of insured objects, 
partnerships with shipping companies against smuggling, or PPPs with internet 
service providers against cyber-crime. It would be useful to see if the findings of this 
study are also applicable to those PPPs. The hypotheses about PPP formation and 
PPP development could be tested in other cases of PPPs. However, as none of the 
partnerships analysed for this study fall into the categories of contractual or 
consulting PPPs, the hypothesis about the choice of the PPP type does not include 
these two types. Therefore, it would need adjustments in the light of findings of 
further research. One idea concerning the direction of these adjustments can be 
suggested here: This study identified common ground, understood as a shared 
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understanding about an issue, as a requirement for all PPPs, but advisory or 
collaborative PPPs also require at least some common interest as an incentive to 
invest resources into the PPP without a guaranteed return on investment. In order to 
include contractual and consulting PPPs, the hypothesis about the PPP type may 
have to be adjusted in the following way: 
An advisory PPP is chosen if there is common interest and if only information 
or advice is pursued by the public sector partners. A consulting PPP is chosen if 
there is no common interest and if only information or advice is pursued. A 
collaborative PPP is chosen if there is common interest and financial or other 
material resources are also pursued by the public actors. A contractual PPP is 
chosen if there is no common interest and if financial or other material resources are 
pursued. A unitary (advisory, consulting, collaborative, or contractual) PPP is chosen 
if the planned PPP activities do not involve cooperation problems. If, however, the 
planned activities involve cooperation problems, then the more flexible and conflict-
resistant PPP network is the PPP type of choice (figure 4). 
The original hypothesis about the choice of the PPP type is based on the 
empirical findings of this study, while the adjusted hypothesis above goes beyond 
these empirical findings.  However, this adjusted hypothesis is not purely speculative. 
It is informed by the theoretical considerations presented in chapter 2 and by the 
empirical findings of this study. Therefore, it may be a useful hypothesis for future 
research on PPPs. 
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Figure 4: Choice of PPP Type 
 
Source: own illustration 
 
 
The focus of this study was explaining the creation of transnational PPPs against IP 
crimes, which came at the expense of explaining their effects. However, this study 
did shed some light on several questions related to their effects, but without fully 
answering them. For example, this study has shown the effects of many PPPs in 
terms of trained law enforcement officers, arrested suspects, seized goods, and in 
terms of shops and websites that have been shut down. However, it is very difficult to 
assess the effect of all these activities on the level of IP crime. The level of IP crime 
itself is unknown. Estimates are based on statistics of seizures and assumptions 
about how much of this clandestine activity remains unknown (Bergevin 2011, GAO 
2010, OECD 2008). Assessing the effects of PPPs on an unknown figure, which is 
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influenced by many other factors, is a task that seems impossible. However, it can be 
said that many PPPs against IP crimes address an aspect of IP protection that 
promises to be more effective than others. The largest obstacle to effective 
IP protection is not the law but a lack of law enforcement (OECD 2008: 187). 
Therefore, those PPPs that focus on the enforcement of existing laws rather than 
negotiating new ones are probably a lot more relevant than the much-debated 
initiative to establish an Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). Thus far, the 
ACTA initiative has not led to increased IP protection but to increased opposition 
against IP protection. Meanwhile, the less well known PPPs against IP crimes have 
produced tangible results in terms of arrests and seizures. This study contributes to 
making those relevant activities more visible. 
 Another important question concerns the transnationalization of law 
enforcement through PPPs. The study provided several examples where the PPPs 
have facilitated transnational law enforcement cooperation, but it was not possible to 
provide a comprehensive assessment of the transnationalization of law enforcement 
before and after PPPs. This would have required a detailed analysis of law 
enforcement on the national level. However, the findings of this study suggest that 
PPPs are not a one-way street that leads only to the privatization of public services. 
The requirement of the TRIPS Agreement to criminalize IP infringements is an 
expression of statization of law enforcement in this issue area. The international 
criminalization, which was an important factor leading to the foundation of global 
PPPs against IP crimes, requires public prosecutors and public law enforcement 
agencies to enforce IP rights. Before the TRIPS Agreement, this was often a matter 
of private law only. Therefore, PPPs are not only an expression of public actors 
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moving towards private actors, but also of private actors moving towards public 
actors. 
 How the partners in a PPP influence each other is another important question 
that could be the subject of further research. The question of whether private actors 
have undue influence on public policy as a result of PPPs came up several times 
during this study, but there is probably no definite answer that applies to all PPPs. In 
many cases, a PPP may simply be a way of supporting an agreed public policy with 
resources from stakeholders that benefit most from the execution of that policy. It 
does not appear undue that the direct beneficiaries of intellectual property rights 
voluntarily support their enforcement disproportionally more than the average 
taxpayer. However, the availability of private sector resources may make certain 
public policies feasible that would have been unobtainable if the funding of the policy 
would have been an indispensable aspect of the public policy decision. Therefore, 
some PPPs may be a way of creative lobbying, where private money can be used in 
an official and legal way to support certain public policies. 
Even if the money does not significantly influence the public policy decision, it 
can still harm the reputation of a public institution. For example, if Interpol should 
ever be involved in corruption investigations against FIFA officials, one might wonder 
if the actions taken by Interpol are influenced by the fact that FIFA is its largest 
private sector financier. 
Last but not least, this study has shed some light on the important question: 
What are PPPs good for and what are they not good for? A comparison of the 
successful and failed PPPs in this study suggests that PPPs are especially good at 
mobilizing private sector resources for the support of existing public policies. This is 
especially useful if public actors made a decision for a policy without having allocated 
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adequate resources for its execution. Financial resources as well as information may 
support the execution of the public policies. Giving advice within a PPP that suggests 
a public policy change was also not a problem. However, it was problematic if such 
advice was not only given, but if the PPP acted as a decision making body and 
adopted this advice through legislative proposals. This has resulted in significant 
opposition against PPP activities at the World Customs Organization and at the 
World Health Organization. Apparently, PPPs are not good for making decisions 
about public policies before the appropriate public decision making bodies, even if 
those decisions are non-binding. 
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